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ABSTRACT 
The foundation structures for telecommunications in the 
English-speaking Caribbean were laid during the period of direct 
colonial control of the region by Britain. They formed part of 
the global communications network of a large empire requiring 
quick and efficient links with a remote imperial Centre. In this 
thesis, we argue, however, that the Caribbean component of this 
colonial telecommunications system was designed not just to 
improve imperial political administration of a distant and 
scattered region, but even more directly in support of a 
Nineteenth century drive for increased British private capital 
accumulation in Central and South America. 
We indicate that in the process of penetrating the Caribbean 
territories, the early British multinational telegraph 
conglomerates received the direct financial and technical support 
of their British home government, in a meso-corporatist 
relationship designed to counter both United States and other 
European competition in the region. The company Cable and 
Wireless emerged, both as an end-product of this 
inter-imperialist competition, and as an attempt to rationalize 
the innovation of wireless telegraphy with the more established 
cable network interests. 
Political de-colonization and the growth in the influence of 
the large colonial Dominions led to a fracturing of the symbiotic 
relationship between the private telegraph interests and the 
Imperial state. Nationalization of the industry, which followed, 
eventually led to more autonomous control by the Dominions over 
the telecommunications systems within their national territories. 
This marked the end of the empire-wide remit of the state-owned 
Cable and Wireless. But we argue that monopoly control over the 
telecommunications systems of the smaller, less powerful 
colonies, such as those in the Caribbean, was awarded to the 
diminished Cable and Wireless as a concession for its loss. 
However, despite close to three decades since the start of the 
process of political independence in the region, and early 
attempts by some governments to gain national control through 
equity acquisition, the dominance of Cable and Wireless continues 
to increase. 
In the last decade, the increase in the company's dominance 
has been facilitated by Western multilateral lending agencies, 
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose loan 
conditions and demands for privatization in the sector have 
mediated on the side of the entrenched multinational company, in 
the same way that the British imperial government mediated on its 
behalf during Colonialism. Rapid technology changes, 
telecommunications liberalization in the global centres as well 
as significant weaknesses in Caribbean national and regional 
policy planning have also worked to the advantage of the 
company's renewed policy of increased investment and greater 
control over Caribbean telecommunications decision-making. 
-7- 
INTRODUCTION 
The early foundation structures for both telecommunications 
and mass communications in the English-speaking Caribbean 
were laid during a period of direct colonial control of the 
region by Britain. They formed part of the communications network 
of a global empire, requiring quick and efficient links with 
administrators, plantation owners, shipping and other outlying 
commercial and political interests. Naturally, the centre of this 
global communications infrastructure was London, the political 
headquarters of the imperial power of the day. The main visible 
actor in the extension of the network throughout the empire, 
including into the Caribbean colonies was not the British State, 
as might be expected, but a succession of private companies. 
These firms, however, operated in a close collaborative 
relationship with the state authority, which often provided both 
financial and technical support. In exchange for this support, 
the state often negotiated a role for itself in company policy 
and direction to ensure consistency with government and empire 
objectives. 
Many of the former colonies have become politically 
independent within the last three decades. In this period, 
policy-makers have been confronted with entrenched institutional 
structures which were originally designed to fulfill the economic 
and political objectives of the external colonizing power. The 
decision-makers in many such ex-colonies are only now beginning 
-8- 
to recognize 'that despite political independence, the fate of 
their peoples continue to be bound up with the non-state economic 
and institutional legacies bequeathed by 300 years of British 
rule. 
This study examines the historical basis of the continued 
dominant role being played by one such major ex-colonial 
non-state actor in the monopoly ownership and control of the 
telecommunications resources in the english-speaking Caribbean. 
The telecommunications operator under examination is the 
British multinational corporation (HNC) Cable and Wireless PLC, 
which in 1989 operated a monopoly on the inland and overseas 
telecommunications services in nine Caribbean territories, and 
was a dominant partner in the network ownership of six others. 
We are interested here, in the historical processes which 
resulted in the company acquiring such a dominant position within 
the region, and the factors which are contributing not just to 
its maintenance but to its expansion within the region over the 
last decade. 
To better understand the process, we examine the successive 
early corporate mergers which created the conglomerate now known 
as Cable and Wireless, and the critical relationship between the 
company and its British 'parent' State, including its transition 
into and out of formal public sector ownership. Our study traces 
the early extension of Britain's outwardly radiating colonial 
communications network into the 'West Indies' and the impact of 
de-colonization on the fortunes of the then nationalised company. 
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The later projection of its newly privatised corporate power onto 
the relatively small States in a fragmented and debt-ridden 
post-colonial Caribbean formed the basis of our field research in 
the Caribbean, complementing some of the primary historical data 
gathered. In all this, we note the pervasive influence of the 
company on decision-making in favour of, existing structures and 
conventions in place of renewed regulatory policies and 
re-examined priorities. 
In the historical analysis in PART 1, this study seeks 
to support the proposition that public government, in the form of 
the'British Imperial State was consistently and actively the 
agent for the expansion and growth of private monopoly interests 
to positions of dominance in Caribbean telecommunications. We 
also argue that the structure and policies for telecommunications 
in the modern Caribbean have been determined by this colonial 
dominance. In further advancing this argument, PART 2 supports 
the proposition that the corporate policies of the early Cable 
and Wireless and its antecedent telegraph companies were the 
economic agents of British colonial policy. This policy, while 
permitting the autonomous development of telecommunications in 
the large dominions of the empire, consigned the smaller colonial 
territories to direct British corporate control. This historical 
pattern reflects itself in the continued dependence of Caribbean 
telecommunications on British capital, technology and management 
expertise from the formerly state-owned multinational company, 
Cable and Wireless PLC. 
- 
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In the concluding PART 3, we argue further that where 
attempts were made by certain of the newly independent states of 
the region to gain greater control over their telecommunications 
services, such efforts were eroded-by the demands and policies of 
western multilateral lending agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Declining commodity 
prices gave rise to increased indebtedness and acute foreign 
exchange crises. These events coincided with rapid changes in 
telecommunications technology requiring a major new wave of 
capital investment. In order to meet IMF-imposed foreign exchange 
criteria and qualify for further multilateral loans from the 
World Bank, the governments in the region's major economies were 
pressured into policies of divestment and sale of state-owned 
telecommunications facilities and operating companies to external 
investors. 
We contend that the primary-beneficiary of these policies, 
as with the policies of the British imperial state, was the 
external multinational company Cable and Wireless. Failure of 
regional governments to implement policies of collective 
bargaining and co-ordinated planning has worked to strengthen 
this external control. Finally we argue that the formulation of 
public telecommunications policy is often a secret process 
involving inputs from a close-knit group of bureaucratic, 
political and business elites, and that this approach, common to 
both imperial British and post-colonial Caribbean States, 
inhibits effective policy-making. 
- 
11 
- 
At the heart of our analysis are questions about the nature 
of and limits to corporate power within the modern global 
communications sector [Murdock 1982: 118]. While much of the 
related analyses in the past [Harris, 1977; Murdock and Golding, 
1976; Schiller, 1979; Boyd-Barrett, 1980] have concentrated on 
the exercise of corporate power within the mass communication 
sector, our study seeks to examine the same phenonemon but within 
the telecommunications sphere in an underdeveloped region. 
This approach is informed by the concern that as the advanced 
economies and multinational companies enhance their control over 
communications technologies and resources, there is a real danger 
that the underdeveloped countries of the global South will be 
forced into new forms of communication poverty. Studies 
concerning the gross inequalities in international news flow and 
in programme content from the North to the South now require 
re-examination to take into account the renewed capacity of 
telecommunications technologies to contribute to a widening of 
the communications gap both within Third World countries and 
regions, and between the industrialised world and the 
underdeveloped economies. 
While telecommunications multinationals, such as Cable and 
Wireless, expand into new areas to satisfy the needs of their 
large corporate clients locally and abroad, the basic 
telecommunications infrastructure in households and rural areas 
in the Caribbean get increasingly less attention. Average 
penetration of basic telephone in the largest English-speaking 
- 
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Caribbean territory, Jamaica, for example, stood at just 4 lines 
per 100 of population in 1989, compared with over 60 lines per 
100 in the United Kingdom, where Cable and Wireless is based, and 
with 86 lines per 100 of population in the neighbouring United 
States. The trend indicated by these and other statistics 
presented, would suggest that the successive innovations in 
telecommunications technology have not yet had any significant 
impact on a majority of the region's urban households, and even 
much less so among remote rural populations in both the 
Caribbean, and interestingly, in the United Kingdom as well. 
This tendency is consistent with the structuralist arguments 
of theorists such as Johan Galtung [1981: 81-94], Samir Amin 
[1990: 75-90], and Dos Santos [1970: 231] 
, 
who argue that there 
are gross disparities in distribution of global wealth and power 
between Centre and Periphery nations. Galtung, for example, 
argues further that within each nation are also 'centres' of 
development, and 'peripheries' of underdevelopment, consistent 
with the structure of the international order. In our conceptual 
framework in Chapter 1, we isolate and discuss these and other 
theoretical issues which are important in explaining the 
nature of imperialism and underdevelopment and their implications 
for our area of study. 
Conceptually, we rely on a synthesis of the theories 
of imperialism, dependency, micro-corporatism and self-reliance. 
We argue that Caribbean telecommunications development has been 
conditioned by historical and structural factors which imposed 
- 
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severe limits on policy options during the colonial era and the 
first decade of independence. In this protracted era, the 
colonial telecommunications network, as with the peripheral 
economies as a whole, was operated to the prescriptions and 
benefit of the Centre. In this relationship, the imperial state 
performed a largely directive, corporatist role over the private 
companies which were empowered and often resourced to implement 
and profit from such policies. The early Cable and Wireless, 
which was an amalgamation of these smaller firms, was a direct 
inheritor of this policy of micro-corporatism, later even 
becoming directly state-owned. 
We argue that these historical conditions, directly serving 
the interest of the colonial Centre, remained largely unchanged 
in the smaller, newly independent Caribbean states, where the 
policies were mediated by privately-owned multinational 
corporations, mainly the modern Cable and Wireless (West Indies) 
Limited. However, in the larger independent regional territories, 
where post-independence changes in ownership were introduced, the 
dominance of the ex-colonial Centre was re-asserted in the 1980s 
as a result of three principal related factors. 
These included the rapid technological changes in the sector, 
which over-extended the financial and technical capacity of the 
region, in the context of existing conditions. Secondly 
the interventionist role of the western multilateral agencies, 
namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
mediated on the side of the industrialised western economies. 
- 
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These agencies ensured policies of divestment and sale of state 
telecommunications holdings which in practice, were acquired by 
investors from the industrialised countries, such as the United 
Kingdom-based Cable and Wireless with both the necessary 
financial resources and an entrenched dominant position in the 
region's telecommunications sector. The third factor was the 
internal weaknesses in policy-formulation and co-ordination, 
which together with secrecy in decision-making, limited the 
extent of regional joint bargaining and public participation 
towards Caribbean-oriented policy planning. 
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
To what extent was this situation of re-inforced external 
dominance attributable to the failings of indigenous state and 
private sector interests in the region? In considering these 
issues, it is necessary to clarify here our understanding of the 
policy and decision-making processes, in light of the current 
debate. 
According to Herbert Simon, the process leading up to the 
making of a policy decision involves the identification of goals. 
Simon emphasises that the stage of setting clear objectives is 
fundamental in giving purpose to administrative behaviour. The 
policy process itself is concerned with the selection from among 
a range of alternatives the course of action best suited towards 
achieving the stated goals. [1945 : 5]. However, according to Rist 
[1985 : 32], goal identification, like 'policy style', can be 
- 
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fraught with difficulties derived from the sectorization of 
policy-making', in which "each policy area develops into a 
semi-watertight compartment, ruled by its own 'policy elite"'. 
This is the preliminary scenario faced in policy-making at the 
national level in Caribbean telecommunications, where separate 
'policy elites' were in operation, presiding over departmental 
'policy networks' or discrete 'policy communities' for domestic 
and for overseas services [Brown 1984: 9]. At the regional level, 
the policy framework is further complicated by the existence in 
each territory of its own group of national operating companies. 
Difficult as the intra-regional fragmentation appears to be, 
however, the more fundamental difference, is between such 
regionally-based policy communities on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the foreign multinational policy network represented by 
Cable and Wireless. While policy goals of these communities can 
converge within the framework of the existing Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) structure, the profit maximization imperative of the 
multinational corporation, can create a bifurcation of objectives 
when counterposed to local or regional policy goals such as 
'universal service'. In such circumstances where both values and 
major objectives are likely to differ, the difficulty is 
determining whose values and objectives are to be used in the 
decision-making process [Simon 1945 : 76]. Similar conflicts arise 
in the second phase of policy-making identified by Simon. Where 
goals have somehow been determined, the process of agenda-setting 
requires an identification of the available rational options and 
the selection of alternatives "which are conducive to the 
- 
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achievement of... previously selected goals. " [1945: 5]. 
The decision-making process described in these terms by 
Herbert Simon are founded on the concept of rationality, in which 
options and consequences are comprehensively evaluated before 
action or implementation takes place. Policy-making in the 
Caribbean telecommunications sector, where it exists at all, is 
far removed from this paradigm, which 'many theorists argue is 
unrealistic. According to Charles Lindblom, the rational 
approach, while prescriptive of an ideal course of action, fails 
to describe the process of organizational decision-making in 
practice. Lindblom [1964: 157] postulates instead, 
" 
that 
decision-making proceeds through successive limited comparisons, 
in which both facts and values, as well as the means and 
consequences are considered on a more limited scale, 
simultaneously. 
Lindblom discussed the approach in terms of focussing 
on what is immediately wrong: 'remediality', rather than what 
might be right in the future: 'seriality'. "Policy-making is 
typically a never ending process of successive steps in which 
continual nibbling is a substitute for a good bite. " Policy 
planning is projected, not on a second review, but "on a third or 
fourth of an endless series. " [Lindblom 1965: 25]. This system 
of disjointed incrementalism, he argues, is better adapted to the 
diversity of situations in which policy problems may arise, 
because it takes more into account human deficiencies, inadequacy 
of information, cost limitation in the policy process, and other 
- 
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constraining factors. 
This approach, also described as 'muddling through', allows 
for mid-stream correction of errors since changes 
-of existing 
policies are minimal at each stage. Like Dror, however, we view 
the incrementalist approach as insufficiently pro-active in 
radically altering entrenched policies which have developed 
extensive loyalties and support systems over the years. In the 
Caribbean, where Cable and Wireless and its British colonial 
benefactors have been the dominant policy actors for over a 
hundred years, incremental changes alone would be ineffectual in 
the re-ordering of both objectives and priorities for policy 
implementation in the post colonial era. 
According to Dror, incrementalism favours conservatism and 
the status quo by skillfully acting "as an ideological 
re-inforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces. " 
[1964: 153]. While it could be a satisfactory strategy in 
circumstances of broad concensus and policy continuity, where 
such conditions do not prevail and where a society is seeking to 
bring about significant social changes, then incrementalism, 
according to Dror, will not be appropriate [Ham and Hill 1984: 
85]. 
Dror, like Etzioni [1967: 385-389] and Simon [1945: 19], 
seeks an alternative approach between the idealistic demands of 
comprehensive rationality and the other extreme of ill-considered 
and often futile spontaneity in policy formulation. Dror suggests 
- 
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a combination of rational and extra-rational methods, including 
group brain-storming sessions 
-as well as creative and novel 
approaches based on judgement. Simon's later adjustment in favour 
of 'bounded rationality' or 'satisficing' goes some way in 
acknowledging the practical limitations of comprehensive 
rationality. It no longer seeks to maximize all possible values, 
but only those regarded by the policy-maker as satisfactory for 
attaining the policy objectives. 
However, this approach, although an improvement on 
comprehensive rationality, is regarded as nonetheless, still 
quite demanding of the policy-process. Instead, Etzioni favours 
the breakdown of decisions into categories of fundamental 
decisions and incremental decisions. [1967: 387]. In Etzioni's 
model of 'mixed scanning', fundamental decisions would determine 
overall policy directions, while less critical judgements could 
be made or adjusted during implementation. It offers scope for 
radical changes in direction and fundemantal objectives, while 
permitting some flexibility in implementation. 
Etzioni's approach appears to provide a more useful and 
adaptable approach to decision-making in the Caribbean 
telecommunications policy environment. It would permit, for 
example, the determination of fundamental telecommunications 
policy and regulation to take place at a regional level, while 
allowing scope for modifications and incremental changes to take 
account of circumstances at national or operating company level, 
as well as during implementation. However, the mixed scanning 
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approach of- Etzioni is not in itself unproblematic. Regional 
fragmentation among agencies could limit the scope for, such 
two-tiered decision-making unless a well-structured co-ordinating 
institution is established. While this would appear to create a 
financial strain in already over-extended national budgets, the 
savings from ill-considered and narrow national decision-making 
could substantially compensate. Another difficulty with Etzioni's 
'mixed scanning' is that the distinction between fundamental and 
other decisions is not always self-evident and could be 
controversial. Consequently, we would endorse the views of Ham 
and Hill that it would "seem important to specify criteria for 
distinguishing the two types of decisions. " [Ham and Hill 1984: 
87]. 
The significance of addressing the mechanisms for regional 
decision-making and policy formulation arises because existing 
piece-meal approaches are proving unsuccessful as a response to 
the well co-ordinated approach by the dominant external 
corporation, Cable and Wireless. While the 'muddling through' 
method may seem less expensive, it creates, in the long run, an 
inadequate overall perspective, which is required for long term 
bargaining and technology planning with external interests. 
Incremental changes, in these circumstances, may not always be 
appropriate to redress a century-old consolidation process by 
existing structures. 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
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In examining Cable and Wireless as a modern multinational 
company operating in this policy environment, we need the benefit 
of a multi-disciplinary approach. Our theoretical discussions 
have therefore drawn on the disciplines of economics, political 
science, history and -sociology to help in defining some of the 
questions not susceptible to single-discipline treatment. 
Economic analysis is required, for example, in discussing the 
role of MNCs in the global economy. But because the company was 
for over half a century a State monopoly enterprise, we also 
require the benefit of both political science and business 
history disciplines to understand its interaction with the State 
and the effect of this relationship on early telecommunications 
in the smaller colonies such as those of the Caribbean. 
This interdisciplinary approach is advocated by Thomas Dye, 
who relates it to the concept of 'policy analysis'. Dye notes 
that the use of concepts from a wide range of disciplines 
, 
contributes a wider breadth of experience to the- process of 
analysis, and to the tackling, of social problems. He regards 
this interdisciplinary approach as capable of assisting public 
policy-makers to "improve the quality of public policy"[1976: 
108], and is one of the characteristics which distinguish Policy 
Analysis from the related but narrower field of political 
science. 
According to Harold Lasswell [1951], an -early exponent of 
Policy Analysis, the approach involves the development of 
knowledge about the policy process itself, and the improvement of 
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information available to policy-makers. This process, according 
to Lasswell aims at examining "the fundamental problem of man in 
society" [1951: 8], and "the realization of human dignity in 
theory and in fact" [1951: 15]. These processes, as Christopher 
Hill and Michael Ham [1984: 5] point out, involve both a 
descriptive and a prescriptive role for policy analysis. Put even 
more succinctly, it covers both analysis OF policy and analysis 
FOR policy [Gordon, Lewis, Young 1977 in Ham and Hill, 1984: 4]. 
While the preponderant emphasis of this study is on the 
analytical and descriptive aspects of the social issues under 
examination, our reference to 'role' implies a concern with the 
consequences of the extant order and an interest in alternative 
institutions and strategies. As a result, in the later stages of 
this study we offer a brief discussion on some elements of an 
alternative strategy. 
In defining Policy Analysis, Dye moreso than Lasswell 
identifies it with the decision-making of State authorities. 
"Policy Analysis is finding out what governments do, why they do 
it and what difference it makes" [Dye 1976: 1]. While this 
emphasis by Dye on state decision-making accords well with the 
traditionally strong role played by the State in policy-making, 
some contributors to the more recent theoretical debate on the 
state have begun to call into question its centrality to the 
resolution of-major social problems which have their root in 
international and transnational structures. In the current era of 
acceleration of globalization processes, it is argued, national 
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decision-making and sovereignty are becoming less fundamental. We 
take up this debate on interdependency in the context of a 
discussion on the state presented in the initial chapter. 
It is hoped that this study will contribute, particularly 
from the historical data, to a more comprehensive understanding 
of the early policy-making processes which have resulted in the 
present configuration of Caribbean telecommunications structures, 
institutions and policies. Our attempts to examine in some detail 
the background, growth and current scope, of the penetration by 
Cable and Wireless into the region's economic life, aims at 
helping to clarify the ways in which current decisions about 
regional telecommunications are taken and how these implied 
policies are translated into action. 
A legitimate question in this context is why focus our 
analysis on the role of a single non-state actor within the 
region. The informed assessment of a Caribbean-based German 
communications specialist, Kristian Knaack, provides a concise 
response: "If we talk about telecommunications technologies and 
and policies in the Caribbean, we talk Cable and Wireless. " 
Reference has already been made to the overwhelming dominance of 
the company in the ownership and control of both the overseas and 
domestic networks in the region. "On the whole", remarks Knaack 
"Cable and Wireless has a monopoly in the Caribbean" in 
circumstances where the company's interest, as a profit-oriented 
corporation, is not identical with the development goals of 
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Caribbean planners [Kristian Knaack in 'Trincom 89' Report, 
1989: 39-40]. 
Our policy analysis, therefore, appropriately places the 
focus on this major policy actor in its interaction with the 
regional and British 'states. In the context of a synthesis of 
existing theories, we aim to enhance our knowledge of the 
corporate issues impinging on the policy process itself. By also 
examining the Caribbean telecommunications policy environment 
both historically and in contemporary terms, our study seeks to 
raise important issues concerning the relationships between the 
state, society and the international corporate community in the 
sphere of telecommunications. Among the issues which we hope will 
be posed by this study are the questions of whose policies are 
formulated under the present regime, how these policies emerged, 
and in whose interest are they translated into action. 
While the geographical context of this research study is 
the Caribbean, and much of the analysis relies on data from 
this region, many of the conclusions are not atypical of the 
general situation facing other under-developed ex-colonial 
societies in the so called Third World. The case of the 
English-speaking Caribbean may well be closely analagous to the 
situation in other underdeveloped regions which were similarly 
dominated by a single telecommunications multinational company or 
which fell within the sphere of influence of the former British 
colonial empire. 
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As with most research into corporate activities and state 
policies, the analysis is constrained by access to the relevant 
data. In the case of Cable and Wireless, we have benefitted from 
their co-operation in the supply of mainly officially published 
historical, financial and policy statements. Additional and 
sometimes more penetrating accounts have come from interviews and 
examination of public records, both in the United Kingdom and in 
the Caribbean. A more detailed account of these sources is 
provided. 
ORGANIZATION OF SECTIONS 
Having discussed in the foregoing introductory section the 
nature of the research problem, and our approach to tackling it, 
we now set out the manner in which the material is organised- in 
the study. 
In PART 1, consisting of Chapters 1 to 3, we examine the 
imperialist state and its role in Caribbean telecommunications 
and economic underdevelopment. PART 2, comprising Chapters 4 
to 7, looks at the activities of Cable and Wireless and its 
antecedent private companies, in creating the colonial 
communications network of which the Caribbean formed a part. It 
links into the previous section by examining the dynamic 
interaction between the corporate profit motive and the political 
objectives of the sponsoring parent state. The concluding PART 3, 
embracing Chapters 8 and 9, is dedicated to an examination of 
both state and corporate influences on telecommunications in the 
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modern Caribbean, and an analysis of the strategies- employed to 
achieve control. 
While there is some historical progression to the study, we 
reject a chronological approach to chapter structure in favour of 
relevant themes being drawn from the historical or other data, 
and discussed in relation to the specific topic of our 
investigation. 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
Chapter 1 introduces some of the core issues of our study 
with a theoretical discussion of Imperialism, the State and 
Under-development. Marxist and non-marxist perspectives of 
imperialism are brought to bear on the role of the British 
imperial state in promoting the commercial exploitation of its 
colonial empire in the nineteenth century. A micro-corporatist 
approach is held as a powerful contributor to the capacity of 
the then existing private enterprise to penetrate and retain 
markets within the colonial empire. This entrenched control forms 
the basis of the situation of structural dependency existing in 
ex-colonial peripheries such as the Caribbean. But while this is 
regarded as a very important factor in molding the character of 
current regional communications policies and structures, the 
significance of internal political factors is'-also highlighted. 
The theoretical problems and issues raised in the previous 
chapter are immediately followed up in Chapter 2, which presents 
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a socio-political overview of the Caribbean Region as the context 
in which the policy analysis is located. The issues of external 
control and internal political fragmentation arise as central 
factors in our analysis of the social and economic problems 
facing the region. The rise in external debt has implications for 
the resources which can be allocated to telecommunications in the 
harsh fiscal environment of under-development. One result is 
greater dependence on both multilateral lending agencies and 
foreign direct investment which, acting together with the 
industrialised countries, give rise to questions of renewed 
imperialism. These issues are explored in their international and 
regional contexts. 
In Chapter 3, we present and discuss the research data on 
the penetration of British colonial telecommunications 
infra-structure into the Caribbean region, and the subsequent 
role of Cable and Wireless itself in the refinement of these 
so-called "Tentacles of Progress" [Headrick: 1988] based on the 
political requirements of the British state. The particular 
importance of this chapter to our study is the foundation it 
establishes for our subsequent conclusion that the configuration 
of the region's modern telecommunication system conforms in large 
measure to the infrastructure of dependency laid down in the 
Caribbean colonies of the nineteenth century. 
The next chapter marks the start of PART 2 dealing with 
the historical development of Cable and Wireless and its dual 
role as an agent both of its own economic aims and of the 
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political objectives of its parent state. To begin with, Chapter 
4 consists of a literature review and analysis of the role of 
multinationals both in communications and in the wider global 
economy. Here we argue that the foreign and economic policies of 
industrialised countries, collectively expressed through 
multilateral lending agencies such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), often provide additional advantages to MNCs. IMF 
demands for government divestment and privatization of 
telecommunications systems in the underdeveloped south, for 
example are likely to operate in the interest of large external 
carriers such as Cable and Wireless, which are frequently the 
only entities with the necessary resources to acquire the 
nationalised firms and industries. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 we present and discuss historical data 
on the early development of private cable telegraph firms, the 
emergence of wireless as a competitor to cable and the eventual 
merger of these enterprises into the multinational corporation we 
now know as Cable and Wireless. The early resistance of both the 
British state and the cable conglomerates to competition whether 
in technological terms from Marconi's wireless, or from the route 
diversity schemes of the Pacific Cable Board, reflect the 
difficulty of shifting established alliances in the interest of 
new innovations and decentralised control. Demands for increased 
self-government by the larger colonies contributed to the pace. of 
change. But in the process, the less powerful colonies such as 
Hong Kong and those in the Caribbean, became the complimentary 
prize for a company stripped of its home base and of its larger 
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client states in the first wave of British decolonization. 
Chapter 7 concludes PART 2 with a presentation of data 
profiling the Modern Cable and Wireless in the decade following 
privatization in 1981. Unfettered from the pursuit of the 
explicit political goals of its former owners in government, the 
company's new global strategies resulted in dramatic expansion 
and an unbroken record of profitability. But, as we point out, 
its growth continues to be built on the foundations of over a 
century of patronage from the British imperial state and from the 
policies of western funding agencies. 
The rise of Cable and Wireless PLC as a new corporate giant 
coincided with the post-colonial economic decline and 
indebtedness of many partner governments in the Caribbean and 
elsewhere. In Chapter B. the start of PART 3, we begin with 
an analysis of the role of Telecommunications in National 
Development. While telecommunications is not regarded as a 
panacea to structurally rooted socio-economic problems of the 
region, greater resource allocation, policy planning and 
regulatory reforms are seen as essential to fulfill its 
developmental potential. Counterposed to this analysis is an 
overview of the renewed profit-generating infrastructure of Cable 
and Wireless in the region. We document and evaluate this 
reinforced dominance. Our examination of both the national and 
regional responses again suggest weaknesses in policy-making 
structures, the absence of regulatory reform and of adequate 
collective approaches to technology transfer, negotiations and 
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service delivery. 
Chapter 9 provides a concluding analysis, bringing together 
some of 'the contemporary policy implications of the historical 
process outlined in the study. We relate these assessments to the 
theoretical issues raised earlier, including consideration of the 
disparity in the flow of benefits from the existing order. Issues 
of sovereignty, interdependence and future regional co-operation 
are also discussed. 
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PART 1 
IMPERIALISM AND EARLY CARIBBEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
IMPERIALISM, THE STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, we explore some of the analytical concepts 
which can assist in an understanding of the role of the British 
imperial state in the expansion of the colonial telegraph 
network. It is this early network of private firms which merged 
and later became the multinational corporation known today as 
Cable and Wireless. In this process of expansion and corporate 
consolidation, the British imperial government also performed a 
key function. We argue that under historical conditions of"mature 
capitalism,, the-role of the British state was transformed from 
one which was supportive of the process of capital accumulation 
to one of directing that process (Cawson 1985: 6]. In the area of 
telecommunications inýthe early nineteenth century,,, the British 
government's intermediation of the diverse interests of a range 
of telegraph companies became, by the closing decades of that 
century, a relationship of corporatist control of a large scale 
powerful multinational conglomerate. 
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The corporatist relationship between the multinational 
company and the British state reflected itself abroad in the 
form of imperialism and cartelization. In this scenario, the 
state exerted control over the policy direction of its major 
conglomerates, which in turn supported the political and military 
objectives of the government. We counterpose this powerful 
joint external dominance by the state and conglomerate with the 
divided and exploited circumstances of the colonial territories 
into which they had expanded both politically and economically. 
The ideas of structuralists from the dependency school as well as 
other theorists such as Johan Galtung, are employed to explain 
these global relationships of a dominant centre and a 
corresponding underdeveloped periphery. These theorists also 
provide the basis to understand the correspondence of interest 
between the developed urban centres and the relatively 
underdeveloped rural sectors in both the industrialised and 
'Third World' economies. 
The ideas of-the dependency school are regarded, however, as 
inadequate to explain the processes and relationships within the 
periphery itself. A synthesis is therefore explored between the 
global framework of the dependentistas and the explanations of 
internal dynamics provided both by the marxist school and by 
neo-realists such as Stephen Krasner. A resolution of the 
development dilemma of these dependent economies is addressed in 
a discussion of the concept of collective self-reliance. 
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Discussed in their broader policy implications, these 
ideas are also applied to the structure of the relationship 
between the the telecommunications networks of many small 
underdeveloped territories, such as those in the Caribbean, and 
the large privately owned carriers, epitomised by the Cable and 
Wireless monopoly in the Caribbean region. 
1.1 
- 
THEORIES OF THE STATE 
In beginning this overall discussion, we take as our first 
point of departure an analysis of some of the leading theories of 
the state as they relate to the Caribbean and Britain through 
important transitions in their relationships. 
1.1.1 
- 
The Marxist Model 
"In any analysis of imperialism, the actions of capitalist 
states must play an important role. " [Brewer 1980: 14]. According 
to Brewer, the ideas of Marx on the subject, though not regarded 
as 'holy writ', have proved very fruitful. In the Marxist model 
of the capitalist state, power is derived from the ownership of 
economic resources. In their well known declaration in the 
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels regarded "the executive of 
the modern state", as "but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. " [Marx 1977: 223]. The Marxist 
perspective flowing from this idea, argues that the role of the 
state under capitalism is to facilitate the process of capital 
accumulation and profit generation by a dominant economic class. 
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In this approach, the wealthy 'ruling class' acts to 
preserve the broad framework of the existing social order, using 
its economic power, ideology and organization to control the 
parliamentary, bureaucratic, military, communications and other 
personnel within the different branches of the state apparatus. 
Lenin, advancing the ideas of Marx, argued that the capitalist 
state functioned not only as the domestic tool of finance capital 
and monopolies, but also as the advance guard for the global 
expansion of capitalism. Writing in the spring of 1916, Lenin 
observed: "The latest period of capitalism shows us that definite 
relations are being established among capitalist groups, 
relations based on the economic partition of the world; whilst 
parallel with this fact and in connection with it, definite 
relations are being established between political groups, between 
States, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of 
the struggle for colonies, of the 'struggle for economic 
territory'. "[Lenin 1917: 86] 
These observations of Lenin find direct reflections in the 
activities of Cable and Wireless and and the British government 
in the wider Latin American region during the first half of the 
20th century. A secret report, commissioned by the British Board 
of Trade in 1944, entitled 'A Survey of International Cartels' 
reveals the undeclared but supportive role of the British 
imperial state in what it called 'private international 
industrial agreements'. The report estimated that in the 
manufacturing sector alone, products covered by international 
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cartel arrangements represented some 34% of total British 
manufacturing output in 1938 [Board of Trade Survey, 1944: XX111], 
Cartelization activity in the telecommunications industry 
was discussed in some detail in the report: "In October, 1921, 
the four great telegraph companies of the world, Marconi's 
Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd of London, the Gesellshaft fuer 
Drahtlose Telegraphic of Berlin, Compagnie Generale de 
Telegraphie sans Fil of Paris and RCA of New York entered into an 
agreement to eliminate competition between their 
telecommunication interests in Argentine, Brazil and Chile. Under 
the agreement, each company appointed two trustees (and the U. S. 
company a third to act as chairman) to whom the companies 
transferred the interests in the South American countries. 
fur Drahtlose Telegraphie, G. m. b. h., and as a result of mergers, 
Cable and Wireless Ltd. has become substituted for Marconi's 
for all the purposes of the agreement. The Trustees for Cable and 
Wireless (in which HMG {Her Majesty's Government} hold shares), 
are Lord Inverforth and Sir Edward Wilshaw. " [Board of Trade 
Survey, 1944: 49]. 
The document indicates conclusively not only the existence 
within the global telecommunications sector of the cartelization 
process of which Lenin spoke, but also the active involvement of 
European and American capitalist governments in the establishment 
as well as the maintenance of such agreements. As the following 
further extract shows, the joint state/company role in the cartel 
arrangements was not just to secure market share against 
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international new-comers to the sector. Using the explanation of 
the exigencies of wartime, the continued state role was also 
directed against the emergence of any internal competition within 
the target countries or independent choice of investment partner: 
"On the 21st of January, 1940, the TIE Department (Trading with 
the Enemy Department} authorised the British Trustees to continue 
the old arrangement 'so far as practicable and desirable' on 
condition that all communications relating thereto were submitted 
to the Department for prior approval. There was a danger that, if 
this was not done, the Germans would enter into independent 
arrangements with the South American Governments, and co-operate 
in setting up 'national' companies which would squeeze out those 
controlled by the trustees. The 
... 
F. O. {Foreign Office} 
concurred in the licence, and the U. S. Government have apparently 
permitted the American company to continue on the same basis. " 
[Board of Trade Survey, 1944: 49]. 
In a perceptive evaluation of these global activities of 
imperialism, Lenin commented: "We see plainly here how private 
monopolies and State monopolies are bound-up together in the age 
of finance capital, both being only differing stages in the 
imperialist struggle between the largest monopolists for the 
division of the world. " [Lenin 1917: 82]. If the wider interest 
of British capitalism was to be promoted in Latin America, the 
British state would have to compete successfully with the 
expanding influence of German and American capitalism. To ensure 
this, Britain, as well as the other states, felt the need to 
support the establishment and later direct the operation of 
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capitalist cartels within the telecommunications sector. 
In emphasising the 'essentially capitalist role fulfilled by 
the state', Samir Amin notes that it is not only dominated, but 
also motivated by the ideology of capitalism. He argues that the 
capitalist state slavishly imitates the organizational, 
administrative and educational forms of capitalism. When imbued 
with a high degree of consciousness, "it seeks to incorporate 
into the reality the criteria of capitalist rationality 
(efficiency, productivity, profitability). "[Amin 1990: 167]. 
This characterization of the behaviour of the capitalist 
state refers most relevantly to the institutions of government in 
developed capitalist economies such as in Britain. But if the 
state in this context is an imitation of capitalist values and 
practices, then the state in the largely un-reconstructed 
colonial peripheries such as much of the Caribbean could also be 
seen aA predominantly patterned and motivated by capitalist 
ideology. This is because, taking the example of Jamaica, "the 
institutions, structures and legal practices of the Jamaican 
system 
- 
as indeed of the other British Caribbean countries 
- 
are 
theoretically based on patterns and forms transplanted from Great 
Britain in the form of the Westminster-Whitehall heritage. " 
[Jones and Mills 1989: 106]. 
In such a situation, according to Amin, "it is then 
possible to understand why, when the real social base of this 
capitalist power is weak (or non-existent), the capitalist power 
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is unsure whom it is serving or should serve. In these 
circumstances it can slide under the prongs of compradorization, 
turning the local state into an extension of the dominant 
worldwide capitalist power. " [1990: 168]. This, we argue here, is 
the process underway within the Caribbean, mediated by the 
financial lending agencies of the capitalist west. 
In his variant on the Marxist state model, Miliband maintains 
that far from being a neutral agent, as claimed by pluralism, the 
state is a tool of the wealthy corporations and powerful economic 
classes operating within society [1969: 14-15 ]. However, in the 
case of Caribbean societies, the significant corporations and 
powerful economic classes operating within the economy were 
externally based multinationals and their governmental 
representatives within the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. 
Referring to the case of Jamaica, the largest economy in the 
English-speaking Caribbean, Thomas notes that foreign ownership 
of major sectors of the economy was extensive: "mining 100 per 
cent; manufacturing 75 per cent; financial services 66 per cent; 
transport 66 per cent; communications, storage, services all 
exceed 50 per cent and sugar 40 per cent. The Jamaican 
bourgeoisie, already small in numbers, was linked together by 
family ties 
- 
with their associated dynastic traits. As a class, 
however, in economic terms, they were subordinate to North 
American and British capital. " [Thomas 1989: 291]. 
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While allowing that the state may exercise some autonomy 
from these dominant economic class interests, Miliband advances 
three reasons for his class characterization of the state. The 
dominant economic class, the bourgeoisie, usually shares the same 
class background as the leaders of the state bureaucracy, 
military, judiciary and other institutions. Secondly, he argues 
that this ruling economic class is able to consistently influence 
the state through its organizations and personal contacts. 
Thirdly, Miliband contends that the very survival of the state 
under capitalism is objectively dependent upon the economic base 
and support created by the bourgeoisie [1969: 49-55]. Although 
later revising this position to place more emphasis on the 
state's selective autonomy from the bourgeoisie [1977: 73-74], he 
maintains that the state remains a principal agent for the 
continued dominance-of the wealthy classes. 
Poulantzas contributes to the debate on this model the view 
that the dominating influence of the bourgeoisie on the state is 
not a uniform and monolithic class input. He argues that this is 
because the bourgeoisie is not a uniform and monolithic class but 
one which contains within it a varied range of sub-interests and 
groups. These internal variations within the dominant class 
enable the state "to intervene against the long term economic 
interest of one or other fraction of the dominant class.. " 
[Poulantzas 1973: 285]. 
The implication of this view (and that of Miliband) is that 
over time, the state may act in the interest of foreign capital, 
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or in the interest of the local capitalists "depending on the 
concrete conjuncture" [Poulantzas 1973: 285]. In this scenario, 
we would argue that the reality within small under-developed 
countries is that the dominant interest would usually, though not 
always, be the large externally-based corporations. Both their 
relative economic strength compared to that of even the state 
itself, and the influence, of their home governments and 
associated multilateral benefactors such as the IMF, ensure a 
positive response by the local state to a foreign corporate 
agenda. 
In emphasising the influential, often decisive role of a 
capitalist ruling class on the decision-making and policies of 
the state, marxist theory also underlines the absence or gross 
under-representation in state policy-making, of the interest of 
the working or unemployed mass of the population. Applied to the 
conditions in the global south, the implication of this analysis 
is a class structure, at the top of which is the powerful foreign 
capitalists, supported by some elements of the local 
beourgeoisie, with the working class and unemployed masses at the 
very bottom. And the relative influence on the state's day to day 
policy-making would occur in that order of priority. Amin, 
however, does not regard this foreign dominance of the state as 
insurmountable. "Under popular and national pressure, it could 
also try to refuse this surrender and seek rather to build an 
autonomous state, bourgeois, in that it is founded on the 
ideology of capitalist rationality, but without the real 
bourgeois social support that transmits the rationality. " [Amin 
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1990: 168]. 
Interpretations of the prescriptive implications of 
the Marxist model vary widely. However, at its most elementary, 
it involves a radical re-structuring of the ownership of the 
economic resources, and hence the values and 'super-structure' of 
the society, including the state. Amin sees 'a central role for 
the state in the conduct of 'development' in the developed and 
underdeveloped capitalist countries. He acknowledges such an 
approach as a "rejection of the 'anti-state' ideological 
propositions, of conservative liberalism, " which "are running 
the wind in the West. "[Amin 1990; 168-169. ] 
Synopsis 
An important strength of the analysis offered by-Marxism is 
its explicit identification of an economic motive as the primary 
basis for the collaboration between the capitalist state and the 
associated multinational companies. The capture of overseas 
markets and raw materials is represented as the central objective 
underlying the politico-military conquest of colonies. It reveals 
the involvement of capitalist governments in a competition for 
territorial control as part of the inter-capitalist struggle for 
markets which took the form of cartels in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries. We have shown the involvement of both Cable and 
Wireless and the British government in this process, which would 
appear to support the marxist analysis that the capitalist state 
acts primarily in support and defence of the dominant capitalist 
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class, or the fraction within it which happens to be in the 
ascendency. 
In line with Samir Amin, however, we argue that within the 
ex-colonial capitalist economies, such as those in the Caribbean, 
the influence of the local capitalist class on the state is 
subordinate to that of foreign capital, whose entry into the 
economies of the former colonies has been a primary function of 
the imperial state. The entry of multinational companies such as 
Cable and Wireless was initially facilitated through the 
intermediation of Britain, the colonizing power. However, in the 
post-colonial period, the consolidation of such external 
multinational companies has depended more on the indirect support- 
of capitalist multilateral lending agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, than 
through the direct intervention of their home governments. 
1.1.2 
- 
Pluralism and Interdependence 
While Marxist conceptions of the state have been concerned 
with 'ruling class' control of the economic infrastructure, 
the pluralist approach has offered notions of a more diverse 
influence on the state. Early exponents of pluralism, such as 
Schumpeter, associate the functions of the state with promoting 
democracy, which he regarded as "that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people's vote" [Schumpeter 1947: 269]. 
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This emphasis on electoral competition forms part of a 
pluralist assumption of popular participation, which is often 
more imagined than real. Commenting on the perceived democracy 
which-forms much of the basis of modern pluralism, Parenti [1983] 
notes that "elections and political party competitions" are not 
the sure tests of democracy as they are often portrayed to be. 
"Some two party or multi-party systems are so thoroughly 
controlled by like minded elites that they discourage broad 
participation and offer policies that serve establishment 
interests no matter who is elected. " [Parenti: 1983: 59]. 
In more recent times, other pluralists have argued that state 
power in a western capitalist society is distributed among a wide 
range of competing groups. Each group is capable of influencing 
the decision-making carried out in state institutions. A broad 
spread of influences are brought to bear on public policy-making 
because different interests are active around different issues. 
The leading modern exponent of this view, Robert Dahl, [1961] 
argues that in this mix, government agencies are one set of 
pressure groups among the rest, -and that as such government both 
pursues its own interest and responds to demands coming from 
outside of it. Still other perspectives on pluralism see the 
state as an independent arbiter, defending the 'public interest' 
against undue influence by any single sector or class in 
society [Truman 1951: 508, Birch 1964: 236]. 
The interdependency school within pluralism constitutes 
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an increasingly important perspective. Keohane and Nye [1981: 
121-129] visualize a pluralist approach to international 
relations in which multiple sectors interact with each other 
across national borders. Issues of political sovereignty and 
national defence, in this approach, are subordinated to economic 
factors. Priority is placed on global economic progress, 
particularly through the instrumentality of non-state actors such 
as multinational corporations. Transborder economic development 
is regarded as dependent more on the free international 
interaction of such non-state actors than on the pursuit of 
national policies and regulatory controls. 
One radical exponent of this view sees a very dim future 
for the nation state: 
"the fundamental problem of the future is the conflict 
between the political forces of nationalism and the 
economic forces pressing for world integration. This 
conflict currently appears as one between the national 
government and the international corporation, in which 
the balance of power at least superficially appears to 
lie on the side of the national government. But in the 
longer run, economic factors are likely to predominate 
over political... " [Johnson 1981: 400] 
This approach to inter-dependence, described by Vernon 
[1971: 112] as the 'sovereignty-at-bay' model, counterposes 
national policy-making to global trans-governmental policies, the 
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motive force of which is the multinational corporation. Under 
this model, development is achieved through the goodwill of 
dominant multinationals, voluntary capital investment and 
technological transfers to underdeveloped countries, and through 
rigorous free trade. Interdependence can even imply the end of 
nationality and national governments, and, as Johnson puts it, 
the ultimate emergence of "a world federal government... as the 
only rational method for coping with the world's economic 
problems. " [Johnson 1981: 400] 
The interpretation placed on this theory determines how 
useful it can be for the process of communications policy 
analysis. At its most generic, interdependence appears to address 
the pluralist goal of mutual co-operation among countries of all 
types towards the peaceful, even if not smooth, functioning of 
the international system. In communications terms, this approach 
would take advantage of the liberal tradition of international 
dialogue for solving such problematic issues as trans-border data 
and information flows, shared use of the electro-magnetic 
spectrum and allocation of geo-synchronous orbital positions. It 
recognises and seeks to redress, within the system, the dominant 
role of multi-national corporations in the marketing of 
telecommunications services and equipment and in the distribution 
of news and media programmes. This conception of inderdependency 
operates within the framework of international institutions whose 
memberships are based on nation-states exercising in principle, 
the right to self-determination and equality. 
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On the other hand, Johnson's more extreme approach to 
interdependency implies an abandonment of national sovereignty, 
regulation and policy planning in favour of the free flow of 
capital and services. It envisages an involuntary surrender to 
foreign capital and global influences: the position earlier 
rejected by Amin (1990: 168]. Such an approach to interdependence 
legitimises the role of the technologically more advanced 
countries and their multinationals as natural leaders in a world 
where the so-called tide of economic growth will lift all boats. 
It also ignores the role of internal factors such as class, 
indigenous creativity and national culture. 
In defending a more responsive approach to interdependence, 
Hamelink argues that while there will always remain scope for 
activities within the interstate arena', more account needs to 
be taken of the numerous non-state actors that had become 
essential forces in international politics. ' His conception of 
these forces go beyond multinational corporations and the 
economic realm, to include worldwide voluntary non-governmental 
and social organizations. In reviewing the strategies which 
could be employed in the struggle for a New World Information 
Order in the 1990s, Hamelink rejects as counterproductive, the 
whole-scale reliance which he feels was placed on the 
state-centric model, during the previous two decades: 
"A critical problem with the concept of national 
sovereignty as a central category to the 1970s debate 
is the fact that it is firmly rooted in the 'realist' 
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paradigm of international relations. It conceives the 
world as a state-centric system, and in extending 
nation-state based power politics to the inter-state 
arena, aspires to the maintenance of the status-quo, or 
maximally to system reform rather than to fundamental 
transformation of world society. The 1970s debate on a 
new international information 'order was seriously 
impaired by its exclusive reliance on this 
state-centric paradigm. This incapacitated the debate 
to search for solutions to cross-border communication 
problems that transcended the existing system and to 
take serious account of the numerous non-state actors 
that had become essential forces in international 
politics. " [Hamelink 1990: 1-2] 
Hamelink is here searching for an adequate interdependency 
framework capable of counter-balancing the dominant global role 
of the private capitalist corporations and institutions. He 
correctly recognises that the nation-state had failed to fulfill 
this function in a global environment where "basic issues of 
international communication have to be analysed against the 
background of social processes that are most adequately described 
as 'globalization' processes". 
An important problem which an uncritical globalist approach 
encounters is its seeming neglect of the internal national 
issues, a weakness it shares with dependency. In an attempt to 
correct this significant deficiency, Hamelink urges a recognition 
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that "the outwardly sovereign state tends to appropriate also 
sovereign control-over its citizens. " This, he maintains, "is the 
characteristically Hobbesian vision in which only the absolute 
sovereignty of the state (the leviathan) can control the eternal 
civil strife. " To address this, Hamelink suggests that state 
sovereignty ought to be regarded as "more than the emancipation 
from the powers of emperors, popes and nobility. The development 
of legitimate sovereign states went together with the development 
of egalitarianism in which subjects became citizens. " [Hamelink 
1990: 2] 
Nonetheless, it has to be recognised that currently it is 
the state which is the most important INDIGENOUS actor in the 
determination of policy in telecommunications in most Third World 
societies. In the Caribbean, where non-state actors are mainly 
professional organizations and trade groups, it is still the 
state to which the society traditionally looks for the 
formulation of policy and the protection of the interest of 
citizens. The diverse, participatory democracy envisaged by 
pluralism, is, in the Caribbean context, confined to periodic 
elections, in which policy areas such as telecommunications are 
rarely central-issues. 
Synopsis 
The linkage between the state and the promotion of electoral 
democracy, which characterised early forms of pluralism, has 
understandably encountered severe criticism, resulting in some 
- 
48 
- 
modifications. A competition for votes between sometimes similar 
political elites twice in each decade does not appear to 
constitute an effective influence on policy-making or state 
actions. Rather, it could serve as a device for maintaining the 
status quo by creating the illusion of democracy, as Parenti 
points out in his analysis of the United States [1983: 216]. At 
the level of many small under-developed societies, while the 
degree of popular electoral participation is often higher than in 
the United States, a lack of effective popular involvement in the 
periods between elections is another important deficiency in the 
process of public policy formulation [Bishop'1983: 138]. 
More recent interpretations of pluralism have sought to 
describe a more responsive and diverse pluralist process 
involving multiple group and sectoral influences on state 
decision-making. But in the context of the Caribbean 
telecommunications sector, interest group representation 
advocated by the democratic pluralist school remains weak. 
The state though itself weak and subordinate to the demands of 
foreign capital, continues to be regarded as the leading local 
source as well as the prime regulator of policy on 
telecommunications issues. 
We isolate for special attention in our analysis the 
interdependency strand within pluralist thought. The more 
extreme elements envisage a global market-in which the state and 
national policy-planning cease to be important factors, with 
multinational corporations and other capitalist non-state 
-actors 
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dominating decision-making. In evaluating the appropriateness of 
this brand of interdependence, the inescapable question is: in 
whose interest would such an approach operate? For it to be 
useful as a tool of policy analysis for underdeveloped countries, 
the extreme exponents of interdependency would also need, to take 
more into account the stark differences in economic strength, 
size and historical factors among countries. The presumption of a 
harmony of interest underlying the theory appears to beý more in 
favour- of the dominant states and their non-state actors who 
find it convenient to assert the identity of their interests with 
those of the community as a whole. Such an approach would involve 
severe implications for small, vulnerable societies such as those 
in the Caribbean region, whose interests and policy goals were 
fundamentally different from those of the multinational 
corporations. 
At the same time, the existence of these powerful private 
non-state actors, particularly in the field of telecommunications 
cannot be ignored. And Hamelink's concern to extend analysis 
beyond the nation-state is well founded. From the available data 
discussed in this study, Cable and Wireless as a non-state actor 
is a more influential force in the determination of Caribbean 
telecommunications policy than the individual governments or 
state bureaucracies. But is this the result of an inevitable and 
inexorable globalization process, or the subjective failing of 
national and regional policy planning? According to Krasner, 
this weakness is more likely to be the result of both internal 
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and external factors [Krasner 1985: 3]. 
1.1.3 
- 
Elite Theory 
Whereas pluralism is premised on the dispersal of power in 
society, the elitist model regards power as being concentrated in 
the hands of specially privileged groups or elites. Following the 
conceptual schemes of Mosca and Pareto, Bottomore identified the 
basic notions common to elite theory: "in every society, there is 
and must be, a minority which rules over the rest of society; 
this minority, the 'political class' or 'governing elite', 
composed of those who occupy the posts of political command and, 
more vaguely, those who can directly influence political 
decisions 
- 
undergoes changes in its membership over a period of 
time... 
. 
"[Bottomore 1966: 12). 
Bottomore distinguishes within the political class, a 
smaller group: the political elite, which consists of "those 
individuals who actually exercise power in society at any given 
time". These would constitute cabinet and high government 
officials, senior bureaucratic and military leaders and 
influential business or aristocratic families. The wider 
political class includes this group, ' but also technical, 
professional, intellectual and business elites across a range of 
national sectors, as well as a possible counter-elite, 
"comprising the leaders of political parties which are out of 
office, and representatives of new social interests or classes" 
[1966: 14). 
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The concept of political elites was developed and 
elaborated to counter the ideas of class enunciated by Marxism, 
and to a lesser extent in criticism of the majority rule dictum 
of modern pluralist democracy. The inclusion of the notion of the 
circulation of elites contested Marx's concept of a stable and 
exclusive ruling class. Bottomore points out that the determinism 
for which the classical elite theorists criticised Marxism is no 
less evident in their own view that all societies consist of 
elites and non-elites [1966: 18]. Both marxism anmd elite theory 
describe the existence in various societies of dominant groups, 
setting the political agenda and determining policy. While both 
concepts are useful, the fundamental distinction for us is that 
which is based on control of the economic resources. While elites 
may exist in many professional, bureaucratic or other policy 
sectors, they are often responding to the central, agenda-setting 
power of social class, based on the control of decisive economic 
resources. 
Max Weber saw the process of bureaucratization as a 
necessary corollary to the expansion and increased complexity of 
public government in modern industrial society [1947: 328]. The 
creation of administrative and bureaucratic institutions by the 
state engenders specialists in many areas of public 
policy-making. The power implicit in administering large 
bureaucratic organizations, could in some circumstances result in 
the effective control of decision-making by the bureaucratic 
power elites in top administrative positions. However, while such 
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institutional positions are often-very important sources of 
elitist power, it would appear that economic class position 
functions as the overall force to which these elites most readily 
respond in the small, newly independent countries, such as those 
in the Caribbean region. 
In the telecommunications policy environment of the region, 
the dominant power source is technical expertise and investment 
capital, both of- which often reside in the same external 
investing multinational company or funding agency. Commenting on 
the process of telecommunications policy formulation in the 
region, Jones noted that "within the Caribbean interest group 
universe, the people with the command over the technicity, those 
with the technical skills in the communications field and who 
advise government, are themselves very important agents of change 
and policy determination. "[Jones 1984: 13]. And Stone points out 
that apart from the senior political leaders and their key local 
advisors, the most dominant influences on public policy 
formulation in Jamaica in the 1980s were the main international 
financial and aid agencies and big business. [Stone 1989: 38]. We 
believe that the situation thus described in Jamaica is not far 
removed from the scenario in the wider Caribbean. ' 
Synopsis 
Elite theory appears to, suitably describe much of the 
process of policy formulation in many Caribbean territories, such 
as in Jamaica, Barbados and several of the even smaller Eastern 
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Caribbean countries. The elites involved in this process are not 
just locally based technocrats, but more influentially, the 
expatriate advisors who are part of technical agreements or 
management contracts signed between governments and multinational 
corporations of multilateral lending agencies. Limited technical 
knowledge at a wider societal level which is linked to severe 
limitation of educational opportunities and technical training 
means that these elite policy actors are not constrained or 
counter-balanced by diverse pressure groups, as envisaged by 
democratic pluralism. 
In his study of small developing states, Gayle contrasts the 
limitations faced by these states with the scope of their larger 
counterparts: "larger polities tend to have greater state 
capabilities, so that citisens (sic) can be offered participation 
in a far wider range of relevant and vital decisions. " [1986: 3]. 
Whether these capabilities are utilised in many larger states is 
still open to question. But in the micro-states of the Caribbean, 
for example, as yet un-developed pressure group structures and 
weakness in public information systems, contribute to limiting 
the effective, public participation in such issues as alternative 
technologies, corporate monopoly and investment decisions to 
bureaucratic and corporate business elites. 
The elitist method of decision-making appears more open to 
influence, if not manipulation by powerful sectoral interests 
than an approach involving public debate and alternative policy 
proposals. In the region, the situation is exacerbated by acute 
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political fragmentation, which enabled private interests such as 
Cable and Wireless to pursue a single corporate strategy in 
negotiation with elites from the various nation states, each 
pursuing what is perceived as its own particular national or 
elite interest. 
1.1.4 
- 
Corporatism 
Corporatism, according to Wyn Grant, is "a process of 
interest intermediation which involves the negotiation of policy 
between state agencies and interest organizations arising from 
the division of labour in society". The policy agreements which 
result from this-process of negotiation, "are implemented through 
the collaboration of the interest organizations and their 
willingness and ability to secure the compliance of their 
members. "[Grant 1985: 1]. Developed during the period after the 
First World War, theories of corporatism attempt to explain the 
reciprocal relationship between government, the corporate sector 
of large scale, mostly multinational corporations, and the trade 
union movement. The period was marked by growing economic 
depression and an increasingly interventionist role by 
governments into economic activities. 
Cawson argues that among the consequences of this increased 
state activity was a growing emphasis on economic regulation and 
social planning. One response to this was "the emergence of 
functional interest associations aiming to influence and mediate 
state activity in various sectors. " Cawson notes that in the 
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economic field, "the most influential of these were the cartels 
through which manufacturers protected themselves against the 
harmful features of oligopolistic competition. "[Cawson 1978: 191] 
The bargaining relationship between the state and these 
interest organizations arose because, according to Cawson, 
"governments have had to adjust to the existence of centres of 
power outside the state" [1978: 179]. He notes that "the 
crucial transformation occurs when interest groups change from 
being private protective associations, and move towards the 
establishment of regular and mutually supportive relationships 
with government. "[Cawson 1978: 191) 
"The corporatist thesis" argue Ham and Hill, "is that the 
state has moved from a position of supporting the process of 
capital accumulation to directing that process. In making that 
shift, new patterns of relationships have developed between the 
state and the major economic interest groups, and the state, 
although constrained by these interests, has autonomy deriving 
from its command of legal, organizational and other resources. 
Such autonomy enables the state to act in the interest of 
capital, labour and other interests as appropriate. "[Ham and Hill 
1984: 41]. This interpretation, seemingly close to the pluralist 
conception of multiple and equal group influence on the state, is 
regarded as different from pluralism in that corporatist 
decisions "reflect the outcome of a bargaining process between 
corporate interests, which implies the assumption that each party 
is able independently to exercise some form of sanction. Power is 
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thus neither pluralistically dispersed, nor concentrated, but 
polycentric within an overall hierarchy. "[Cawson and Saunders 
1983: 16] 
As with other conceptions of the state, there are many 
variants on the corporatist theory. Schmitter's well-known 
definition emphasises the representational monopoly which the 
state accords to interest organizations willing to function 
within a corporatist relationship. Corporatism, in his view is: 
"a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number 
of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) 
by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their selection of 
leaders and articulation of demands and supports. " 
[Schmitter 1974: 93-94] 
Schmitter describes two types of corporatism: state and 
societal. State corporatism in his perception, would proceed more 
in an authoritarian and anti-liberal, even fascist manner. 
Societal corporatism, although also involving a strong and 
interventionist state, is less aggressive in style, seeking, by 
the use of rewards, pressures and bargaining, to negotiate with 
non-state associations towards their incorporation into 
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state-determined objectives. Schmi- 
accords with the macro-corporatist 
who disaggregates the concept 
meso-corporatism operating at 
micro-corporatism functioning at the 
1985: 10-12]. 
Synopsis 
tter's societal corporatism. 
approach described by Grant, 
further to refer to 
the industry level and 
level of the firm [Cawson 
The role of the capitalist state is neither even-handed in 
class terms nor passive. Corporatism provides a very useful 
analytical tool to describe the active pursuit by the state of 
the interest of the corporate sector and the reciprocal response 
of big business in carrying out certain agreed objectives'of the 
state. The process of negotiation which characterises societal 
corporatism, underlines the convergence of objectives which can 
exist between the state and multinational conglomerates. 
The category of meso or industry-level corporatism accords 
well with the early conduct of the British imperial state and 
that of the privately owned pioneering British telegraph and 
cable companies in the last half of the Nineteenth century. In 
promoting their development and expansion, the state was able in 
return to secure implementation by the companies of the regime's 
empire-building objectives. The subsequent consolidation of the 
entire British overseas telecommunications industry into the 
single Cable and Wireless group, transformed meso-corporatism 
into a micro-corporatist relationship between the state and a 
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single firm. Though falling outside of the era after the Second 
World War, when corporatism became more widely recognised, the 
inter-penetration of state and corporate interests in the 
telegraph sector conforms significantly to the descriptive and 
analytical features of corporatism. 
Eventually, the merged Cable and Wireless Limited, became 
incorporated into the formal British state bureaucracy after the 
Second World War. The take-over took place under a 'British labour 
government willing to fulfill trade union demands for 
nationalization in exchange for their post-war co-operation. It 
is the concept of micro-corporatism, therefore, which offers the 
most useful frame of reference for our subsequent consideration 
of the role of the British government in its historical 
relationship with Cable and Wireless. 
1.1.5 
- 
Theories of the State: Evaluation 
In examining the emergence of Caribbean telecommunications 
systems, we regard inter-state relationships at the national, 
regional and global levels as providing important political 
contexts within which the leading non-state actor, Cable and 
Wireless operates. But equally significant has been the 
relationship between Cable and Wireless itself, as a 
multinational corporation and the British imperial government. 
Initially this state/company relationship took the form of a 
symbiosis between the firm's corporate power and the central 
state authority, in a period which marked the zenith of Britain's 
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imperial power and the rise of capitalism as the dominant 
ideology in Europe and the Americas. 
In more recent times the company also had to operate in 
conditions where the great majority of its partnerships were with 
politically independent states. In the Caribbean, 'for example, 
the process of political de-colonization meant that Cable and 
Wireless had to adjust to an attendant increase in the number 
of regional governments. Company-state relationships have not 
been confined, therefore, to the interaction with its powerful 
home-government and prime benefactor. The company itself has 
undergone change, switching from a state-owned enterprise to a 
private corporation in the last decade. This development in 
itself has been the source of some concern among 
newly-independent agricultural micro-states confronted in an 
unequal negotiating relationship with a global, techno-dominant 
corporate monopoly. 
This review of approaches to the state, then, has allowed 
us to examine the various models which may be applicable to 
policy decision-making in the many contexts within which we 
encounter state power in this study. Like Cawson and Saunders 
[1981] and Stone [1983], we see no need to adopt any single one 
of these theories across the range of contexts in which we may 
consider the state and political influences on it. "Instead of 
making a choice between mutually exclusive theories, the task of 
the analyst is to use them as guides to discover the multiple 
channels that link private interests with the state. " [Stone 
- 
60 
- 
1983: 208]. 
On this basis, the indications from our analysis would 
suggest that the concept of corporatism is the approach 
which best characterised the relationship between the British 
government and the cable industry from its founding until its 
nationalization in 1945. This relationship has had certain 
important implications for the pattern of development of the 
company and its contact with the Caribbean. Similarly, a combined 
application of the related elitist and Marxist theories of the 
state appear to be the best framework within which to interpret 
the conduct of Caribbean states in their historical association 
with the Cable and Wireless, as well as in their conduct of 
internal policy-making. The pluralist political model is viewed 
as less useful given the weak status of interest group 
representation in the sector and the negligible impact of the 
electoral process on telecommunications policy-making. 
Before the states in the Caribbean attained, in principle, 
an independent political role in policy-making, their societies 
were overtly dominated by the centrifugal forces of imperial rule 
from London. Our presentation later of some of the historical 
research data will highlight the vital role which was then 
perceived for improved telecommunications in the control of a far 
flung colonial empire. We will also discuss the circumstances 
under which the early development of the telegraph technology and 
its expansion throughout the empire, were not directly undertaken 
by the British state but by private companies with varying 
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degrees of state sponsorship. 
The extent to which Cable and Wireless continued in this 
corporatist relationship with the British government will also be 
considered in some detail later. But the many advantages to the 
company of active imperial state support are likely to have 
weighed heavily in creating and sustaining the entrenched 
monopoly control enjoyed by- Cable and Wireless in the modern 
Caribbean. The role then, of the state during early capitalism as 
well as in the modern era of imperialism can be of considerable 
significance in understanding the wider context of the company's 
emergence and of the basis of early telegraph expansion into the 
Caribbean. 
1.2 
- 
IMPERIALISM AND EMPIRE-BUILDING 
Ann Spackman points out that the joint stock company was 
"initially the state licensed means of mobilizing private wealth 
for state expansion. Later, it was adapted for the growth of 
domestic enterprise". She notes that "Capitalism emerged out of 
feudalism and the restrictive guild system by way of the 
inventions of credit, banking and individual contractual 
freedoms, all of which were established and protected by statute 
law" [Spackman 1975: 344]. 
The discovery of telegraphy in 1837 and the subsequent 
development of submarine cables fell within the regulatory ambit 
of these statutes [Headrick 1988: 108-109]. The innovations also 
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occurred in the period of the classical Industrial Revolution 
which saw the emergence and dominance of modern capitalism as the 
primary mode-of production over the feudal land-based relations. 
In the analysis of Karl Marx such revolutionary changes in 
political economy occur when technology outgrows the existing 
economic structure. Advances then in the smelting of iron, in the 
development of locomotives and in a whole range of machine tools 
and production methods in Britain, contributed to the rise of 
capitalism. But at the same time, they necessitated more rapid 
and improved communications methods as a catalyst to the 
development and spread of capitalism. 
Among the pressing economic requirements of this new era 
was also the need for increasingly greater quantities of 
raw materials and additional market outlets for their 
manufactured products. For these opportunities, the emerging 
capitalist class began to look abroad, in the vast empire which 
had been acquired militarily up to two centuries earlier. 
Commenting on this process in relation to the large colony of 
India, Marx wrote: "The millocracy has discovered that the 
transformation of India into a reproductive country, has become 
of vital. importance to them, and that, to that end, it is 
necessary above all to gift her with the means of irrigation and 
of internal communication. " [Marx: New York Herald Tribune, 
July 11,1953: 7] 
The targets in India for the infrastructural investments 
were cotton, tea and mineral resources in the same way that for 
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the Caribbean colonies it was primarily sugar and bananas. 
Marx supposed that these profit-motivated economic investments in 
railways in India, for example, would have provided the basis for 
the eventual industrialization of such colonies. 
,, You cannot maintain a net of railways over immense 
country without introducing all those industrial 
processes necessary to meet the immediate and'current 
wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there 
must grow the application of machinery to those 
branches of industry not immediately connected with 
railways. The railway system will therefore become, 
in India, truly the fore-runner of modern industry. 
This is the more certain as the Hindus are allowed by 
British authorities themselves to possess particular 
aptitude for accommodating themselves to entirely new 
labour and acquiring the requisite knowledge of 
machinery" (Marx: New York Herald Tribune August 8, 
1953: 5]. 
The course of history has proved Marx wrong in this 
analysis, so demonstrating that neither the simple fact of the 
existence of human aptitude nor elements of imported technology, 
whether in the form of railways or telecommunications networks, 
are sufficient conditions for real economic development and 
the transfer of technology to the countries on the global 
periphery. Not only did the introduction of railways, textile 
mills and other technologies fail to create industrialization in 
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India, it aided in the devastation of Indian handicraft 
textile production and facilitated the inland transportation of 
imported textiles from Lancashire in England [Brewer 1980: 57]. 
Nonetheless, in acknowledging the merits of Marx's overall 
thesis of capitalism, many theorists have since based their 
analysis of the relationship between dominant world powers and 
the undeveloped, dominated societies on the basic ideas of Marx's 
paradigm. Among the most well known of these, Lenin [1969: 73] 
advanced the thesis that imperialism represented the highest and 
last stage of monopoly capitalism. Finance capital from the 
industrialised capitalist economies would increasingly be 
exported abroad in an inter-imperialist competition for profits, 
raw materials and spheres of dominance and control. In Lenin's 
analysis, this process would lead to the spread of capitalist 
relations of production. The notable difference in emphasis from 
Marx is the central role identified by Lenin for finance capital, 
which he regarded as the product of the fusion of industrial and 
financial capital into vast inter-locking conglomerates and 
price-fixing cartels. 
Because of the absence 
corporate structures, blocs 
basis, with strong links to 
Competition is therefore 
capitalist states in the 
spheres of influence and o- 
common with Marx, Lenin 
of price-cutting in such monopolistic 
of finance capital form on a national 
the national parent state structures. 
escalated into a contest between 
forms of annexation, trade barriers, 
utright military conflicts. But in 
and Bukharin argued that capitalist 
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development would have been achieved in the under-developed 
countries. The economic stagnation and social deterioration in 
the majority of underdeveloped countries, call seriously into 
question the correctness of these predictions. The aspect of 
their arguments which has been more accurately borne out was 
their expectation of a continued concentration of wealth and 
power in the hands of corporate giants in the global centre as 
one definitive outcome of the interaction among global 
monopolies. 
In Latin America, one of the earliest political theorists to 
recognize the strengths as well as the significant limitations of 
Marxist analysis was Jose Carlos Mariategui. Writing in the 
1930s, he argued that Third World societies such as Peru were 
characterised by feudal and semi-feudal modes of production. 
Radical transformation could not await the transition to 
capitalism. While for Lenin imperialism was a stage of developed 
capitalism, Mariategui argued that in the underdeveloped 
territories imperialism was also related to and benefitTing from 
persistent pre-capitalist relations, which he saw as intensifying 
the grip of Imperialism in these countries [Mariategui 1971). 
While also viewing the route to development in the region as 
industrialization, Mariategui, unlike Marx placed great emphasis 
on the peasantry as well as the struggle for internal 
re-construction as pre-requisites for national development and a 
re-ordering of global economic relations. This concept by 
Mariategui found practical expression and support in the success 
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of the Chinese revolutiQn in achieving spectacular advances for 
self-reliance against the rural dependency on feudal structures. 
1.2.1 
- 
Structural Implications of Imperialism 
Unlike Mariategui, Johan Galtung does not make a specific 
association 
. 
between imperialism and capitalism. For him, 
Imperialism is a system that splits up collectives and relates 
some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of 
interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest 
or conflict of interest' [Galtung: 1981: 302-304]. He outlines a 
structure of imperialism characterised by a relationship between 
'Centre' and 'Periphery' nations. The powerful nations of the 
Centre are able to exercise such diverse influences over the 
weaker ones on the Periphery as to create what he euphemistically 
calls 'disharmony of interest' between them. A similar dichotomy 
exists within the periphery itself, where centre-centre 
relations, or contacts between developed population areas are 
stronger than the relationships between rural and urban areas, 
described by Galtung as internal centre-periphery relations. 
(1981: 301]. 
Galtung identifies 'value 
one source of inequality in 
global groups. His model en, 
benefits most' in the flow 
direction. At another level, 
effects', he contemplates the 
exchange' or trading relations as 
the interaction between the two 
: ourages consideration of 'who 
of goods and services in either 
which he calls 'antra-actors 
consequences of the international 
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interaction within the respective countries: 'Does the 
interaction have enriching or impoverishing effects inside the 
actor or does it just lead to a standstill? ' [1981: 305-306]. 
Galtung himself does not come down decisively on an answer to 
this key question, but by posing it allows room for consideration 
of some primary effects on the periphery of his concept of 
Imperialism. 
The global element of Galtung's model appears to be 
more descriptive of effects and interaction process than it is 
analytical of the causes. Unlike the Marxist tradition, he 
provides no definite guidance as to the principal motivation for 
domination. Galtung identifies five types of imperialism: 
economic, political, military, communication and cultural. 
Though usefully distinguishing the multifarious influences of 
a dominant power, he still does not clarify the primary motives 
for domination and the main causes of under-development, which 
on both counts appear to be economic. 
Galtung's structural theory of imperialism, however, 
does provide us with a useful descriptive framework of what he 
calls 'interaction relations' between industrialised and 
under-developed countries and between regions within both sets of 
countries. His concept of 'conflict of interest', which he 
defines as 'a situation where parties are pursuing incompatible 
goals', is an apt description of the relationship between 
national policy objectives in Caribbean telecommunications and 
the policy goals being pursued by the global Centre, represented 
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by Cable'and Wireless within the sector and by the multi-lateral 
lending agencies at the macro-economic level. Equally, Galtung 
offers the concept of a 'correspondence of interest', as an 
antithesis to 'conflicts of interest', thereby facilitating 
analysis of the shared values both within the Caribbean Periphery 
and between centres and peripheries globally. 
1.2.2 
- 
Imperialism and Communication 
Galtung's analysis of 'communications imperialism' is of 
particular interest to us. The mechanisms through which this, 
like the various other forms of imperialism, operate was through 
what he called 'vertical interactions' between Centre and 
Periphery countries, the latter being the colonies and 
ex-colonies and the former the 'mother country' or hegemonic 
metropole. The 'interactions' worked to the disadvantage of the 
periphery in such areas as trade and communication. Direct 
interactions between peripheries is missing, with third party 
external contacts monopolised by the Centre. Periphery 
interaction with other global centres does not exist, nor does 
wider multilateral relationships involving Centre and various 
peripheries. 
In addition, Galtung's model describes a feudal 
centre-periphery structure conforming with the maintenance of 
colonial ties. "A territory may have been exploited for raw 
materials most easily available and/or most needed in the Centre, 
and this in turn leads to a certain social structure, to 
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communication lines to deposits, to trade structures... " 
[Geltung, 1981: 307] 
Applied to the specific sector of communication, Galtung's 
approach helps us to understand why early British submarine 
cables initially targetted transatlantic trading destinations in 
the United States and the Caribbean, as well as the tea and 
textiles routes to India and the East. It also helps to explain 
why several additional miles of cable work was often undertaken 
to ensure that the lines did not intersect colonies belonging to 
other European powers. Inferences can be drawn as to why 
telephone calls from Jamaica to neighbouring Cuba, a former 
colonial periphery of Spain and location of the region's first 
successful anti-capitalist revolution, still takes much longer to 
connect than calls to distant London, or to New York in the 
United States. 
Galtung's theory of communications imperialism finds support 
in the prior work of Innes. In discussing the significance of 
communication to the British and other geographically dispersed 
colonial empires, Innes noted: "In the organization of large 
areas, communication occupies a vital place... The effective 
government of large areas depends to a very important extent on 
the efficiency of communication. "[Innis 1950: 7]. 
Galtung's theory is also capable of enhancing our perception 
of post-colonial geopolitics in the region. For example, despite 
the close proximity between the ex-colonial Caribbean and the 
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United States which may be seen as a relatively new imperialist 
Centre, important areas of European dominance have 
-been 
preserved, such as the strength of residual British hegemony over 
Caribbean telecommunications, education and sport. 
In taking account of the relationships within countries, 
Galtung's analysis makes frequent reference to the existence of 
internal inequality and 'disharmony'. This internal disparity, 
possibly reflected in urban versus rural development, is held to 
be greater within the Periphery nations than in the Centre 
Nations. Applied to communications, it bears relevance to the 
accumulated data indicating gross disparity in both media and 
telecommunications services between urban and rural areas, and 
between the industrialised and the underdeveloped countries. 
The 1983 World Bank study of global telecommunications and 
development indicated that the underdeveloped countries, which 
together had 71.2 % of the world population, had only 7.4 % 
of the global stock of telephones. The study showed that the 7 
most developed countries, on the other hand, enjoyed 92.6 % of 
the world's telephones, despite having only 28.8% of the global 
population in 1981. In Latin America and the Caribbean a 
telephone density of 20 million reflected a mere-3.9 % of the 
global stock, compared to a density of 192 million telephones in 
neighbouring United States, which had 37.8 % of the world's 
telephones but only 5.3 % of its population. [Saunders et al 
1983: 6]. Moreover, according to a report to the International 
Telecommunications Union in 1985, three quarters of the world's 
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population live in countries with 10 telephones or less for every 
100 persons; over half live in countries with less than one 
telephone for every 100 persons [Maitland Report Summary, 
1985: 6]. 
These statistics confirm the disparity referred to in 
Galtung's conception of communications imperialism. The' World 
Bank survey also supports his analysis of the nature of internal 
disparity when it finds that: "In industrialised countries, 
telephone density varies less between cities and nonurban areas 
than in developing countries, where a large portion of' the 
telephones is usually concentrated in a few large cities, with 
less access to service in much of the rest of the country. " 
[1963: 6-7]. 
Inevitably, these patterns of inequitable distribution of 
global and national telecommunications resources are paralleled 
and reinforced by other indices of communications inequality. In 
book production, for example, Europe and the Soviet Union account 
for 54.4 % of world total compared to 1.3 % in Africa in 1987. 
Reflected in terms of trade in this traditional information 
resource, it means that Europe including the U. K. earned US$ 
3,278.1 million in book exports in 1987 alone, compared with an 
export value of US$ 10.3aiby Africa and US$ 80. L by Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the same year [UNESCO 1989: Table 11.1]. 
This trend feeds into what, in Galtung's model, is regarded 
as Cultural Imperialism. But more generally, it`forms part of a 
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cycle of economic underdevelopment and 'dependency' experienced 
by a majority of countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
Synopsis 
The penetration of the colonial peripheries with the 
infra-structure of industrial capitalism did not-provide a basis 
for industrial development in the peripheries themselves because 
the investments were not in support of local industrial 
development but of capital accumulation and expansion for Europe. 
Urban enclaves were created to service the needs of external 
industrialization, leading to what Galtung described as a 
disharmony of interest between rural and urban areas in the 
colonies. A similar, though less extreme disparity developed in 
the metropole between rural and urban levels of development, 
leading to a greater correspondence of interest between the 
capitals of the north and south and between rural communities 
in both sets of countries. 
In the modern Caribbean, this pattern is still. recognizable 
in telecommunications, as in other aspects of social and economic 
development. It is often easier on this imperial construct, to 
communicate between capitals, a situation which best suits large 
business concerns, governments and the bureaucratic elite. This 
situation in telecommunications terms is an indication in one 
sector only of the relationships of dominance and dependency 
bequeathed by imperialism and its processes of empire-building. 
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While the class-based marxist model discussed earlier 
provides a more precise description of the existing internal 
economic and class relationships, Galtung's approach to 
imperialism can be useful in highlighting other key disparities 
such as rural-urban resource distribution, post-colonial 
geo-political continuities as well as the cultural and 
communications implications of colonialism. 
1.2.3 
- 
Sub-Imperialism and 'Internal Colonialism' 
Of course, a description of internal disparities within 
countries is not peculiar to Galtung, though his linkage of it to 
ideas of imperialism in the modern era may well be. Other 
theorists, notable Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, both from Mexico, have described these relationships 
as ones of 'internal colonialism' [Stevenhagen 1986: 68-70]. 
As social anthropologists, these writers have focussed more on 
the oppression of rural-based and indigenous sub-groups of 
national populations. In the Caribbean, these ideas are 
applicable to the enslavement and in some cases the extinction of 
indigenous peoples historically, such as the genocide against the 
native Arawaks Indians of Jamaica and the enslavement of Africans 
by a minority of European settlers. 
More currently, concepts of internal colonialism could 
justifiably be applied to the economic and social gulf existing 
between the powerful urban expatriate elites on the one hand and 
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the growing majority of dispossessed in the region. This economic 
and class-based disparity has its reflection in the national 
telecommunications universe in the form of the penetration rates, 
reflecting large numbers of unserved households, telephone 
distribution skewed in favour of upper class households and the 
relatively unbalanced provisions to large business users. 
Applied at a regional level, a variation of the notion of 
'internal colonialism' has been rendered as the concept of 
'sub-imperialism'. According to Marini [1972: 14-24] Brazil as a 
large, industrializing but still dependent capitalist economy has 
acquired the status of a sub-imperialist economy in relation to 
its regional neighbours. It is sub-imperialist because it does 
not yet possess a technological base independent of the global 
centre. But to exert its secondary influence, the ruling circles 
made up of economic and military elites establish partnerships 
with international imperialism. Under such arrangements foreign 
capital is invited into certain sectors of the sub-imperial 
economy in exchange for some access to advanced technology and 
to the global markets controlled by the Centre. A major internal 
implication of this process is the acute exploitation of local 
labour, with military repression often required to suppress the 
endemic instability derived from gaping class disparities. 
From the experiences within the Caribbean itself, 
charges of sub-imperialism have arisen in the relationship 
between the 'more developed countries'(MDCs) and the economically 
'less developed countries (LDCs) in the eastern Caribbean. 
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Described in economic terms as polarization, this process by 
which industrial investment tends to accrue to the MDCs, has been 
a major factor in the negotiations over regional integration for 
over twenty years. Caribbean economist W. Arthur Lewis, for 
example, analysed the economies of under-developed countries, as 
consisting of dual structures. In his model the rural 
agricultural sector provided a reserve of labour for the urban 
industrial sector which is therefore able to undergo major 
expansion [Lewis 1950: 1- 16]. 
But, Lewis argued in favour of an emphasis on urban 
industrialization over agriculture. The production of primary 
agricultural raw materials for export could not sustain economies 
with a burgeoning birth-rate. He recommended as an alternative a 
development approach predicated on the manufacture and export of 
industrial goods, in order to reap comparative advantages in 
cheap labour. The capital and entrepreneurship for this approach 
would come from outside of the underdeveloped territory. In the 
case of the Caribbean, he expected that this expertise would come 
from the United States in particular, under a policy of 
industrialization by invitation, as attempted in the United 
States neo-colony of Puerto Rico in the 1960s. [Lewis 1949, 
1950]. 
For at least a generation, the ideas of Lewis held sway in 
development planning for the region. But over two decades later, 
when the results of this approach seemed less than expected, it 
began increasingly to be called into question, particularly 
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because of its implicit neglect of indigenous resources and its 
reliance on neo-colonial or imperialist centres as the primary 
source of development initiative and capital. Notwithstanding the 
criticisms and modest results, major tenets of the Lewis model 
continue to inform some policy planning in the region. Within the 
telecommunications sector, the development of export-processing 
zones for data in Montego Bay, Jamaica and in Castries, St Lucia 
are very much within the concept of offering cheap excess labour 
to entrepreneurs re-locating from the North, even if in these 
cases it is services and not manufactured products which are 
being exported. 
Other writers examining the role of Imperialism in the 
internal dynamics of under-developed countries have focussed on 
the collaborative role of sections of the local ruling classes 
, 
who form the internal "infrastructure of dependency" [Bodenheimer 
1971: 327]. Such elite groups, usually urban-based, sometimes 
stand to gain economically from an uncritical association with a 
dominant external corporate or governmental partner. Where 
necessary, this association can easily be upgraded to active 
support or defence of the foreign partner, creating local 
legitimacy. 
Schiller describes the increasing involvement of local elite 
sectors in the system of Imperialist control as a form of 
transformation of that system: 
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"... in its re-alignments of power centres, its changes 
sources of exploitation and its modern mode of 
organization and control. In this sense, the concept 
of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum of 
processes by which a society is brought into the modern 
world system, and how its dominating stratum is 
attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed into 
shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even 
promote, the values and structures of the dominating 
centre of the system. " (Schiller 1976: 9). 
In circumstances of extensive geographical separation of the 
actors in these relationships, it is not difficult to recognize 
that reliable, constant and rapid systems of international 
communication are a requirement for effective functioning of such 
interactions. According to Innis, global society had earlier 
undergone a transition from a preoccupation with control over 
time to one of management and control of space. "The use of armed 
force in conquest and defence emphasised the spatial concept and 
organization of society in terms of space rather than time and 
continuity. It meant demands for more effective control over 
space and for more efficiency...,, [Innis 1951 : 106]. By the early 
20th century, the military instruments of this control over 
space, began to be supplemented in some areas by instruments 
of communication and cultural incorporation. 
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Synopsis 
The concepts of imperialism and colonialism have 
traditionally been associated with dominance by an external 
power. 
- 
Interpreted internally or in a regional context, internal 
colonialism can be taken to describe the disproportionately low 
provisions for rural areas or the hegemony exercised by a more 
developed part of a region over its less developed counterparts. 
This analytical concept has validity in the context of a 
Caribbean integration movement involving sub-regions as well as 
territories of widely disproportionate sizes and resource 
endowments. The challenge of balanced development requires the 
confronting of existing notions of superiority in geographical, 
economic, constitutional or ethnic terms in the region. 
Sub-imperialism is also a useful category for analysis, 
because it highlights the sometimes designated, sometimes 
self-appointed role performed by some regional territories or 
interest groups. In the negotiations over the Pacific Cable Board 
and, later over the telecommunications future of the Caribbean 
colonies, for example, Canada, then the largest British colony in 
the Americas, saw itself as a regional supervisor on behalf of 
the empire. But it also had nationalist visions of its own future 
role: "As a junior partner within the British empire, Canada 
internalised the imperial imperative of territorial expansion.. ", 
notes Thompson, in discussing the role of the 'Canadian 
imperialist' Sanford Fleming. Thompson disputes the view that "by 
promoting the growth of transoceanic telegraphy between members 
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of the British empire, Canadian imperialists were.. acting not in 
the interest of Canada, but the commercial, political and 
military interests of the U. K. " [Thompson 1989: 16-17]. He argued 
instead, that these actions were in promotion of Canada's own 
nationalist and sub-regional leadership objectives as well. 
The ideas and mechanics of domination need not emerge 
exclusively from external imperialists, but could be engendered 
internally, either on behalf of the imperialist centre or in the 
interest of indigenous ambitions. Equally, the modern instruments 
of colonialism need not arrive in the traditional guise of an 
external military or 
-political presence. Technology such as 
telecommunications and media systems introduced into the South 
can and often do act as facilitating devices for exploitation. In 
the hands of the dominant classes both internally and externally, 
these technologies can also act as a reliable ally of imperialism 
and as a restraint on radical social change. Internal colonialism 
or sub-imperialism can result in telecommunications operating as 
a local conduit of foreign control rather than performing the 
catalytic role in development which telecommunications could be 
made to play. 
1.3 
- 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PERIPHERY 
For over two decades after the Second World War, the leading 
school of thought among development theorists and communication 
specialists alike equated development with economic growth and 
therefore placed priority on urban industrial modernization of 
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the Western model. The communications corollary to this dominant 
paradigm was argued most forcibly by Lerner: "Everywhere, for 
example, increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; 
rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing 
media-exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per 
capita income) and political participation(voting). The model 
evolved in the West is an historical fact.... The same basic model 
reappears in virtually all modernizing societies in all 
continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, 
creed. "[Lerner 1955: 46]. 
The implications of such 
-a view for the global south 
includes disapproval of what these theorists called the 
'traditional society', mainly rural sectors or Galtung's internal 
periphery. It endorsed and legitimated the prevailing 
telecommunications emphasis on modern urban networks and the 
creation of 'new towns' and industrial centres rather than 
developing indigenous agricultural, fishing, entertainment and 
educational methods and resources. In mass media terms, it gave 
rise to the wide-scale acceptence, even by UNESCO, of the 
doctrine of 'free flow' of communications. This model envisaged 
the transmission of messages without an intrinsic regard to 
notions of balance in the flow of information between the global 
North and South. It is the the residue of this very idea which 
currently underpins the demands by the industrial North for an 
elimination of national constraints on the transborder flow of 
data and electronic services. 
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According to Rogers, another of the 'free flow theorists', 
development began with the introduction of new economic ideas 
into a social system from outside it, leading to high per capita 
income and modern standards of living. [Rogers 1969: 7-8]. 
Progress meant economic expansion measured on the statistical 
average of per capita income. Its major emphasis was on 
attracting development aid for large scale development projects 
with a built-in communications element to familiarize new users 
with the facilities. The model paid scant attention to national 
wealth distribution indicators. In addition, this approach 
placed very little store by the use of indigenous culture, local, 
materials and internally generated ideas and methods, as 
important motive forces for development. 
In essence, the ideas of this economic growth model 
supported the older concepts of colonial trusteeship and 
externally directed 'development'. The introduction by Cable and 
Wireless of new generations of equipment, buildings and 
transmission sytems, accords with this approach. Once the 
innovations are determined as beneficial to the region, the 
corporate sales and promotional departments are engaged to 
fulfill the requirements of the Rogers model. 
By the early 1970s, the limitations- of this ethnocentric 
model were becoming increasingly clear. According to Anayatullah 
it was premised "on a unilinear view and interpretation of 
history. It presumes that all history is inexorably moving toward 
the same destiny, same goals and same value systems as Western 
- 
82 
- 
man has.,, [Inayatullah 1976: 101]. To this, Anayatullah could 
easily have added not just western, but western industrial 
civilization. 
1.3.1 
- 
Structural Dependency and Realism 
Within Latin America and the Caribbean, a succession of 
theorists on colonialism, development and under-development have 
contributed potent ideas in interpreting from the South the 
factors contributing to 'Third World ' poverty. Many of these 
writers began by questioning the adequacy or even 
appropriateness of dominant northern paradigms in explaining the 
persistence of underdevelopment in the south. "... there was no 
real reason why theories and approaches based on the idealization 
and simplification of the history of western industrial 
capitalism should apply to societies with completely different 
structural characteristics and historical experience. " [Oteiza 
1978: 15]. 
Among those who sought to challenge and reformulate the 
traditional approaches were the economists of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America [ECLA], a United Nations agency 
established in 1947 and located in the Chilean 
-capital of 
Santiago. For over three decades, ECLA functioned as the primary 
centre for alternative development thinking, utilizing a 
structuralist and reformist approach articulated initially by 
, 
its leading theorist Raul Prebisch. 
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According to Christobal Kay [1989: 26] "the originality of the 
stracturalist paradigm lies in the proposition that the process 
of development and underdevelopment is a single process; that the 
centre and periphery are closely interrelated, forming part of one 
world economy. Furthermore the disparities between the centre and 
periphery are reproduced through international trade. Thus, the 
periphery's development problems are located within the context 
of the world economy. " Prebisch extends this argument by way of 
an analysis of international terms of trade which he regards as 
fundamentally unequal [Prebisch 1950: 1]. 
In place of the export-orientation, the ECLA economists 
advocated import-substitution policies based on a degree of 
industrialization in the economies of the South. This approach, 
like that of Lewis in the Caribbean, was to undergo some 
criticism and revision by a newly emerging generation of Latin 
American thinkers. Nonetheless, these ideas created the 
foundation stones for what was to become known as the Latin 
American theory of underdevelopment and dependency. 
Among the more well known 'dependentistas' is the economist 
Andre Gunder Frank, who, consistent with that tradition, argued 
that underdevelopment in the global periphery was a result of the 
development process in the northern industrialised economies. 
Frank [1967: 7] characterised this relationship as a structure 
of a global metropolis in the North and satellites in the global 
South. The relationship was essentially one of exploitation of 
the poorer countries 
-a process facilitated by the insertion of 
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these countries into the world capitalist system of unequal trade 
and its attendant skewed international division of labour. 
Critics of the dependency approach epitomised by Frank's 
early analysis argue that this holistic view exaggerates the 
importance of external factors while underplaying or even 
omitting the significance of internal variables. In the view of 
Petras and Brill [1985: 405] "the globalist perspective paints a 
picture of domination based on a 'passive receptacle' notion of 
the Third World in which the internal class forces are 
non-actors, or even blank surfaces ready to be shaped and 
exploited by the 'Core'. " 
For Bernstein, [1982: 231] the very concepts of 'internal', 
'external' requires re-examination in light of the difficulty he 
sees in distinguishing between the aspects of value formation 
deriving from the 'national economy' and those deriving from the 
'world economy'. In a similar vein, Ernesto Laclau [1977: 36], 
also rejects "all talk of a single unique contradiction", 
arguing instead that "relationships of dependence have always 
existed on the margins of the existence of capitalism. " 
Dos Santos (1973], however, offers a specific context 
within which dependency may be said to exist. He defines it as: 
"a conditioning situation in which economies of one 
group of countries are conditioned by the development 
and expansion of others. A relationship of 
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interdependence between two or more economies or 
between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries 
can expand through self-impulsion, while others, being 
in a dependent position, can only expand as a 
reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, 
which may have positive or negative effects on their 
immediate development. " [Dos Santos 1973: 76]. 
A major plank of the early dependency thesis, according 
to Blomstrom and Hette's 'ideal typical position', was the notion 
that "since the periphery was doomed to under-development because 
of its linkage to the centre, it was considered necessary for a 
country to disassociate itself from the world market... ". 
(Blomstrom and Hette 1984: 76]. Many dependency theorists have 
rejected this approach of unilateral de-linking or dissociation 
from the world capitalist system. They argue instead, for 
greater emphasis on policies of import substitution in preference 
to a more dependent export orientation. 
Celso Furtado's response to economic dependency allows 
considerable room for a constructive involvement with global 
capitalist economic structures [1970,1974]. He notes that an 
inward-directed development process can suffer from 'structural 
stagnation' and 'exhaustion'. These occur because once 
import-substituting industrialization has satisfied the domestic 
demand for consumer goods, it needs to re-adjust to the 
production of consumer durables, such as large domestic 
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appliances and later, the production of machinery and other 
capital goods, all requiring larger amounts of investment [1970: 
118-119]. 
Furtado argues further that the small size of the internal 
markets act as a brake on the expansion into durables and capital 
goods production because of an absence of economies of scale. It 
is at this stage that stagnation can set in, 'demonstrated'by 
foreign exchange shortages, inefficiencies in production, low 
levels of profitability and importantly, inaccessibility to 
useful technological innovations. 
Given the important deficiencies in strategies of export 
orientation and the weaknesses [see Furtado 1970: 100] in import 
substitution, Hatton questions the basis of pursuing one or the 
other' of these policies exclusively. Based on the experience of 
the Dominican Republic, (about the same size as Jamaica), Hatton 
has demonstrated that "selective import substitution strategies 
and export promotion are not mutually exclusive alternatives, in 
that the affirmation of the one does not imply the negation of 
the other.. 
." 
The two approaches, he points out are 
complementary, each depending on the other for its success and 
effectiveness. "The complementarity approach breaks with the 
traditional approaches of 'inward development' or 'outward 
development'-which have characterised the debate and the concrete 
strategies of growth conducted in successive waves of adoption 
and reflection. " [Hatton 1989: 199]. 
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This analysis is of particular pertinence to the territories 
of the renglish-speaking Caribbean with very small national 
markets and a combined CARICOM population of only five million. 
The dilemma of this. region is how to constructively engage in a 
relationship with the global capitalist system without being 
dominated and directed by either its multi-lateral agencies such 
as the International Monetary Fund, or its trans-national 
corporations such as Cable and Wireless. The enhancement of the 
early structuralist approaches by more versatile and internally 
relevant contributions, creates a more useful and balanced 
framework within which to interpret and address the difficulties 
in regional policy planning for development. 
The emphasis of the more widely known dependentistas, 
particularly Gunder Frank, was undoubtedly on the structural 
deficiencies bequeathed to the underdeveloped countries by an 
exploitative and unequal system of international relations. This 
emphasis often gives rise to the criticism that it neglects 
internal factors, some well within the subjective control of 
local policy-makers. The emphasis on the international structural 
factors is unapologetically defended by some writers from the 
south as reflective of reality. Walter Rodney argued for example 
that the internal weaknesses are but consequences and not causes 
of underdevelopment; the causes being located primarily in the 
external sphere: 
"It is true that because of lack of engineers, Africa 
cannot on its own build more roads, bridges and 
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hydro-electric stations. But that is not a cause of 
underdevelopment, except in the sense that causes and 
effects come together and reinforce each other. The 
fact of the matter is that the most profound reasons 
for the economic backwardness of a given African 
nation are not to be found inside that nation. All that 
we can find inside are the symptoms of underdevelopment 
and the secondary factors that make for poverty. " 
[Rodney 1971: 30]. 
The dependency school, however, does not consist of an 
homogenous body of theory on Third World underdevelopment. 
And many theorists within the modern dependency paradigm 
now adopt a more flexible approach. Even Gunder Frank, for 
example, acknowledges that internal policy is a critical element 
in post-colonial economic development. He notes, however, that 
this internal state policy itself derives from class conflicts 
and from struggles between conflicting interest groups. Some of 
these groups and classes stand directly to benefit from the 
perpetuation of the externally dominated status quo and would 
therefore seek to direct state policy towards an unquestioning 
retention of the external exploitative associations [Frank 
'1972: 13]. 
Although Frank may be the most well known, he is but one of 
a diverse body of dependency theorists, many of whom attempt to 
meet more directly the legitimate criticisms levelled against the 
single-mindedly externalist approaches. Sunkel [1973: -133] argues 
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that underdevelopment expresses itself in two polarizations: one 
between nations but also another within nations. And while the 
external ones are decisive, no realistic analysis of development 
should underestimate the internal structural and political 
elements. It is this approach to dependency which we find to be 
most relevant to the issues under examination here: A recognition 
that analysis and resolution of the post-colonial problems of 
under-development requires a thorough appreciation of the 
external causes but also takes fundamentally into account the 
varied internal factors which also contribute to stagnation or in 
certain conditions to economic growth. 
"The importance which is attributed to external 
conditions should not obscure the existence of 
internal conditioning structures as, even though in 
the long run process of change the influence of the 
former tend to prevail, the structural transformation 
is the outcome of the interaction between both. " 
(Sunkel 1973: 133] 
The ideas of structural dependency, thus approached, offer 
a potent explanatory and analytical context for Caribbean 
telecommunications. 
Synopsis 
Historical linkages by shipping, post, telegraph and 
telephones to the British imperial Centre of economic power 
- 
90 
- 
operated primarily as communications conduits facilitating a 
global division of labour in which the Caribbean was a raw 
materials appendage. The network was configured to meet the 
administrative and economic requirements of the external power, 
and these requirements were frequently antithetical to balanced 
development and self-sufficiency in the region's economic or 
communications sectors. Communications itself was not regarded as 
a critical input in the economic or cultural growth in the 
periphery itself, but as the instrument of privileged urban 
expatriate and business elites. The existing telecommunications 
structure, controlled by external interests of the same 
traditional lineage, continues to bear close resemblance to 
the elite-oriented, urban based structure of the past. 
Development and under-development are viewed as two aspects 
of a single global and historical process. In telecommunications 
development, as with the wider economic sector, the 
industrialised countries of the north have a dominant control 
over the technology, capital and global institutional 
infra-structure, which limited Third World economic development. 
While the holistic view of the dependency paradign does not tell 
the entire story of underdevelopment, it does describe a current 
global process of structural incapacity, in which the economies 
of the underdeveloped countries can only expand as a reflection 
of the expansion of the dominant countries' [Dos Santos 1973: 
76]. The telecommunications environment, similarly, is 
configured to respond more readily to external demands upon it 
rather than to the needs of the country as a whole, including its 
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rural and agricultural areas. 
The limitations of the dependency analysis is its inadequacy 
in addressing the internal weaknesses which interact with the 
global structural problems to further limit the scope and pace of 
development. 
1.3.2 
- 
Collective Self-Reliance 
In the face of difficulties with the prescriptive aspects of 
Dependency and the often adverse socio-political implications 
of export-orientation, Armart Mattelart, argues in favour of an 
approach, complementary to Dependency, but which is based on 
humane internal re-structuring as a strategic aim. In this 
approach, "Development begins to be envisaged, no longer as an 
externalization movement, whose motor of development is trade and 
transfers from the exterior, but a process of mobilization of 
local resources with a view to satisfying local needs. It is in 
this context that the notion of 'Self Reliance' operates. " 
(Mattelart 1983: 22). 
In support of the same concept, Kempe Ronald Hope advocates 
a widening of the framework to cover regional and inter-regional 
self-support strategies, which he describes as Collective 
Self Reliance. According to Hope [1986: 19], Collective Self 
Reliance in this framework is taken to mean "autonomy of decision 
making and full mobilization of a society's own resources under 
its own initiative and direction. " The concept therefore seeks to 
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bring together societies embarking on this path "so as to 
embrace truly co-operative relations among self-respecting 
mobilized societies. " 
Analysts using the concept of Self Reliance concur on the 
centrality of local control of development resources. According 
to Mattelart, Self Reliance is understood as "the valuation of 
resources for the satisfaction of fundamental needs, and as the 
local control of these resources. "[1983: 23]. Among the constituent 
aspects of Self Reliance identified by Mattelart is a rejection 
of linear industrialization strategies and a renewed emphasis on 
qualitative criteria for development in place of gross national 
product [GNP] measurements. 
Like Hope's 'collective' approach, Mattelart also 
underlines the value of solidarity as a defining feature of Self 
Reliance. He sees development strategies "conceived in terms of 
satisfying the needs of the entire population and not being 
content to respond to the desires of an elite or middle class 
fractions. " Another element is the integral relationship between 
economic development and the preservation of cultural integrity 
and cultural diversity. "By challenging the notion of development 
pushed forward by the logic of transnational expansion, partisans 
of self-reliance support the demand for a cultural identity and 
their own cultural field as a site for political emancipation. " 
(Mattelart 1983: 24-25). 
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Externally, the strategy requires an exploration of joint 
economic initiatives and co-operation among regional countries or 
Third World societies. In this way, it is argued there can be a 
gradually reduced dependency on the developed countries and an 
increase in interdependent relationships and joint barganing 
among the underdeveloped countries. "Co-operation among these 
countries is aimed at generating or adapting knowledge needed for 
a socially relevant, endogenous, self-sustaining development 
process in order to avoid the blind or forced transfer of 
inadequate technology. " [Hope 1983: 23]. Yet, as Amin noted, such 
co-operation faces daunting prospects, not least from 
industrialised countries who feeling threatened, resort to 
'neo-protectionist responses, despite the liberal language. ' 
[Amin 1990: 208 ]. 
Another difficulty which this approach is likely to 
encounter is the conflicting interests which often exist among 
Third World countries themselves, whether to do with competing 
export products, geo-political interests or sheer size. As 
occurred in the early stages of the negotiations over trade in 
services, some Third World countries may find themselves in 
alliance with the industrialised North on specific issues. In 
Hope's ideal framework, however, a harmonization of currently 
conflicting objectives and lasting solutions must be found and 
worked out in advance through a form of 'solidarity contract' 
which takes account of the individual requirements of countries 
with shared aspirations. 
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Unlike some interpretations of dependency, Self reliance 
does not posit the state as the sole or even dominant actor in 
the process of national development. In recommending it on this 
ground, Mattelart notes that it takes into account "the 
peculiarities of various groups making up a population or the 
specific contribution they could make in the drawing up of a 
balanced development policy". This requires "a vast process of 
popular organization and the political mobilization of the 
individual and the group... This solidarity, expressed through 
the realization of individual self reliance, is also expressed 
through collective self reliance at all levels: at the local 
level (family, commune, village federation, ethnic group); at the 
national and regional level. " [Mattelart 1983: 24-25]. 
Synopsis 
Whereas the clear (though not exclusive) emphasis of 
dependency is on international structural relationships, 
collective self reliance calls for the introduction of a new 
INTERNAL economic order as an essential corollary to global 
reform. "Collective self reliance has therefore become inescapable 
for Third World countries. It is essential to their very survival 
and it is very much connected to the basic notion of reducing 
dependency. Collective self-reliance as a development strategy 
can hardly be understood outside the dependency framework. 
Self-reliance is the antithesis of dependency. " [Hope 1986: 23]. 
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The concept of Self Reliance is not a new one, and may be 
viewed as part of the South-South initiatives which were embodied 
in demands for a new international economic order during the 
1970s and 1980s. However, it acquires particular importance in a 
regional context such as in the Caribbean, as well as in 
a global context, in which resources for development aid from the 
North are already beginning to be re-directed to less developed 
economies of the North itself. For example, economic assistance 
once destined either through bi-lateral or multi-lateral channels 
to the under-developed South is already being shared with the 
several countries of Eastern Europe now viewed in a politically 
more favourable light by the industrialised capitalist economies. 
Within Western Europe itself, the introduction of the Single 
European Act in 1992 will involve major revisions of traditional 
bi-lateral trading relationships with peripheries in the South. 
And, major changes in the Soviet Union as well as its new 
focus on ideas of a 'Common European Home' are also likely to 
involve reduced levels of assistance or less favourable terms to 
Third World partners, such as Cuba. In the emerging new political 
order, economically dependent and scattered territories of the 
Caribbean are likely to be forced into major internal adjustments 
and more substantial regional alliances. 
1.4 
- 
BRIEF CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
We have attempted to present in the foregoing chapter some 
of the main theoretical issues raised by the interplay between an 
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imperial state power and its corporate sector. We have also 
discussed the relationship of dominance and dependency involving 
a synergistic state/company relationship in the metropole, on the 
one hand, and the disparate, small and under-developed 
territories in the Caribbean periphery, on the other. Our 
examination of the nature and functions of the state sought to 
explore alternative theoretical perspectives through which the 
institutions of government and policy-making may be examined, and 
our analysis of imperialism provides both a theoretical and an 
historical frame of reference for the interactions. 
We will return to these issues throught the thesis, but 
particularly in the concluding Chapter 9. There, together with a 
review of our main empirical findings, we will attempt a 
synthesis of the various theoretical strands, including our 
discussion in Chapter 4 of multinational corporations in the 
world economy and in the Caribbean. 
However, we turn next to a close examination of the 
Caribbean as the main policy environment of our analysis. In 
Chapter 2, we will consider the region's peculiar geographical 
and political fragmentation, attempts at regional integration, 
and the consequences of indebtedness on Caribbean attempts at 
economic, political and communications de-colonization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CARIBBEAN: DEPENDENCY AND FRAGMENTATION 
The territories geographically defined as being in the 
wider Caribbean region differ significantly in terms of size, 
colonial and ethnic backgrounds and political systems. This 
reflects a complexity derived not only from the naturally 
scattered, predominantly island configuration of the area, but 
also the history of European rivalries, conquest and political 
balkanization of the region. Massive enforced transfer of 
peoples from Africa under slavery and from Asia under the 
system of indentureship created diverse ethnic populations with 
their own varied cultural practices. The imposition of European 
values upon this mix, together with the economic exploitation of 
mining and agricultural products, incorporated the Caribbean area 
into the Western economic and political system for over four 
centuries. 
A major consequence of these historical and geographical 
factors is the severe fragmentation of the Caribbean. One of the 
most obvious present-day indicators of this historical 
fragmentation of the wider region is language. Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico are Spanish-speaking 
territories with a combined population of close to twenty million 
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people. The French-speaking Caribbean consists of the independent 
territory of Haiti and three French overseas departements: 
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cayenne (French Guiana) with a total 
population of about 6 million. The Dutch colonies in the 
Caribbean include Suriname and the group of six islands called 
the Netherlands Antilles, all with a population of over 735,000 
people. And, the former Danish colonies of St Thomas, St Croix 
and. St John, now, like Puerto Rico, colonised by the United 
States, have a combined population of 103,000. 
The English-speaking Caribbean, though collectively only the 
third largest population grouping with just over five million 
people, is the most numerous in terms of islands or individual 
territorial units. Although most of these units share a common 
history of British colonialism, the grouping can be further 
subdivided into those which have gained their independence and 
those remaining as British colonies or dependencies. Among the 
existing British colonies in the region are Montserrat, Anguilla, 
the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the 
Cayman Islands and Bermuda with a combined population of 132,000 
people. 
Altogether, the wider Caribbean region currently consists of 
over 32 million people, distributed across 26 countries. However, 
the focus of this study is on the English-speaking segment 
which constitutes the Commonwealth Caribbean. And even within 
this grouping, the number of territories are sufficiently 
numerous as to necessitate the identification and targetting of 
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specific countries in our detailed treatment later. As a context 
for our discussion and in recognition of the close political and 
historical links within the anglophone region, it is useful to 
consider further some of the specific characteristics of this 
anglophone sub-region. 
2.1 
- 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
The independent, English-speaking territories of the 
Caribbean number twelve countries, which, together with 
Montserrat, form the membership of the Caribbean Common Market 
and Community (CARICOM). As can be seen on the regional map at 
Figure 1, the membership of this grouping is dispersed' across 
some two thousand miles ranging from Guyana on the northern coast 
of South America through the state of Trinidad and Tobago in the 
southern Caribbean Sea, northward through an arc of smaller 
islands. These include Grenada, St Vincent, Barbados, St Lucia, 
Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Kitts-Nevis. Further north 
of this arc are the islands of The Bahamas, and south of these is 
Jamaica, with the territory of Belize located on the Caribbean 
coast of the Central American mainland west of Jamaica. 
The four economically more advanced countries are Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana. These are 
officially referred to as the MDCs or More Developed Countries. 
Among these, Jamaica is the largest in population terms, with its 
2.4 million people (1988] accounting for over half of the total 
population of the entire region. Trinidad is next with a 
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population of 1.2 million [1988], followed by Guyana with a 
population of 700,000 [1987], and Barbados with 256,000 (1987). 
The Bahamas with a population of 241,000 (1987), is also among 
the more advanced economies of the region. But while being a 
member of the Caribbean Community, it does not participate 
in the Common Market aspect. Table 1 outlines the basic 
demographic statistics of the region, indicating a high level of 
population density, and showing the relatively small size of most 
of the territories. 
Of the 8 less developed countries (LDCs) of CARICOM, Belize 
is the largest with a population of 152,000, followed by St 
Vincent and the Grenadines: 123,000; St Lucia: 119,000; Grenada: 
110,000; Antigua and Barbuda: 77,000; Dominica: 74,000; St 
Kitts/Nevis: 45,000; and Montserrat the smallest with a 
population of 12,000. 
The former British Caribbean region, therefore, consists of 
a scattered collection of relatively densely populated islands 
and mainland territories, located close to other mostly larger 
territories which constitute the peripheries of other European 
empires. In line with the analytical models of Johan Galtung, 
describing a 'feudal Centre-Periphery structure' [1981 : 307], 
there is little or no contact between the British, French, Dutch, 
Spanish or American colonial peripheries, which although 
geographically close, are artificially separated by the colonial 
heritage of language, telecommunications channels and cultural 
traditions, all attuned to their respective Centre nations. 
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TABLE 1 
- ---------- 
------------------------- 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
------------------ 
OF CARICOM MEMBER 
----------- 
COUNTRIES 
--- 
Country 
---------- 
Ind. Date 
------------------ 
Population 
--------- 
Area--- r  Density 
(1985) (sq/km) per s/km 
Jamaica 1962 2,357,900* 10,992 213 
Trinidad 1962 1,235,400* 5,128 230 
Guyana 1966 788,000 214,970 4 
. 
Barbados 1966 250,000 430 581 
The Bahamas 1973 230,000 13,935 17 
Belize 1981 170,000 22,963 7 
St Vincent 1979 110,000 389 283 
St Lucia 1979 137,000 616 222 
Grenada 1974 110,000 311 309 
Antigua 1981 80,000 440 183 
Dominica 1978 84,000 750 112 
St Kitts 1983 44,000 269 161 
Montserrat (U. K. Colony) 12,000 104 115 
----------------------------------------------------------------- Sources: Government Statistics 1988* 
Commonwealth Secretariat 1985 
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2.2 
- 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The independent countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
are all multi-party parliamentary democracies modelled on the 
Westminster system. This is in keeping with the fact that they 
are all former British colonies. Of the 12 independent CARICOM 
member states, ten retain the British monarch as the titular 
head of state, represented by a local Governor General, with a 
Prime Minister as the head of government. Two, Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago, have adopted a republican status with a 
President as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of 
government. Both, however, remain members of the Commonwealth. 
The process of decolonization began with the political 
independence of the largest of these territories, Jamaica, in 
August 1962. This was followed in the same year by Trinidad and 
Tobago, and four years later by Guyana and Barbados both in 1966. 
The gaining of independence for the other CARICOM member states 
occurred only as recently as the 1970s and 1980s, as outlined in 
Table 1. However, while a majority of territories have gained 
political independence, the process of decolonization in the 
region is still incomplete. Currently, the most active agitator 
for independence is Montserrat, but its efforts suffered a recent 
setback with a decision in London to revert the island's status 
from a self-governing to a Crown colony with direct rule from 
London through the offices of an expatriate Governor. 
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According to Stone [1986: 15] the range of countries in the 
Caribbean Basin can be distinguished politically by three main 
sets of attributes. These he summarised as Democratic Pluralist, 
Authoritarian and Populist-Statist. In his classification, most 
of the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean stood within the 
democratic pluralist grouping by the end of the 1970s. The 
attributes of their political category included a participatory 
political tradition, strong civil rights and moderate social 
rights, freedom of association on voluntaristic and autonomous 
bases, the promotion of dissent and moderate initiatives towards 
reform within the system. 
While we agree that many states in the Caribbean continue to 
have these attributes, the most typical feature of political 
decision-making would appear to be the dominant role of elites, 
with any broad participatory role in state decision-making being 
confined to periodic electoral activities. In an earlier 
publication, Stone himself underlined the pivotal role played by 
both local and foreign power elites in public affairs in Jamaica, 
arriving at judgements which are broadly applicable elsewhere in 
in the region: "policies are formulated by party leaders in 
government, in collaboration with civil service advisors and 
specially appointed party advisors and consultants. The latter 
has assumed increasing importance in the 1970s, replacing civil 
service advisors in various sensitive policy areas. Certain 
policy areas involve joint decisions between these local 
decision-makers and foreign institutional interests such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, who often determine policy emphases and 
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direction by their control over financing. " [Stone 1980: 75]. 
Since the 1970s however, a greater degree of ideological 
variation and experimentation has been introduced in some 
territories of the anglophone region. Between 1974 and 1979, 
Grenadian Prime Minister, Eric Gairy introduced authoritarian 
rule by subordinating the parliamentary and electoral systems 
to his own personal directives. His personal usurpation 
of the broader role of the capitalist state, limited the scope 
for capitalist development, and for legal political opposition. 
The regime was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by the 
revolutionary socialist government of Maurice Bishop. According 
with Stone's classification, the new Grenada regime was 
participatory, with a self-imposed mandate for transformation and 
the promotion of national unity. The political method of this 
regime, however, involved the suspension of certain traditional 
civil liberties under revolutionary conditions, and the 
incorporation of societal group interests into a vanguard party. 
This social experimentation, the first of its kind to gain 
power in the English-speaking Caribbean, led to a substantial 
reduction in unemployment, increased productivity and in the use 
of local resources. It made exemplary advances in social services 
such as public transportation, health and education. [See Steve 
Clarke in Bishop 1983: xxii-xxv]. This new political experiment 
also led, however, to increased hostility from the neighbouring 
superpower, the United States of America, which excluded Grenada 
from regional economic trade and aid arrangements such as the 
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Caribbean' Basin Initiative (CBI). Grenada developed alternative 
relations with Cuba and the eastern bloc, but these served to 
polarise the regional integration movement and to further isolate 
the tiny island-state from both its CARICOM neighbours and the 
U. S. 
These pressures were soon reflected within Grenada itself, 
with ideological factions developing within the ruling party and 
national leadership. The situation deteriorated further with the 
execution of the Prime Minister, which was followed by a US-led 
military invasion with token participation by certain other 
CARICOM member states in 1983. Since then, the country has 
resumed a liberal elitist character, with deteriorating social 
and economic conditions but under greater political and military 
hegemony of the United States. 
To varying degrees, similar experiments were attempted by 
the Michael Manley Government in Jamaica between 1974 and 1980 
and by Forbes Burnham in Guyana between 1967 and 1985. Domestic 
ideological policies of socialism were declared alongside a 
non-aligned foreign policy. The emphasis was on a strengthened 
state sector as the leading engine of development, with carefully 
defined conditions and areas for foreign investment. The decade 
of the 1980s, however, saw the demise of such state-centred 
development approaches [Thomas 1988: 210]. This was effected 
again through economic isolation, stringent demands for reforms 
by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for foreign 
currency loans and credit clearance, as well as by direct U. S. 
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political and military pressures, and internal disjunctures 
between the state and counter elites in the political and other 
spheres. 
In the aftermath of these experiments, the result has been a 
resurgence of the status quo, in the form of a regionally more 
uniform, pro-capitalist traditional society, internally dominated 
by foreign and upper class elites, with a marginalization of any 
radically distributive or revolutionary approaches to national 
development. In many territories traditional policies mean 
reinforced domination by the white economic elite and a more 
receptive environment for large transnational enterprises. The 
two other major regional territories, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Barbados, have to varying degrees maintained a continuity with 
the traditional socio-political system which the experiments in 
Guyana, Grenada and Jamaica attempted to challenge in the early 
post-colonial period. 
The approaches within the traditional political framework, 
however, have been differentiated, being implemented under 
varying degrees of regulation, ranging from advanced economic 
nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, through the conservative but 
pragmatic policies in Barbados, to the largely open, unregulated 
economies of most of the small eastern Caribbean states. Within 
this grouping of established conservative states, economic power 
resides firmly in an alliance of large foreign corporations, 
particularly in the banking, mining and tourism sectors, and a 
small local, mostly white, elite. 
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These dominant sectors are serviced by an aspiring 
professional and bureaucratic, largely black middle class, which 
has performed the leading role in day-to-day political 
government. Among the majority of the region's population, 
however, made up of peasant farmers, small traders, workers and 
the unemployed, an increasing political consciousness and harsh 
economic conditions are giving rise to new, localised and 
regional initiatives in the non-governmental (NGO) sector, aimed 
at a greater degree of self-reliant social and economic 
existence. It is this portion of the population, by far the 
largest and internally most dynamic, which are least served by 
existing telecommunications arrangements. 
Synopsis 
Despite the end of formal colonialism as a prevalent 
practice in international relations, it is clear that the process 
remains incomplete in the wider Caribbean region, and its effects 
are still very pervasive even within those states which have 
gained political independence. In the english-speaking part of 
the region, with which we are primarily concerned, these effects 
of colonialism combine with physical fragmentation and small size 
to contribute to the maintenance of an environment of continued 
dependency and acute political vulnerability. 
The experiments in Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica between 1967 
and 1985 represented attempts to re-structure this 
- 
107 
- 
socio-political order. However, the experience of these countries 
provides a number of indications of the problems faced by radical 
national transformative initiatives within the geo-political and 
historical contexts of imperialism and neo-colonialism in the 
Caribbean. In the first place, the fate of such initiatives 
demonstrate the weakness and vulnerability of the state in the 
periphery, in relation to external economic, political and 
military forces. Although substantial social and economic 
transformation can be achieved in the region without operating 
directly within the political parameters of the United States or 
Britain, such bold initiatives in the Caribbean run the risk of 
military repression or long-term economic strangulation by these 
powerful interests in the global north. This appears particularly 
to be the case where local interest organizations among the 
people are weak, or where there are major divisions in the state 
or national leadership. 
2.3 
- 
SIZE AND ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY 
As we have seen, individual Caribbean states today are 
as vulnerable to external military aggression from the United 
States as they were to the European conquistadores of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. A major part of this 
traditional vulnerability is the structural factor of size and 
the geographically scattered nature of the regional territories. 
If these factors are important impediments to strong political 
development, they loom even larger over the economic and 
communications prospects of the region as a whole. 
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Despite a total land area of about 271,400 square kilometres 
the aggregate population of the region under review is just 
over five million people distributed across a large number of 
states. According to the 1985 Report of the Commonwealth 
Consultative Group On Small States, population provides the most 
effective basis for defining the size of states. The same 
criteria was- independently employed by the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in its study of 
'Problems of Very Small States and Territories'[1969]. Both the 
U. N. agency and the Commonwealth Consultative Group use a cut-off 
point of one million people as the defining feature of a small 
state. 
On this basis all but two of the CARICOM member-states are 
by definition small states. The Commonwealth study further 
classifies states with populations below the million mark as 
mini-states and those with populations below 100,000 as 
micro-states. According to this scheme, four CARICOM member 
states: Antigua, Dominica, St Kitts-Nevis and Montserrat are 
in the minimum category of 'micro-states'. Another seven could be 
classified as mini-states, while Trinidad and Tobago which falls 
just outside of this category and Jamaica, the largest of the 
territories, are still in global terms quite small states. This 
situation, with such a high concentration of very small states, 
constitutes a unique feature of the Caribbean region in global 
terms. 
- 
109 
- 
A major significance of smallness in global relations is 
the vulnerability which it may accord in the economic, political 
and military spheres. As we have seen such countries are 
particularly at risk where they adopt policies out of keeping 
with the demands of the industrialised capitalist world, and in 
particular, the regional superpower, the United States of 
America. But they are also vulnerable in relation to the 
financial strength and private decision-making machinery of 
individual multinational corporations whose global budgets often 
dwarf the national budgets of many of these states. The 
Commonwealth Consultative Group drew special attention to such 
vulnerabilities: 
"In general, Third World states tend to be in a 
disadvantageous position in relations with transnational 
corporations through inadequacies in negotiating skills 
and access to information; and with their slender human 
resources, small states are in an even weaker position 
than other developing countries. In many cases, the 
agreements transnational corporations draw up may be said 
to resemble those 'unequal treaties' that imperialist 
powers used to impose in earlier centuries upon weaker 
nations. The crucial issue for small states is to avoid 
inequitable contractual arrangements and political 
interference. " [1985: 56] 
Despite these dangers, the Report points out that TNCs can 
nonetheless make an important contribution to such states in 
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providing much needed capital, technology and market outlets. 
Besides the potential impact of major private corporate 
interests, the inability of the small states by themselves to 
benefit from economies of scale is among the wider economic 
disadvantages which small societies face. 'Industrialization' for 
example, is constrained by... the small size of domestic markets, 
difficulties in penetrating foreign markets, the absence of a 
favourable industrial environment, lack of an indigenous 
technological base and inadequate supplies of local raw materials 
for processing industries' [Commonwealth Group Report 1985: 17]. 
In micro-economic terms, Pantin observes that "small size implies 
that in virtually every. instance, the minimum economically 
efficient scale of plant will yield output greater than domestic 
demand. The need to export, then, entails that firms involved 
will be exposed to the full force of global competitive markets, 
and protectionism. " [Pantin 1989: 278]. 
This assessment has a particular implication in 
telecommunications and other technology-based sectors. The small 
technical and economic base of the individual countries or the 
region as a whole severely limits the prospect of indigenous 
research and development. This in turn leads to a sometimes 
uncritical acceptance of foreign capital and expertise, whose 
technological input is used as a major negotiating factor for 
deepening both external ownership and control. 
All of the constraints identified are applicable not just 
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to the individual small states in the Caribbean but also to the 
region taken as a whole. In 1988, the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB) reported that performance for that year was " generally 
lower than in 1987 and was indicative of stagnation in some of 
the major regional economies. " The Bank's Annual Report noted 
further that "the projected slowdown in growth performance in 
OECD countries is expected to contribute to a sizeable decline in 
the volume of world trade. Such a development would further 
adversely affect the dependence of the region on trade in primary 
commodities. " 
This report by the CDB is an indication not just of the 
pattern in an isolated year, but reflects the structural economic 
dependency of the Caribbean region. The region exports sugar, 
bananas, cocoa, citrus and other crops mainly to markets in 
Europe and the United States, from which it imports finished 
goods and processed foods. Tourism is a long standing and 
increasingly important foreign exchange earner. Mineral 
production, confined mainly to bauxite and alumina from Jamaica 
and Guyana and petroleum from Trinidad and Tobago, is 
dominated by transnational corporations and real earnings 
fluctuate according to world market prices. Light manufacturing 
in the more developed territories relies heavily on imported 
fuels and raw materials which are purchased with scarce foreign 
exchange. 
"Transnational corporations with global interests 
have taken charge of industrialization rather than 
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Caribbean capitalists with local economic interests. 
Like the European conquerors, their goal is to create 
wealth for themselves -- Caribbean development is a 
lesser priority. Thus the region produces very few of 
the inputs in its finished products. Instead, it 
imports raw materials and semi-finished parts and 
assembles them for export. Its industries depend 
heavily upon external capital, technology and markets. 
As in the colonial era, the Caribbean continues to 
shape its productive system to the demands of others. " 
[Schuyler 1988: 5]. 
Fiscal and foreign exchange revenues generated from this 
economic structure are invariably unable to finance any major, 
systematic development in social services such as health, housing 
telecommunications and education. Internal migration from rural 
areas to the towns is spurred on by the absence of employment, 
social amenities such as electricity, pipe-borne water supplies, 
public transport, telephones and recreational facilities. These 
amenities, even where they exist in the urban areas, are mostly 
overstretched and in disrepair, or alternatively inaccessible to 
low income or unemployed sectors of the population. 
2.3.1 
- 
Debt and Economic Bondage 
Over the last decade, economic conditions in the Caribbean have 
been exacerbated by the accumulation of massive external debts. 
These debts began to build up following increases in the price of 
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oil introduced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1973. By 1975, the price of this critical 
resource had increased four times over and with it the foreign 
exchange requirements both to buy the commodity and to import the 
many oil-based raw materials and consumer products needed by the 
economy. 
According to Girvan et al (1989: ii], total CARICOM debt by 
1980 was US$4002 million requiring an annual debt servicing of 
US$672.3 million. By 1988, however, this level of indebtedness 
had more than doubled to US$9802 million. This meant a debt per 
capita in the Caribbean of US$1634 million and an annual debt 
service of US$1161.8 million. Within the English-speaking region, 
the debt owed by Jamaica looms largest, totalling#4.5 billion, or 
more than half the regional total in 1989. This level of 
indebtedness translates into a national per capita debt of some 
US$1,800, in a country where most of the employed population 
earns less than US$1100 a year and where there is an official 
unemployment level well in excess of 20%. 
This precarious situation for the Commonwealth Caribbean 
occurs in the context of the overall debt crisis facing countries 
of the global south. In Latin America alone, foreign indebtedness 
exceeds US$430-billion, of which the single country of Brazil 
accounts for US$115-billion, or just under a quarter of the 
Latin American total. Girvan et al (1989: 3) have pointed out, 
however that there are important structural differences between 
the debt owed by the larger Latin American countries and that 
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owed by the smaller countries of the Caribbean and Central 
America. Unlike the situation in South America, the greater 
proportion of Caribbean external debt is owed to official 
agencies and governments, like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), 
- 
the World Bank and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
A major implication of this situation is that the repayment 
and rescheduling arrangements for the majority of Caribbean debt 
is far more inflexible than for the major South American 
economies. This is because whereas the bi-lateral credit 
arrangements between debtor countries and commercial banks are 
open to re-scheduling, the multilateral sources such as the IMF 
and World Bank have not been willing to enter into any 
significant re-scheduling arrangements. The small countries of 
the Caribbean and Central American, for whom these agencies are 
the primary creditors, often have to negotiate additional loans 
rather than re-structure or re-schedule existing ones. This leads 
to further indebtedness and an increasingly high outflow on debt 
servicing. It also leads to increasing dependence on 
transnational tax revenues or new investment to finance budget 
gaps and meet borrowing conditions set by the multilateral 
lending agencies. 
According to a 1989 global survey by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), repayments on' past 
IMF international lending exceeded disbursements by some 
US$3-billion, although IMF concessional lending, which reached 
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US$ 1.2 
- 
billion in 1989, had improved sharply. The survey 
pointed out further that political changes in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe could lead to even more difficulties in access 
to concessional credit for the debt-ridden countries of Latin 
America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. [OECD 1989 Survey: 
Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries, Paris, 
1989]. One net effect of these developments is a strengthening of 
the role of multinational corporations and private capital in the 
economies of the Caribbean region. 
At a global level, the enforced debt repayment to 
multilateral agencies are effected by the use of a range of 
'conditionalities' and penalties, including withdrawal of 
scheduled loan tranches if pre-set performance targets and 
repayment arrangements are not met. In the case of the World 
Bank, demands have included divestment of state-run enterprises, 
including telecommunications and other public utilities, and the 
employment of foreign expertise for the implementation of certain 
Bank-aided projects [Worrell 1989: 71, Jefferson 1989 : 53]. 
Because existing policy in the industrialised countries now 
favour private operation of telecommunications and other public 
utilities, lending levels to the state sector for these 
industries have remained very low. Where regional countries such 
as Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago are faced with infrastructural 
deterioration in these sectors, they are left to resort to the 
sale of telecommunications assets and equity to multinational 
partners such as Cable and Wireless. Discussing this dilemma in 
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----------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS (MDCs) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Country Per Capita 
Debt 1988 
US$ Mn. 
Jamaica 1,839 
Trinidad 1,782 
Per Capita Unemployment 
GDP 1988* Rates 
US$ Mn. 1988 
1,351 19% 
Barbados 2,945 
Guyana 2,244 
3,699 21% 
5,740 17% 
547 20% (1980) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Complied from ACE, CDB and Caricom Statistics 
*Current prices 
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its wider macro-economic context, *Frobel notes: 
"One tactic among several forced on countries in such 
straits is to try and transform external debt into 
foreign-owned equity by selling national assets at cut 
prices, providing golden opportunities for TNCs to 
expand in debt-ridden developing countries. In 
addition, a number of formerly more reluctant Third 
World (and other) countries are now abolishing many of 
their remaining restrictions and controls on foreign, 
investment, at the same time increasing other 
incentives to attract TNCs" [Frobel 1988: '64). 
In the field of communications, the 'disposal of such 
assets to overseas interests represent the surrender of a major 
element of sovereign control over key instruments of autonomous 
national and regional development. 
2.4 
- 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The inclusion of this brief historical sections provides a 
useful reference point to the current social composition of the 
region and the early role of non-regional actors on present 
structures and policies. The situation, for example, before the 
arrival of the Spanish in the region provides a useful context 
for understanding how the direction and pattern of communication 
channels were altered by this new European presence. Outlining 
the circumstances of British ascendency and later dominance also 
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assists us in better understanding the impact of intra-European 
rivalries and national imperial policies. 
Very little is known of the signalling methods and long 
distance communication techniques of the early dwellers of the 
region, the Arawaks and Caribs who began to inhabit the Caribbean 
from about 700 AD as migrants from the tropical rain forrests of 
South America [Claypole and Robotham 1980: 5]. However, 
archeological evidence suggests the early use of towers, streams, 
wooden trumpets and the blowing of special shells from the sea. 
According to Peter Martyr, later arriving European explorers 
discovered many implements to suggest an organised civilization 
among these peoples, particularly the Arawaks: 'They even 
discovered... many books', and, 'It is supposed that the natives 
preserved in these books their laws, the ritual of their 
sacrifices and ceremonies, astronomical observations and the 
precepts of agriculture' [Martyr 1912: 12-18]. 
The first Europeans arrived in the Caribbean about 800 years 
after the Arawaks and Caribs had settled in the region. 
Christopher Columbus, sailing under the sponsorship of the 
Spanish Crown, arrived in the late 15th century and laid claim 
to the entire region. This arrival was to mark a dramatic change 
in both the direction of human communication and travel hitherto 
existing in the area, as well as in the technology of 
transportation and warfare. Consistent with his mission of-trade 
and conquest, Columbus engaged the initially trusting natives in 
battles, plundering gold and other valuables to take back with 
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him to Europe. 
The Arawaks and especially the Caribs resisted. 
But without a developed military tradition and comparable 
weaponry such as gunpowder possessed then by the Spanish, their 
defence proved inadequate. The great majority of Arawaks were 
killed, many fled and some committed suicide rather than be 
captured in these resistance wars. Those Arawaks who survived the 
early onslaught in the Northern Caribbean were savagely enslaved, 
overworked in the clearing of woodlands and eventually driven 
into extinction [Sunshine 1973: 10]. 
The Caribs in the east, in contrast with the Arawaks, 
were more skilled and resilient fighters. Early attempts to 
capture the islands of St Lucia and Grenada had to be abandoned 
in the face of unrelenting resistence. This ensured the survival 
of small enclaves of Carib people in these islands as well as in 
such territories as Guyana and Surinam [Hart 1970: 15]. 
Synopsis 
These wars and the unyielding defiance by the region's early 
peoples, were to mark the start of close to five centuries of 
Caribbean resistance to the cultural, political, military and 
economic power structures of Europe and the global North. In the 
contemporary era, dominated by advanced technology, the parallel 
struggles are against what McPhail describes as 'electronic 
colonialism'[1987: 55-56), or what Schiller calls 'Cultural 
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Imperialism' [1976: 9], 
In the pre-Columbian era, the direction of human traffic, 
trade and communication were towards the highly developed 
civilizations of South America. The intervention of European 
imperial powers and their heinous system of slavery changed this 
direction irreversibly and determined the cultural, economic and 
political systems which now characterise the region. 
The very beginning of this process of domination through 
military pressure initially, then by physical slavery and later 
through technology in the Caribbean, can be charted from the 
arrival of European populations, their conquest and settlement 
of the region and the enslavement of the aboriginal peoples, 
despite their heroic resistence. 
2.4.1 
- 
European Settlement and Rivalry. 
At the same time, major European countries were themselves 
at war to establish regional supremacy. According to Odell, 
".. there developed from the seventeenth century onwards a 
geographical extension of European conflicts to the Caribbean, so 
that many territories in the region changed hands, often several 
times. The strategic and political interests of different 
European nations were thus reflected locally. Later, once the 
pattern of ownership became fixed, the European nations also 
created contrasting developmental patterns arising from different 
motives in their colonization. For example, for Britain, the 
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Caribbean territories were viewed in economic terms. They were 
solely and simply providers of tropical products grown mainly on 
plantations run by a white aristocracy.,, [Odell 1972: 21]. 
Within the Caribbean, the capture of Jamaica in 1655 marked 
the start of a greater direct control by the British government 
in London over affairs in the region. Until then, control of 
captured territories was entrusted to loosely directed 
'proprietors', acting mainly on their own initiative for private 
gain. In 1660 central authority was strengthened by the 
establishment in London of the Council for Trade and Plantations, 
the forerunner to the Colonial office. 
If the coming of the Europeans influenced the imperial 
allegiances and communication directions in the Caribbean, the 
enforced entry of a large African population was to determine the 
majority ethnic composition of these societies, as well as the 
profitability of the economic enterprises launched by the 
Europeans. 
Unlike the Spanish in search of gold, the English settlers 
realised from the outset that cultivation of the land and the 
export of tropical products to Europe was to be their main source 
of wealth creation. Their first venture was the production of 
tobacco for a European market in which the inhaling of snuff was 
becoming a fashionable habit among the upper classes. By the 
middle of the seventeenth century, however, tobacco production 
could be undertaken far cheaper in the British North American 
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colony of Virginia. A slump in prices caused by overproduction 
drove the less efficient, smaller scale producers, such as 
Jamaica and Barbados, out of the export market for tobacco, even 
while production of cotton and other crops was similarly 
threatened with competition from the American mainland colonies. 
The survival of the British colonists in the Caribbean and 
their economy demanded the production of an alternative crop. In 
1670, the British Governor began the active promotion of sugar 
cane production as an economic enterprise in the biggest of the 
British colonies, Jamaica. This was later to spread not only to 
most of the other British colonies, but to French and Spanish 
colonies as well. 
2.4.2 
- 
Slavery and the Plantation Economy 
The shift from tobacco and other small scale crops to sugar 
cane, had a profound effect on the colonial economy and society 
of the Seventeenth century Caribbean. Whereas tobacco production 
could take place on a small domestic scale, sugar production by 
its nature is extensive, requiring industrial investment in land, 
capital and most of all in a large labour force to plant, care, 
and reap the cane plant and then process and package it into 
exportable sugar. For this undertaking, extensive land 
re-distribution was required, which led to the creation of large 
self-contained production units. 
This shift was to mark the beginning of what Beckford [1972] 
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described as the 'Plantation Economy'. It meant the establishment 
of a white upper-class, land-owning plantocracy, whose members 
did not enjoy that status while in England. Many poorer white 
settlers: political exiles, debtors and other white bondsmen 
transported from Britain, formed the initial workforce and lower 
social classes. Soon, however, this source of labour proved 
insufficient to cultivate large tracts of sugar lands. 
An alternative workforce was then necessary if production was to 
be maintained on a large and expanding scale. 
This led to the intensification of a trade in African slaves 
which had been started in the region by the Spanish over a 
century earlier in 1518. By the middle of the Seventeenth 
century, the slave trade was the main source of labour for the 
colonial plantations of the British in the Caribbean. 
To the British planter class and in the eyes of the 
colonial policy makers, the slaves being imported were mere 
chattel and livestock in the possession of estates. Both in 
their transportation in the so-called 'Middle Passage' 
from Africa to the Caribbean and in their treatment on the 
estates once bought, the overwhelming majority of slaves were 
overworked, whipped, mutilated or routinely killed in punishment. 
Curtin estimates that between 1690 and 1700, of every 100 
Africans taken aboard ships of the Royal African Company for 
enslavement in the New World 23 died en route [Curtin: 1969]. 
Those who did arrive had no representatives or role in the 
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civic affairs of the colonies despite being in the majority in 
the region within less than a decade of the start of the sugar 
plantations. According to Gardner [1872], the total number of 
slaves imported into Jamaica alone was more than a million, of 
which some 200,000 were re-exported. 
For the growing population of African slaves, long distance 
signals and communication methods were essential in organizing 
resistance on a scale wider than individual plantations, or to 
summon social gatherings during rare breaks in the work 
schedules. Hart notes that the primitive telecommunications needs 
for military operations by the slaves were met by the use of the 
'abeng', a shell from the sea adapted to make a series of shrill 
sounds, or alternatively the 'aketty', a similar device. 
These telecommunications devices were used particularly by 
the Maroons who were organised groups of escaped slaves who 
fought a successful series, of resistance wars against British 
troops in the mountains of Jamaica. In many of these battles, the 
'abeng' and the 'aketty' proved decisive: "The Maroons placed a 
scout within the cave where he could hear the echo of the 
footsteps as the soldiers trod on the stone. When the echo ceased 
the scout knew that the last man had entered the trap, and 
emerged from the cave to sound the 'aketty'. Entirely surrounded, 
all the soldiers were killed. " [Hart 1985: 96] 
For calling social gatherings, as well as transmitting coded 
messages of other types, slaves within the estates attempted to 
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use their African drumming as a communication device. "It was 
obvious to the plantation owners that the practice was 
potentially subversive of their social regime, since the slaves, 
using their 'primitive' technology were able to communicate with 
each other at a distance in a language that was incomprehensible 
to the plantation owners but which was quite comprehensible to 
themselves. " [Brown 1984: 4]. Predictably, the response of the 
plantocracy to this situation was the banning of all drumming 
on the estates and the active discouragement of the use of any 
other langauge but English among the slaves. 
The slave populations in the region had no rights in law, 
and the only recourses open to them in the face of oppression 
were submission, escape or risking the consequences of 
organised resistance. Like the Arawaks and Caribs before them, 
large numbers of slaves opted for resistance in defence of their 
humanity. This led to a vicious cycle of greater brutality by an 
increasingly outnumbered and insecure ruling class, which in turn 
fueled more resistance and repression. Birth and death and census 
figures presented to the Jamaican Assembly in 1831 suggested that 
the slave population was declining at the rate of 1000 a year. 
Part of the insecurity which bred this level of brutality on 
the part of the slave masters was the difficulty of rapid 
communication with the imperial centre which was the source of 
their power and support. They felt a profound sense of isolation 
both numerically within the colonies and in their capacity for 
rapid troop reinforcements during the frequent military crises 
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with which they were faced. The need for rapid communication 
both between colonies and across the Atlantic was becoming more 
and more vital. The communication of new laws, colonial 
directives and the responses to these, all of which took several 
weeks by way of ships, was becoming intolerable as the sole means 
of long distance communication then available across the 
Atlantic. Within the colonies themselves, couriers on foot or 
horseback, while being the fastest available means of internal 
communication, were also highly vulnerable in the siege situation 
faced by many colonial administrators. 
But despite the limitations, resistance and brutality, the 
slave trade and the use of slaves in the West Indies formed the 
single most important source of external earnings by the British 
economy in the late Seventeenth and during the Eighteenth 
centuries. According to Eric Williams: 
The slave trade kept the wheels of metropolitan 
industry turning; it stimulated navigation and 
shipbuilding and employed seamen; it raised fishing 
villages into flourishing cities; it gave sustenance 
to new industries based on the processing of raw 
materials; it yielded large profits which were 
ploughed back into metropolitan industry; and 
finally it gave rise to an unprecedented commerce in 
the West Indies and made the Caribbean territories 
among the most valuable colonies the world has ever 
known [Williams 1970: 148]. 
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He noted that the 'Triangular Trade', in which European 
manufactured goods were transported to Africa to be traded for 
slaves which were then taken for sale in the West Indies in 
exchange for European-bound sugar, accounted for 21% of British 
imports, 8% of exports and 14% of total external trade 
[Thomas 1988: 21]. 
It was not until the early 19th century that the Caribbean 
colonies began to yield less lucrative returns for both private 
planters and the British economy as a whole. The downturn was in 
part the result of strong competition from the larger French 
colony of San Domingue and partly the result of frequent, violent 
and costly slave revolts. In England and elsewhere in Europe, 
pressure from an emergent manufacturing bourgeoisie and from 
religious and humanitarian allies in the Church led to the 
abolition of the British slave trade in 1807- and of slavery 
itself in the British colonies by an Act of 1833, but to take 
full effect only in 1838. 
Synopsis 
The arrival in the Caribbean region of large numbers of 
African slaves transformed the sociology and economy of the 
region from one of a settler colony of Europeans to a capitalist 
agro-industrial economy with a vital link into the British 
economy. The enslaved majority devised their own communications 
methods and forms of resistance. This increased the physical 
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insecurity and social isolation of the slave-owning minority of 
Europeans and their need for a rapid and reliable means of 
communications with Britain. As an expression of this insecurity, 
they resorted to methods of extreme brutality to enforce 
conformity and to help secure a sustained period of profitability 
for British investors. 
According to Hart, 'capital accumulation from the slave 
trade and the production and distribution of sugar from the 
Caribbean area had helped to finance the development of the 
technological inventions of the Industrial Revolution, thereby 
stimulating the growth of the British economy' [Hart 1989: 3]. 
There appears to be little doubt, therefore, that the early 
motivation for the British state's involvement was an economic 
interest in raw materials produced under conditions of slavery in 
the region. Later, however, when the slave trade had been 
abolished and the once lucrative sugar plantations entered their 
first period of decline, the region's strategic location emerged 
as being of paramount importance to the geo-political interests 
of the European imperialists. 
Among the technological inventions developed in Europe during 
the Industrial Revolution was telegraphic cable communication. 
This new technology opened up new investment opportunities in 
Europe and the colonies, and provided the imperial authorities in 
England and their local administrators in the colonies with a 
potentially valuable new instrument for long distance 
communication. It offered a relatively rapid response capability 
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in times of mass revolts and greater overall control over the 
colonial empire. The early development and subsequent expansion 
of this new telecommunication network will be discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this study. 
2.5 
- 
NATIONALISM AND DECOLONIZATION 
The period following emancipation in the Caribbean was 
marked by further severe economic hardship for the majority of 
the populations. But that era also saw a social re-organization 
of the society. As was to be expected, large numbers of ex-slaves 
left the stifling confines and bitter memories of the sugar 
estates to establish their own small plots and communities. This 
simultaneously created a stratum of peasant proprietors and 
precipitated a severe labour shortage within the established 
plantation system. The plantocracy responded with efforts at 
re-structuring production methods and with the introduction of a 
new stream of immigrant labourers. The majority of these were 
Indian indentured workers, who arrived in the period from 1854, 
going mainly to Trinidad and the then British Guiana (now 
Guyana). 
It is this phase which created in these two territories 
the current approximate numerical parity between African and 
Indian eitnic groupings. Later, an attempt was also made to 
recruit Chinese immigrants, but this took place only on a much 
smaller scale and confined to Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad. These 
efforts at meeting an immediate economic problem were to 
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permanently alter the race and class composition of a Caribbean 
society once composed mainly of European and Africans. 
These efforts, however, did not avert a severe economic 
crisis across the region, persisting through most of the century 
following emancipation. The plantation owners were constrained by 
the continued existence of the Navigation Acts which obliged 
trade by British colonies to take place exclusively with Britain 
using British ships. Muscovado sugar from the West Indian 
colonies entered Britain under special monopoly arrangements 
which gave the region's planters important advantages. However, 
by the mid-Nineteenth century European beet sugar began to 
compete commercially with cane sugar and both the Navigation Acts 
and the special preferential duties of West Indian sugar were 
beginning to be considered as impediments to the expansion and 
freedom of British industry. 
In 1846, the Caribbean plantocracy, their beneficiaries 
and paid lobbyists in London received a severe blow with 
the introduction of the Sugar Duties Act, under which the special 
arrangements were abolished. Three years later in 1849, the 
Navigation Acts were also abolished, signalling the beginning of 
Britain's disengagement from the West Indian sugar industry from 
which it had gained so much. 
Within Westminster itself, the last half of the nineteenth 
century was also a period of active debate over whether the 
whole empire should not be dismantled. Under Gladstone and the 
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Liberals, the idea of 'separatism' became current in support of 
the view that the colonies were now millstones around the neck 
of an industrially retooled and emergent Britain. A Select 
Committee of the British Parliament was appointed in 1870 to 
re-examine colonial policies, following which the Colonial Office 
reaffirmed that the empire would not be separated, but each 
component would have to become more self-reliant: "Self-reliance 
does not mean separate existence", Arthur Knatchbull-Hugessen of 
the Colonial Office, is reported to have explained in 1871. "A 
colony may be great and self-reliant, and still maintain an 
intimate connection with the mother country. The government wish 
to retain them bound to this country by ties of kindred and 
affection. " [Barty-King 1979: 37]. 
In practice, the new ties in the colonial relationship with 
the imperial centre was to be effected with the then emerging 
technology of the telegraph. Not only was it to be the instrument 
of 'maintaining an intimate connection with the mother 
country', but also a major alternative area of British capital 
investment to the now declining sugar plantations. According to 
the London Times of August 26.1869: "There can be no doubt that 
the most popular outlet now for commercial enterprise is to be 
found in the construction of submarine lines of telegraph. " 
But if Britain, for its own economic objectives, saw 
advantages in re-structuring economic relations within the 
Empire, so too did the more enterprising planters in the West 
Indies. Additional market outlets in the United States and France 
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were secured, and overall, a collapse of the West Indian sugar 
industry was temporarily averted, although many inefficient 
estates ceased operation. For the emergent black majority 
populations, however, it was a period of self-discovery in 
conditions of economic deprivation and social squalor. These 
efforts culminated in major waves of social upheaval which swept 
the region in the Great Depression of the 1930s, upheavals which 
were to form the cradle for the modern development of the 
region through the establishment for the first time of indigenous 
political, trade union and social institutions. 
These institutions, many under the leadership of radical 
nationalists, hastened the arrival of internal self-government, 
and Universal Adult Suffrage which was achieved by the people of 
the region in 1944. Close to twenty years later, the campaign for 
full political independence for the larger territories started to 
gain ground, as the economic relations with Britain began 
increasingly to take second place to trade with the United States 
and Canada. Notwitstanding the absence of any re-structuring in 
the basic primary agricultural character of the economies, the 
discovery of oil in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica contributed 
to new optimism and seemed to increase the prospects of greater 
self-determination both at the national and regional levels. 
Synopsis 
For the rising industrial bourgeoisie in Europe of the 
mid-nineteenth century, sugar, slavery and the plantation 
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economy had become a redundant and burdensome vestige of a 
passing era. The dominant influence of the new industrial class 
in the British Parliament, and the agitation of slaves led to 
the abolition of slavery and a re-structuring of the plantation 
economy. In the english-speaking Caribbean, these developments 
ushered in both a period of severe economic depression as well as 
the inauguration of new institutions which were to become the 
foundations of self government and later of political 
independence in the region. 
2.6 
- 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
In these circumstances, British colonial policy-makers saw 
the possibility of off-loading the multiplicity of West Indian 
colonies under an independence arrangement which involved a 
federation of all the small with the larger territories as a 
new unitary state. The massive physical distances between 
the component parts, wide disparity in standards of living 
among most LDC and the MDCs, the production of largely similar 
primary crops in competition for the same external markets 
coupled with strong internal nationalism were all placed at a 
secondary level to the convenience of a neat federal experiment. 
Numerous previous attempts at federation took place on 
a smaller scale from as early as 1800, the primary aim being to 
reduce the administrative expense of so many small colonies. 
Those attempts foundered oweing to physical distances, ethnic and 
historical incompatibilities and problems of communication. 
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Within three 'years of operation between 1958 and 1961, the 
latest and most ambitious attempt at political union, called the 
West Indies Federation, also collapsed. 
Jamaica, the largest of the member-states, was the first to 
withdraw, following a referendum on the issue in 1961. Popular 
sentiment then, was in favour of national independence, which was 
secured from Britain in 1962. The withdrawal of Trinidad and 
Tobago followed, and it too secured its political independence in 
1962. The departure of the two major member countries was 
decisive and Federation was officially disbanded, with a majority 
of the remaining territories also securing political independence 
in the succeeding two decades. 
The collapse of the colonially designed federal scheme, 
did not indicate a permanent rejection of regional integration. 
However, the succeeding regional relations and integration 
systems inherited a legacy of suspicion, thinly veiled 
competition and narrow nationalism which had so fatally beset 
the Federation. In particular, the less developed countries 
regard with some distrust the more developed ones, and seek to 
negotiate extra-regional third party arrangements as a buffer 
against over dependence on MDC leadership and control. And among 
MDCs themselves internal policies and commitment towards 
advanced regional co-operation is often overshadowed by a fear of 
mass migration from the LDCs and demands for heavy contributions 
to their development needs. Among both groups of countries, the 
extent of support for advanced schemes of integration vary with 
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the particular political party or even political leader in 
power. 
In the era of independence, following the failure of the 
Federation, the first moves towards regional co-operation were 
loose economic-based arrangements. Unlike the Federation, these 
and succeeding initiatives have been gradual, extensively 
discussed within the region (as against imposed from outside) and 
have moved from the most basic towards more advanced systems of 
integration. The movement of this process conforms with Lynn 
Mytelka's theoretical model of the stages of regional integration 
among Third World neighbours, and Axline's [1989] elaboration of 
this model. 
Mytelka [1975] presents three ideal types of integrative 
schemes, each more advanced than the former, and defined by the 
developmental policy measures which comprise it. The Type 1 model 
constitutes a loose commercial arrangement within a free trade 
area and a customs union. Derived from early European trade 
liberalization schemes, this first model aims primarily at 
increasing intra-regional trade flows. Applied in conditions of 
underdevelopment and uneven resource distribution, it is regarded 
as leading to severe trade imbalances, economic polarization and 
internal dependence. These factors give rise to instability and 
eventually to even greater disunity. 
The Type 2 model incorporates all the policy features of the 
more basic scheme, but seeks to correct its distributional 
- 
135 
- 
deficiencies. Its corrective measures involve compensatory 
and regulatory machanisms such as special solidarity funds, the 
establishment of development banks and other means of spreading 
more evenly the benefits of integration. The Type 3 integration 
model builds upon the two previous co-operation systems but goes 
beyond them to the introduction of measures to limit dependence 
on external actors such as transnational corporations and 
governments of' the industrialised countries. Policy measures 
include a regional regulatory regime for foreign investment, 
collective development planning at region-wide and sectoral 
levels as well as more advanced mechanisms of re-distribution. 
In analysing these three basic linked approaches to 
integration in conditions of under-development, Axline argues 
that a Type 3 scheme is more likely to achieve the development 
goals of regional integration than Types 1 and 2. This conclusion 
is somewhat self-evident as the Type 3 scheme also incorporates 
and deliberately tackles the problems implicit in the preceeding 
two. More significant, however is the conclusion that the Type 3 
scheme requires a higher level of political consensus and 
direction with a correspondingly more complex consultative and 
decision-making structure. 
Examined within the framework of this model, the modern 
movement towards Caribbean integration began with a regional 
Type 1 scheme. This was the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) in 1968, built as much on the foundation 
of some post-federal residue of regional identity as on the 
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potential threat newly posed by Britain's application for entry 
into the European Economic Community (EEC). The success of an 
earlier three-country Free Trade Association among Barbados, 
Antigua and Guyana operating since 1965 provided a pilot scheme 
around. which the regionwide CARIFTA was designed. The planning 
process incorporated inputs from both the business and academic 
communities regionally. Operating from headquarters in Guyana, 
the CARIFTA scheme encountered many of the disequilibria and 
polarization envisaged in such an elementary Type 1 scheme. A 
regional Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), planned as part of the 
overall integration framework, did not begin functioning until 
1970. 
Internal acrimony, particularly between the smaller 
and the larger territories, developed over proposals for the 
introduction of a common external tariff and the harmonization of 
fiscal incentives. These two measures, viewed as essential in 
correcting the skewed investment flows favouring the iDCs, were, 
not surprisingly, defended most strongly by the less developed 
territories. Eventually, the approaching deadlock was resolved in 
1973 by concessions on the part of a new Prime Minister in the 
largest member country, Jamaica, which became a central actor in 
the upgrading of the arrangement to the level of a Type 2 scheme 
in the form of an Economic Community. This was achieved only 
after further intensive negotiations and the establishment of a 
distributive mechanism, the Caribbean Investment Corporation, to 
ensure greater investment flows to the smaller territories of the 
Eastern Caribbean. The new Caribbean Community and Common Market 
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(CARICOM) came into being' in 1973, under the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. 
The integration movement has remained within this Type 2 
framework of economic co-operation objectives, over the past 
decade and a half. According to functional integrationist 
theory the process can best be advanced through "gradual 
politicization of the actors' purposes which were originally 
considered' 'technical or 'non-controversial'. Politicization 
implies that the actors, in response to the initial purposes, 
agree to widen the spectrum of means considered appropriate to 
attain them. " Haas and Schmitter, in detailing these factors 
further, argue that three sets of factors perform a decisive role 
in the transition from economic to political union. The first of 
these are background variables such as the unit size, rate of 
interaction and level of elite compatibility. The second set of 
factors are the variables at the moment of economic union, such 
as the commonality of government objectives, and the degree of 
authority vested in the union. The third set are process 
variables relating to decision-making styles and the adaptability 
of the members to crises [Haas and Schmitter 1966: 261-274]. 
Synopsis 
Judged by these standards of the functional integrationist 
school, Caribbean economic integration is still considerably far 
removed from consolidation into a political union. Unlike the 
European frame of reference of these theorists, the motivating 
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factors appear less to be the gradual politicization of technical 
or bureaucratic issues, than the economic crises and external 
political developments having a common effect on regional 
economies. The fuel crises of 1976 and 1990, for example 
concentrated the attention of the movement on intra-regional 
strategies and resources, and the threat to agricultural 
commodity export markets posed by the Single European Act also 
gave rise to concerted regional political evaluations of further 
integrative survival strategies. 
To date, however, the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
establishing the institutional framework and operational methods 
of CARICOM remains substantially unchanged. Whereas one of the 
functional integrationist expectations would be for a delegation 
of more authority to the centre, the reality within CARICOM has 
been a diminution of the power of bureaucrats in the CARICOM 
headquarters in Guyana. The main motive force in the movement 
appears to come intermittently from the political leaderships 
and from organised interests such as academic and business groups 
in member countries, in response to developments in the global 
economic environment. 
2.7 
- 
UNITED STATES INFLUENCE ON REGIONALISM 
As we noted earlier, the activity and influence of CARICOM 
has varied with the degree of commitment on the part of national 
governments particularly in the MDCs. From a peak level of 
activity in the 1970s, regional trade experienced a major decline 
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during the 1980s [Samuel 1989: 223). In this period, the policy 
of the largest member state, Jamaica, was largely focussed on 
bi-lateral trading and political relations with the influential 
United States government. The US government itself was engaged in 
the promotion of a new trade and aid scheme, the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), the effect of which was to undermine the 
regional integration movement. We discuss elements of the CBI 
here, as an example of the effect of US policy on the region. 
The CBI, introduced in 1984, provided duty-free treatment to 
a number of export products from designated Caribbean countries 
which comply with certain specified political criteria. These 
included provisions that the beneficiary country (1) was not a 
communist country, (2) has not nationalised or seized property 
owned by U. S citizens without proper compensation, (3) that the 
country does not provide preferential treatment to products of 
developed countries that are likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on U. S. commerce, (4) that the country agrees to provide 
equitable and reasonable access to its markets and basic 
commodity resources to the United States and (5) that certain 
limits be observed in the degree to which a beneficiary country 
uses export subsidies or imposes export performance requirements 
or local content requirements that could distort international 
trade [Pantojas-Garcia 1985: 107-8]. 
Under these rules, both Grenada and Guyana, as well as 
Cuba in the Spanish-speaking group, were identified as countries 
to be excluded from the pact on political grounds. However, in 
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the case of Grenada, the threat was made unnecessary because of 
the military invasion carried out by the US in October 1983, 
three months before the CBI legislation was due to come into 
force. The benefits of the CBI legislation were then extended to 
the regime imposed after the invasion. 
But the effect of this US legislation on regional 
integration was to divide CARICOM member countries along US 
determined political lines and then set countries in competition 
against each other for access and quotas to the United States 
markets. The development and consolidation of fragile CARICOM 
trade arrangements were disrupted by a resurgence of interest in 
export processing zones (EPZs), US twin-plant assembly industries 
and the maintenance of good relations with the United States. 
"Thus, it seems clear that the political and economic conditions 
established by the CBI are mainly intended to stimulate, U. S. 
investments in the region and only marginally to result in the 
expansion of locally owned productive activities. " 
[Pantojas-Garcia 1985: 109] It certainly also performed a 
undermining role in the process of Caribbean integration in the 
1980s. 
Dissatisfaction with the real performance of the CBI in its 
first five years of operation, a change of government in 
Jamaica in 1989, as well as developments within the European 
integration movement, are among factors giving rise to renewed 
interest and activity on regional integration. °Existing economic 
difficulties, however casts some doubt on whether this increased 
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regional co-operation activity will involve any qualitative 
changes in the direction of Mytelka's Type 3 integration scheme. 
Substantive changes to the existing system would involve 
strengthening and politicizing the Draft Agreement on Foreign 
Investment as an example of a policy measure aimed at 
consolidating common deficiencies and reducing the dominance of 
overseas transnationals in the region. 
Such a move would involve significant implications for 
the method of operation of firms such as Cable and Wireless 
in the region. However, market performance indicators 
and loan conditionalities being stringently enforced by both 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
region, as well as the burden of debt repayment, have meant 
more liberalization rather than greater regional regulation in 
the telecommunications and other sectors. In these circumstances, 
any tightening of regulatory regimes appear less likely in the 
short term. Instead, further reductions in regulatory 
arrangements are likely, as suggested by Frobel [1988: 64] 
2.8 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the current influence of the United States in the 
region, the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
continue to maintain important political and economic 
relationships with the United Kingdom, derived from their common 
history as former members of the British empire. The region 
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played an important, if involuntary, role in the establishment 
and expansion of that empire through the economic returns derived 
from slavery and the plantation economy. 
Among the innovations of the Industrial Revolution, to which 
the profits of slavery contributed, were the technologies of 
electro-magnetic telegraphy and related cable production. For 
the exploitation of these innovations, the strategic location of 
the Caribbean offered an already established bridgehead to the 
vast markets of South America and a monitoring post on 
developments in the burgeoning rival to European dominance, the 
United States. It is in this respect that the Caribbean colonies 
held the prospect of providing a strategic advantage to a 
widening of the Nineteenth century empire-building of Britain. 
Many territories of the region, such as Montserrat, parts of 
the Virgin islands and Bermuda remain British colonies today, 
some 30 years after the process of de-colonization began within 
the region. But even among the newly independent countries, major 
institutions and historical influences remain which continue to 
condition both modern policies and structures in the region. One 
such remaining centre of British economic influence is the 
multinational firm Cable and Wireless. Its dominant presence in 
the telecommunications sector of the modern Caribbean, poses a 
challenge to the realization of effective regional control over 
an important area of development policy-making. 
In the face of contracting commodity markets and mounting 
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indebtedness, the region has sought to establish various 
integrative institutions. Their effectiveness however, is often 
undermined by the economic, political and military dominance of 
the United States in the region and the policies pursued by 
individual CARICOM member countries. The response of the region 
is therefore constrained by a period of stagnation in the pursuit 
of regional integration. The absence of these wider efforts at 
collective action has contributed to the situation of poor policy 
co-ordination in telecommunications and foreign investment 
regulation in the region. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TELEGRAPHY AND EMPIRE-BUILDING: 
ESTABLISHING THE EARLY CARIBBEAN NETWORKS 
The technological antecedent of Twentieth century optical 
fibre, microwave and satellite technologies, enabling 
rapid global communication across once unthinkable distances, 
was the innovation of telegraphic cable communication. Much in 
the same way that a convergence'of computer systems, digital 
technology and satellites have today set the stage for a 
revolutionary transformation of industry, trade, communication 
and productivity, so too did the harnessing of the steam engine, 
electricity and telegraphy transform global development and 
communication in the Nineteenth century. 
In many areas of the world, the contemporary paths of 
communication flow, even with the employment of dramatic new 
methods, remain those laid down in the formative years 
of cable communications. Within the Caribbean, for example, the 
present-day configuration and ownership of the communication 
system owes much to the groundwork and character of the structure 
established over a century ago. In this chapter, we trace the 
penetration of the telegraph and later the wireless system into 
the Caribbean colonies, highlighting the political and commercial 
objectives which motivated the promoters. We will argue later 
that these have remained a primary consideration for network 
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expansion and development in the modern Caribbean. 
In attempting to come to grips with the significance for the 
modern Caribbean of those early technical innovations, it is 
useful-to reflect initially on the historical development of long 
distance human communication leading to the electro-magnetic 
system of telegraphy. 
3.1 
- 
EARLY METHODS OF REMOTE COMMUNICATION 
Many simple, and often unreliable non-verbal systems of 
message transmission preceded the more advanced telegraph, and 
were used mainly in earlier naval and defence applications. In 
Africa and parts of the Caribbean, the blowing of horns or shells 
served to warn of the impending approach of an enemy. Beckles 
notes that an early mechanical form of long-distance message 
signalling was in operation in the Caribbean in the early 
nineteenth century: "In Trinidad, a pattern of balls and flags on 
the arms of a tower was used to relay phrases such as type of 
ships, or their cargoes, or the weather. " [Beckles 1989: 72) 
In Europe, the French developed a system in the late 
Eighteenth century, to improve the transmission of military 
information for the continuation of the Napoleonic Wars 
[Brock 1981: 56]. Developed by the Frenchman Abee Claude Chappe, 
the system was called the semaphore telegraph. It was presented 
to the French Legislative Assembly in 1784 and put into operation 
ten years later in 1794. By 1835 an extensive semaphore telegraph 
- 
146' 
- 
network was the most advanced signalling system in existence in 
Europe. 
"The Chappe semaphore telegraph required the erection 
of posts at such intervals and on such heights or on open 
ground as to make each post visible by telescope to the 
next in either direction. Those intervals averaged 
about fifteen kilometres (9.3 miles). Each post bore a 
crossbar with a pivoted arm at each end. Ropes and pulleys 
permitted the adjustment of the two arms to signify 
letters or words in the code system used. " [Desmond 
1978: 104]. 
Though a significant improvement on the previously used 
systems of flags and sounds, Chappe's mechanised samaphore 
telegraph was still a cumbersome, slow and militarily vulnerable 
system of communication. The system could not be relied on in a 
thick fog, for example. 
New techniques by which messages could be transmitted in 
encoded form, along wires stretched over great distances, began 
to be tested both in Europe and in the United States in the early 
1830s. These early methods, described as the Electric Telegraph, 
represented the first advanced telecommunications systems, in a 
world where detailed messages were transmitted at best by bearer 
travelling on horse-back or later by using the railway system for 
inland contacts, and steamers and other ships for overseas 
despatches. 
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"Before the 1840s, it took 5 to 8 months for a letter 
to travel between Britain and India, and the writer 
could not expect to receive an answer in less than 
2 years. Even after steamships it still took six weeks 
in each direction. " [Headrick 1988: 96] 
News reports, government information and colonial directives 
as well as personal messages were, thus, subject to major and 
disruptive time-lapses and transportation costs, at a time of 
expanding colonial empires and wars of conquest within and 
outside of Europe. It is in this context that further research 
into improved communications methods took place. 
3.2 
- 
THE ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH 
Leading this research in Britain was the Electric Telegraph 
Company operated by Charles Wheatstone and and William Cooke. 
Their system initially involved transmitting electrical signals 
along the steel lines of the railway track. This 'chronometric 
telegraph' was tested along a mile and a quarter of the London to 
Birmingham railway track, with the impulses conforming to a code 
designed by the inventors and later known as the European or 
Continental Code. 
By 1837 the British government granted the company a 
patent, allowing it to implement and protect its new technology 
of message transmission by land lines from one part of the 
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country to another. This patent marked the point of the first 
formal interface between the private innovators and the state in 
the field of telecommunications in an industrially emergent 
Britain. 
At the same time, in the United States, another leading 
inventor, the artist Samuel Morse, was conducting similar 
experimentation, using a different technique. Morse's telegraphic 
device sent a signal over a wire as an electric circuit was 
alternately closed and opened by the manual operation of a brass 
'key'. A varied sequence of metallic clicks cause an alteration 
of the current flow and, assisted by a magnetic field, could be 
interpreted by way of a code designed by Morse. The audible 
signals were later elaborated into a series of dots and dashes 
mechanically conveyed onto tape or ribbon by the incoming 
impulses. The inventors system of translating each series of dots 
and dashes into symbols for each letter of the alphabet, numeral 
or punctuation mark, became widely used and known as the 
-'Morse 
Code' [Wood 1939: 228] 
By 1836 Morse had designed and made his apparatus, 
demonstrating it at New York University by 1837. Within months 
he applied for a patent to protect his invention, which was 
granted only in 1844. Morse was credited with being the inventor 
of the recording electric telegraph, which from the outset was 
regarded and used in the United States as an instrument for the 
rapid transmission of news. The parallel magnetic system was 
under development in Europe simultaneously. 
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A universal weakness of these new transmission technologies 
however, was that, despite their proven advantages on land, they 
were not capable of transmitting messages overseas. Private 
messages and government dispatches still had to be conveyed by 
Packet Steamers across the English Channel to nearby France. In 
the case of the far-flung colonial empire, information about new 
laws, despatches from the colonial office and the return still 
had to travel by ship, often taking several months to be 
delivered. 
This represented a severe limitation on the effectiveness of 
colonial political and military control, as well as on broader 
international trade and communication. The British authorities as 
well as private trading interests therefore looked with 
increasing optimism towards the day when the so-called 'electric 
telegraph' could be extended overseas. Such political interest in 
the future prospect of the telegraph was frankly expressed on 
behalf of the British Foreign Secretary in a letter to the 
Continental Telegraph Conference, held in Paris in July 1851. 
"Lord Palmerston directs me to observe that 
the free use of continental electric telegraphs 
would be of great political advantage to Great 
Britain by enabling the Government to communicate 
with great rapidity on every desirable occasion 
with British diplomatic and consular agents 
abroad and especially in thus affording the power 
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of early explanation with foreign governments, on 
occasions when misunderstandings may have arisen 
....... 
We should also frequently derive great 
benefit from the rapid conveyance of intelligence 
of a political and military nature from China and 
from our Indian and other possessions... " 
[Palmerston July 4,1851 in PRO File FO 97/197] 
The main technical problem faced by scientists in this 
field was how to insulate the electrical cable from water, 'to 
enable lines to be laid at sea. Wheatstone told a Committee of 
the House of Commons in 1840 of his attempt to use tarred hemp as 
the insulating cover, but this was not to prove successful. It 
was not until five years later that a successful extruding 
machine was built capable of insulating wire. The machine was 
invented and patented by Charles Bewley of the Gutta Percha 
Company in 1845. The technology was also made available by Bewley 
to the firm S. W. Silver & Co., but was commercially exploited by 
the Gutta Percha Company, which was renamed TELCON. A convergence 
however, of techniques of insulation with the technologies of 
the telegraph and of electricity marked the beginning of the era 
of 'submarine telegraphy' to which Palmerston had looked with 
such imperial optimism (Trowbridge 1938: 173-177, Pender 1929: 22, 
Barty-King 1979: 11-15. ] 
3.3 
- 
TELEGRAPHIC FIRST BASE: EUROPE 
In June 1845, John and Jacob Brett registered a firm, The 
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General Oceanic, Telegraphic Company with the objective of laying 
a submarine cable across the Atlantic ocean linking Europe and 
the Americas. Before this ambitious undertaking was attempted, 
however, John Brett accepted the lesser task of laying a 
cable link between Dover in England and Calais in France. To do 
this, he formed the English Channel Submarine Telegraph Company, 
which successfully laid the cable link in 1850 [Pender 1931: 75]. 
This pioneering connection broke down after only six 
days. However the problem was diagnosed as being related to the 
external materials and not the electrical technology, and the 
global importance of this breakthrough in establishing direct 
telegraphic links across the sea was widely recognised. A year 
after it was accomplished, representatives of four European 
governments possessing land-line technology including Britain, 
France, Prussia and Belgium, attended an International Electric 
Telegraph conference in Paris. 
At this meeting, the other European participants expressed 
unease that Britain was the only country among them whose 
telegraph system was not operated by the State. Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Palmerston was known to be resolved to obtain 
an Act of Parliament to bring these activities within the direct 
purview of government. The justification for this public sector 
operation of internal telecommunications lines was the necessity 
to conform with existing European standards and state ownership, 
which would facilitate European interconnectivity. In addition, 
he argued in favour of state ownership of the internal system 
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on grounds of national security, government administration 
and improved public access to information: 
11.0. the government and country would 
draw much indirect advantage from any 
agreement which would secure ' indefinitely 
to the British newspapers the unrestricted 
use of the telegraphs... How the system of 
telegraphic communication, established and 
maintained in this country by private 
enterprise is to be brought into harmony 
with the national system of telegraphs under 
government control which prevails universally 
on the continent, so as to induce other 
governments to admit Great Britain to a free 
participation in the use of their respective 
electric telegraphs, it will be for the Lords 
of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade 
to determine.... it would be desirable to 
remove every obstacle which may stand in the 
way of full use of the electric telegraph" 
[Palmerston in PRO File FO 97/ 197]. 
A Telegraph Purchase Bill was presented to the British 
Parliament in 1868, under which the Post Master General would 
acquire and operate existing and future systems of inland 
telegraphy. On the basis of this, a grant of 8-million pounds was 
to be allocated to buy out the assets of such companies in the 
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United Kingdom and the investments within these companies of 
private railway firms. The government, therefore, took over the 
internal telegraph system, placing it under the Post office. 
Significantly, however, the enterprises engaged in the 
external telegraph connections with the empire were not 
nationalised. Brett's submarine cable system, for example, 
remained within the purview of private investment well after it 
had succeeded in establishing a lasting and reliable link between 
Dover and Calais. Despite high capital cost of this undertaking, 
its financing was left to private capital. But like the Channel 
Tunnel of the 1990s, government maintained a close political 
interest in the success and significance of this pioneering 
project. 
With the cable link to France accomplished, private 
businessmen and the British government alike began to examine 
other feasible submarine application of this new technology. Soon 
the next target became cable links with Ireland across the 
60-mile span of Irish Sea. After two unsuccessful attempts, a 
link from Port Patrick in Scotland to Donaghadee in Ireland was 
established in 1853. These were followed by other successful 
links to Holland, Belgium and other European centres of 
commercial and political interest to Britain. [See Baglehole 
1969: 9]. 
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Synopsis 
The successful development of technology which enabled 
inland message transmission by cable, marked a very important 
stage-in the development of greater centralised control by the 
urban-based state apparatus over rural areas. As Shields and 
Samarajiva, quoting the Maitland Commission, point out, reliable 
point to point communications technology between urban and rural 
areas is often seen as enhancing "the ability of government to 
co-ordinate administrative activities, improve internal security 
and facilitate the incorporation of rural economic activities 
into the national economy by enhancing trade flows" [Shields and 
Samarajiva 1990: 204]. It is consistent with utilization of these 
advantages that the British government, citing the situation in 
mainland Europe, moved swiftly to nationalize the internal 
network by 1868. 
But, as Sheilds and Samarajiva also point out, the extension 
of telegraphic and other lines of communication into remote areas 
also meant the possibility of increased industrial, commercial 
and cultural penetration of the internal periphery: "The fact 
that integration detracts from the rights of rural communities to 
define their development priorities is ignored. " The example of 
the effect of new telegraph and telephone systems on the internal 
political and socio-economic life of early 20th century Ethiopia, 
illustrated some potential consequences. According to Garretson, 
these systems "helped centralize power in Addis Ababa since the 
emperor would communicate with distant provinces in hours rather 
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than weeks or months... it also strengthened some of the authority 
of the great nobles, largely at the expense of peasants and serfs 
who suffered new taxes to pay for the system's maintenance and 
upkeep. On the other hand, traders benefitted greatly, since 
quick-money transfers could be made or the latest market value of 
a commodity ascertained. "[Garretson 1980: 59, quoted in Shields 
and Samarijiva 1990: 204]. 
In England, the Chamber of Commerce and the large newspaper 
establishments were among the leading supporters of 
nationalization, because of the rapid expansion of the network 
at lower tariff levels which state ownership was expected to 
confer, over private monopoly. The commercial and publishing 
interests anticipated an unprecedented opportunity for market 
expansion and rural access. Foreman-Peck notes that whereas under 
the private telegraph companies, the number of telegraph offices 
stood at 2,155 in 1868, the number of Post Office telegraph 
stations totalled 3,444 by 1872. "The volume of telegraph traffic 
leaped upwards, in the year ending March 1871,9.8 million 
messages were sent, compared with 6.4 million in the calender 
year 1868. " [Foreman-Peck 1989: 85]. 
Early inland telegraphy, therefore, was likely to have 
played an important role, together with the postal and rail 
systems, to the economic and social incorporation of what Galtung 
calls the 'internal periphery' of the imperial Centre [Galtung 
1971: 306]. The British state, through the monopoly of the Post 
Office, took direct control of this process, initially by 
- 
156 
- 
supporting the reseach, but later by nationalization. Mastery of 
the technology of submarine telegraphy would unleash similar 
process at a wider, global environment. 
3.4 
- 
SUBMARINE CABLE TELEGRAPHY AND COLONIAL CONTROL 
In the intervening years after the development of the 
land-based telegraph system in Europe, the British colonial 
authorities began investigating ways in which it could be used to 
upgrade imperial communications and control by colonial 
administrators, especially within the larger territories and 
dominions, and in scattered island-possessions such as the West 
Indies. 
"Communications are of the essence of our empire and 
unless we succeed in solving some of the most urgent 
problems of more rapid communications, it will be 
almost impossible in the future to hold together 
this vast empire, scattered over the whole globe. " 
[British General Smuts in Wilshaw 1936: 107] 
Not surprisingly, the challenge of improved colonial control 
over India, placed that vast sub-continent among the first within 
the British Empire to receive land lines. This was introduced in 
1851 and later "at the instigation of the Governor General, Lord 
Dalhousie", extended to Calcutta and Agra and then to Lahore and 
Peshawar [Barty-King 1979: 7]. While declining to take over the 
commercially lucrative trans-oceanic telegraph lines, British 
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political interest in their continued expansion throughout the 
empire was reflected in the allocation of state grants and other 
incentives, initially to the smaller companies such as the 
Bretts' General Oceanic Telegraph Company. 
Later, the conglomerate Eastern and Associated Telegraph 
Group, was also to benefit significantly from a close 
co-operative relationship with the British government. Headrick 
notes that "Until 1878, Eastern received no subsidies or dividend 
guarantees, but they did get considerable official help in the 
form of landing rights, ocean-bed surveys, diplomatic support and 
government cable traffic" [Headrick 1988 : 106]. Later, the 
company was to receive other more direct state support in 
exchange for its active implementation of an expansion in the 
imperial telegraph network. It is this relationship, continued 
and intensified later, which we describe as the beginnings of a 
corporatist symbiosis between the state and the early telegraph 
industry. 
The Eastern Group was controlled by the Manchester-based 
textiles and cable entrepreneur John Pender, who had major 
interest in the fibre and other raw materials from India. The 
role of Pender, considered a founding father of Cable and 
Wireless, will be discussed in greater detail later. However, it 
appears that economic interest in Asian textiles played a major 
role in the early extension of the telegraph there, as other raw 
materials did in the later penetration of the Caribbean and the 
Americas. But in addition to the economic benefits to its private 
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industrialists, the additional motive of the state in providing 
strong support was the increased control which the network 
offered in the administration of empire. 
"The political situation in continental Europe and 
similarity of resource endowment historically 
directed British economic interests into long distance 
trade and specialization, importing food and raw 
materials and exporting manufactures and 
semi-manufactures. So in the 1850s, Britain's most 
important trading partner was the (independent) US and 
second in importance was the (colonial) Indian Empire. 
Naturally, communication with these two areas was a 
priority, hence the state support, both for reasons of 
imperial security and economic interest and the 
development of TELCON. " [Foreman-Peck, Correspondence 
1990 : 2] 
In central Europe, meanwhile, neighbouring mainland 
territories with the landline facilities began to confront the 
issues of transborder communication flow and exchange of tariffs 
for mutual message transmission. At first, the issue was 
approached through bilateral treaties. But as more and more 
countries became affected, a multi-lateral approach was also 
developed. In July 1850, an Austro-German Telegraph Union, the 
first of its kind was formed, holding regular conferences between 
1850 and 1863. Its membership was extended to five other central 
and northern European states. 
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In western Europe a similar organization of national 
telegraph operators was formed on the initiative of France and 
Belgium in 1851. An expanded membership created the West European 
Telegraph Union in 1855. By 1858, consultations between these two 
Unions resulted in a first joint conference in Brussels, Belgium, 
to be followed by a major international conference in Paris in 
May, 1865. This conference created an International Telegraphic 
Union (ITU), which by the following year had issued regulations 
affecting telegraphic traffic throughout Europe. It is this 
Telegraphic Union which, after World War Two, was to become the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), affiliated to the 
United Nations and based in Geneva. 
With the advent in Europe of the submarine cable, the British 
colonial administrators of territories such as India, no less 
than the Colonial Office itself in London, were anxious to 
take advantage of the trans-oceanic cable technology. An 
attempt was made to link the southern coast of Europe with North 
Africa in 1854, but this was abandoned after some difficulties. 
The attention of the private developers of this new 
technology was now to be focussed on the original major task of 
linking Europe with the Americas across the Atlantic Ocean. 
Initiatives by the Atlantic Telegraph Company in England was 
matched by those of a wealthy paper merchant in the United States 
called Cyrus Field. He formed The New York, Newfoundland and 
London Telegraph Company independently to carry out the 
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transatlantic link. Field had difficulty in raising the required 
money for the project in the United States and later travelled to 
London, where he made contact with John Brett. [Pender 1931: 79]. 
The two men began a collaborative venture with the financial 
support of their respective governments. 
"... both British and American governments agreed to 
pay the Atlantic a subsidy of 14,000 pounds a year 
up to the time when its dividend had reached 6 per 
cent, and 10,000 pounds a year subsequently. This 
was not just by way of encouragement, it was payment 
to a private enterprise for a service which otherwise 
government would have to have provided for sending 
government despatches. " [Barty-King 1979: 12]. 
In 1857, the first attempt was made by this company to lay a 
telegraphic cable under the Atlantic, but this was unsuccessful. 
A second attempt on July 17,1858 succeeded. The first 
transatlantic cable signals were received on August 13, and 
within days a ninety eight word message was conveyed- from Queen 
Victoria to President Buchanan, with a transmission time of 16 
hours! The press began to. make early use of this facility, with 
this first transatlantic message being printed by the New York 
Sun newspaper. 
Within less than a week in operation, however, 
communications subsided. Like the trail-blazing link to France, 
the problem was traced to a fault in the cable insulation. 
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Despite attempts to boost the system, it went completely silent 
on September 18,1858. 
Similar attempts, with British government financial support 
failed-to establish submarine links between Egypt and India. The 
overall situation led the British government to set up a special 
Committee of Enquiry in 1859 into the Construction of Submarine 
Telegraph Cables. Technical evidence was gathered bearing on the 
problems of induction and retardation of current, the limitation 
of the use of Morse Code, and the new alternative technology of 
William Thompson's Mirror Galvanometer instrument. This enabled 
messages to be sent along a single line simultaneously, without 
having to wait for the clearing of the line before another 
message was sent. The Committee concluded that much remained to 
be understood in technical terms about cable transmission, and 
it urged more research into both transmission and insulation 
(HMSO 1851]. 
In all this, and despite major losses in both the capital 
of its shareholders and governments subventions to the project, 
the Atlantic Telegraph Company remained interested in 
successfully laying the cable across the Atlantic. To this end it 
continued to lobby the British government for permission to again 
raise funds for the undertaking, in line with the new state 
regulation of the joint stock company. It also sought financial 
guarantees from both the British and U. S. governments for the 
project. Despite government reluctance, the overall importance of 
direct submarine communications between Europe and the Americas 
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was a good lobbying point and by 1859, each government agreed 
to pay 8% subsidy a year on the allowed capital of 600,000, but 
payable only on the condition that a cable was successfully 
laid and working. 
Extraordinary co-ordination was now required both in 
financial and technical terms, if this project was to be 
successful. Through the efforts of British businessman John 
Pender, director of the Atlantic Telegraph Company, a merger was 
arranged between the two leading cable manufacturing companies. 
The Gutta Percha 'Company and the Glass Elliot Company of 
Greenwich came together to form the Telegraph Construction. and 
Maintenance Company(TELCON) Limited in 1864. This new company was 
to provide credit to the Atlantic Telegraph Company of over half 
the costs involved in manufacturing and laying the cables for 
this fresh Atlantic venture. 
After thus overcoming the problem of raising the 837,140 
pounds required to finance the 2,500 miles of improved 
cable, the Atlantic Telegraph Company finally began the renewed 
task of laying the cables in May 1864. To their dismay, however, 
the work ran into problems within weeks of starting and 
eventually the cable broke and fell into the sea, causing the 
project once again to be abandoned. 
With a government refusal of permission for any further 
capital-raising activities by the unfortunate Atlantic 
Telegraph Company, the task of making yet another cable venture 
- 
163 
- 
across the Atlantic fell to a newly formed company, The 
Anglo-American Telegraph Company. This new company was financed 
mainly by the directors of TELCON, a company whose long term 
future as a major cable manufacturer was tied up with. -the 
success of long distance submarine cable systems. 
For the new venture, TELCON manufactured lighter weight but 
stronger cable. This was successfully laid across the Atlantic 
Ocean in July 1866, from Valentia to Newfoundland, by the 
Anglo-American Company. The company, however, in an attempt to- 
recover some of the costs incurred-in the transatlantic venture, 
set a rate of. 20 a. message. Following complaints by one of the 
line's earliest and most frequest, users 
- 
the press agencies, 
especially in the United States, this rate had to be reduced. 
Synopsis 
The development and operation of submarine telegraphy in 
Britain was pioneered by private telegraph companies, but with 
the strong financial and technical support of the British 
government. In addition to seeing the economic advantages to 
industry, the state's involvement was also motivated by the 
prospects of greatly improved political and military control over 
a globally dispersed empire. A convergence of objectives led to a 
corporatist relationship between the private telegraph interests 
and the British state. 
From the point of view of this economic and political 
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interest of the British imperial state, global telecommunications 
achieved a major watershed in 1866 with the accomplishment of the 
elusive dream of direct cable communication between North America 
and Europe. It was an achievement which also held great 
significance for the islands and territories of the Caribbean, 
including those under British colonial rule. 
Retrospectively, Desmond commented approvingly on the 
universal impact of the innovations: "The establishment and 
extension of telegraphic service opened the door for, most peoples 
of the world to gain a vastly greater, and prompt understanding 
of their environment. " [Desmond '1978: 110]. In practice, however, 
the nineteenth century telegraph was a facility utilised mainly 
by the political, military and business elites. For reasons of 
cost and access to the network, this early telegraph was far from 
being widely available. Political and commercial considerations 
were paramount in the extension of the telegraph to the colonies, 
including to those in the Caribbean, and these interests 
predomidated in their use. [See Headrick 1988: 97]. 
As with the extension of the early British telegraph network 
into the internal national- periphery, the penetration of the 
system into the global colonial periphery, paved the way for both 
greater political control and more intensive capitalist 
investment and exploitation. "Communication channels, being 
carriers not only of information but also of power, are a crucial 
factor in the establishment, maintenance, and change of these 
power relations. Inasmuch as the Roman roads and England's 
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control of sea lanes were basic 
early times, telecommunications 
transnational and state power 
telecommunication is necessary 
realization of 
. 
the rights of 
groups and communities. "[Shields 
to the maintenance of empires in 
is basic to the exercise of 
today. The 
-corollary is that 
to balance that power, 
- 
for 
self-determination of countries, 
and Samarajiva 1990: 207]-. 
3.5 
- 
ARRIVAL 'OF CABLE TELEGRAPHY IN THE CARIBBEAN 
The first proposal for introducing telegraphic cable 
communication in the Caribbean was made in 1857, in the wake of 
news that a transatlantic cable was to be established with 
British government subsidy. According to the official Cable and 
Wireless Historian, Hugh Barty-King, a meeting was called in the 
townhall in Bridgetown, Barbados, in February, 1857, attended 
by the Governor, members of the legislature and leading 
merchants. The meeting was addressed by one Captain Rassloff, a 
Danish engineer working for the British Canadian government. 
He outlined a plan whereby telegraph cables would be laid, 
linking British and Danish West Indian islands, as well as 
joining North and South America. In describing this proposal, 
Barty-King notes that "The main cable would start from Florida, 
pass through the Bahamas, and terminate at St Thomas in the 
Virgin Islands; a second cable would run through the British West 
Indies, ending at St Lucia, where it would branch into two 
routes, one through St Vincent, Grenada, Trinidad and the Spanish 
Main, and the other to Barbados, 
-Tobago and Georgetown, British 
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Guiana. " [Barty-Ring 1979: 13-14]. 
This plan, though enthusiastically greeted by the local 
elite and colonial administrators, was never implemented. 
Failures in government-subsidised submarine-cables elsewhere in 
the Empire (for example in the Red Sea and India),. served to 
discourage the British government from providing backing for any 
further projects. The reciprocal relationship between the private 
investors and their state benefactor had temporarily broken down 
as the private sector partners were proving incapable of 
delivering the projects to which they-were entrusted. 
Such ideas of linking North America, South America and the 
Caribbean islands by-cable were not to be actively considered 
again until 1865, and on this occassion, not by the British but 
by the Americans. In December 1865, a bill was introduced in the 
U. S. Congress granting a firm called'The International Ocean 
Telegraph Company, sole rights to operate a telegraph system 
between Florida and the West Indies for 14 years. 
The contract for the manufacture of the cable was awarded to 
the British company TELCON, and the cable was laid between Punta 
Rassa in Florida and Havana in Cuba via the island of Key West, 
in December 1866. The limit of this system was circumscribed by 
the American sphere of influence, which up to this point covered 
the former Spanish colonies but had not yet spanned the British 
colonies in the region. The business and colonial. elites in 
these English-speaking territories, however, learnt of the 
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dramatic impact of direct communication to Europe via Florida, 
on the American controlled islands. 
It was not long then, before the American James Scrymser, 
proprietor of the International Ocean Telegraph Company, made his 
approach to offer the telegraph cable linkage to the British 
colonies. He also actively lobbied the Colonial Office, and by 
September 1867*, in a despatch from London, Colonial Secretary, 
Lord Camanor, advised colonial governors in the West Indies: 
"You will therefore be at-liberty, on application made 
by the International Ocean Telegraph Company, to 
propose to your legislature a law enabling them to 
land and work cables, but I have to request that 
you will guide yourself by the treasury's letter of 
the 7th of June as to the general principles to be 
observed in such a law, particularly those of not 
granting exclusive privileges, and of securing 
priority for government messages. " [Barty-King 1979: 28] 
Further recommendations included provisions for compensation 
for private property and'authority to the government to take over 
the facilities in time of war or during any 'insurrection'. 
The areas of primary interest by International Ocean 
Telegraph Company were the larger islands of Jamaica, Barbados 
and Trinidad and the colony of British Guyana, but soon islands 
such as St Kitts, Antigua, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and 
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Grenada became involved. All the territories contributed 
subsidies, which amounted to £17,000 a year. The Barbados regime 
placed as a condition of its subsidy, the early start of the 
installation work, towards completion by August 10.1872. 
3.5.1 
- 
The West India and Panama Telegraph Company 
Although it was originally expected that IOTC would itself 
effect the other regional cable connections into the existing 
network from Florida, negotiations with British interests led to 
the formation of a separate company registered in London, to do 
the work in British colonial Caribbean. This action demonstrates 
the over-riding importance placed on spheres of colonial 
interests and control in the establishment of the early 
communications network in the region and throughout the world. 
The company formed, the West India and Panama Telegraph 
Company Limited (WIPTC), was set up on August 9,1869, with 
subscribers including William Andrews of Siemens Indo European 
Telegraph Company, Henry Weaver of the Anglo American Company, 
and ship-owner Henry Holmes. It's Board of Directors, which 
included Cyrus Field, was chaired by C. W. Earle [Companies House 
File 00011116]. 
The WIPTC was capitalised by the issue of 65,000 ordinary 
shares of 10 pounds each. 45,441 shares in the company were sold 
to the public in England, while a further 11,750 shares were 
taken by the contractors, the India Rubber Company, as fully paid 
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up shares in part payment of the contract price, which totalled 
587,000 pounds for making and laying the cables. Uptake of the 
shares were no doubt encouraged by sentiments such as appeared in 
the London Times of August 26,1869: "There can be no doubt that 
the most popular outlet now for commercial enterprise is to be 
found in the construction of submarine lines of telegraph. " [In 
Barty-King 1979: 29]. Indeed, in the August 1869 prospectus of the 
West India and'Panama Company, prospective investors were told 
that revenues over the first three years would run tof468,000 
against estimated working expenses off60,000. 
The West India and Panama Telegraph Company was one of four 
telegraph companies founded in Britain in 1869 during a period of 
dramatic expansion of submarine telegraphy into the British 
colonial empire. The main vehicle of this expansion was private 
enterprise, but under the active control and guidance of the 
central colonial administration in London and its representatives 
within the colonies. The development of these other early 
telegraph companies is discussed in Chapter 5 as part of a 
analysis of the process by which a network of firms merged to 
create Cable and Wireless. 
The WIPTC took over the plans and concessions of the IOTC. 
However, by then a stricter timetable of completion was being 
demanded by the colonial authorities, as a condition for their 
subsidy. The cable works were now expected by the government of 
Barbados to be completed by the 4th of October 1871. 
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The West India and Panama Company, significantly, was not 
only involved in laying the cables and operating the system. It 
was also a user of the service since the company also published 
and circulated a daily news bulletin carrying reports of market 
prices in London and New York. This service was provided to 
regional interests as part of the subsidy ofZ2,500 paid to the 
company by each territory. 
The venture by the The West India and Panama Company was 
more ambitious than simply linking the islands of the Caribbean 
area. As the Company's name suggests, it was intended to 
establish as part of the same project, an expensive linkage with 
Panama in Central America and then along the South West Pacific 
coast to Argentina and Montevideo in Uruguay. The project 
involved the longest submarine cable ever ordered up to then, a 
total of 4,100 miles. To help facilitate this, the British 
colonial government offered to enter into discussions regarding 
a government subsidy. This proposal was accepted by the Company, 
and marked a new level of government involvement in the project. 
Cable-laying for this Caribbean and Latin American network 
began in late 1870, after a fleet of cable ships left the Port of 
London in May that year. Led by the steamer the 'Dacia', the 
fleet consisted of a repair ship and three additional support 
vessels. The first cable which the expedition laid was one from 
Batabano on the south coast of Cuba to Cienfuegos along the same 
coastline and then on to Santiago in south-western Cuba. This 
initial task was completed by September 2,1870, under the 
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direction of Sir Charles Bright. [Baglehole 1969: 5-61 
The next task was to link the island of Jamaica with the 
Santiago end of the transatlantic cable. This was accomplished 
with little difficulty, with the shore end being landed near 
Plaintain Garden in Holland Bay on Jamaica's north east coast on 
September 15,1870. In this way, Jamaica became the first British 
Caribbean territory to have a direct telecommunications linkage 
to Europe, routed through Cuba to Florida, across American 
landlines to the new transatlantic cable en route to London. 
This 'problem' of routing a British cable through a Spanish 
colony was regarded seriously enough to warrant the establishment 
in England of the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company, with the 
exclusive aim of laying another cable by-passing Cuba. Sir 
Charles Bright, to whom the task of laying this by-pass cable was 
also assigned, began the undertaking but it was later abandoned 
when the cable broke and fell into the sea. Instead, he turned 
his attention to establishing the inter-island submarine cables 
for the other territories [Baglehole 1969: 6]. 
After linking Puerto Rico to St Thomas in the U. S. Virgin 
Island and then to St Kitts, Bright attempted the long haul from 
Puerto Rico to Jamaica to connect with the mainline to Europe. 
Misfortune again attended this venture and after laying about 600 
miles of cable, the line again broke, emphasising the unreliable, 
trial and error methods and variable materials which formed part 
of the early telecommunications industry. 
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TABLE 3 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
A CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRST CARIBBEAN TELEGRAPH CABLES 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
COMPLETED SPAN 
--------- 
Sept 2,1868 
----- 
- 
Florida to Cuba 
Sept 15,1870 
- 
Cuba to Jamaica 
Sept 15,1870 
- 
Jamaica-Puerto Rico* 
May 10,1871 
- 
St Thomas to St Kitts 
June 4,1871 
- 
Antigua to Guadeloupe 
June 16,1871 
- 
Guadeloupe to Dominica 
June 26,1871 
- 
Dominica to Martinique 
July 1,1871 
- 
Martinique to St Lucia 
July 8,1871 
- 
St Lucia to St Vincent 
Aug 23,1871 
- 
St Vincent to Barbados 
Oct 11,1871 
- 
St Vincent to Grenada 
Oct 11,1871 
- 
Trinidad then (Guyana) 
Oct 7,1873 
- 
Jamaica to Colon (Panama) 
June 29,1890 
- 
Halifax to Bermuda 
Dec 15,1898 
- 
Jamaica to Turks & Bermuda 
Oct 1,1924 
- 
Trinidad to Barbados 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Cable and Wireless Archives 
Baglehole 1969: 43-46. 
Zodiac, Dec 1964: 22 
* cable lost 
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The task of connecting with the main line via Jamaica and 
Florida was not accomplished until 1873, but in the meantime the 
cable ship Dacia under Bright continued the laying of cables 
linking St Kitts to Antigua and then on down the chain of islands 
in the order of Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, St Lucia, St 
Vincent, Barbados, Grenada and Trinidad. Afterwards, the line was 
extended to British Guiana (now Guyana) on the northern coast of 
South America. The overall West Indian Telegraph service was 
completed in October 1871 with the Georgetown 
- 
Trinidad link. 
However because of the failure to connect the chain of Eastern 
Caribbean islands with the mainline to Europe via Jamaica, these 
islands ramained for six months unconnected to the transatlantic 
system. Emergency alternative arrangements had to be made and the 
service was finally opened on March 7,1872 with'a connection 
via Panama. In Barbados, announcement of this was made in the 
Barbados Times on March 9,1872: 
"The Telegraph Company has given notice that the cable 
is laid and in working order all along the line from 
Havana to Demerara and through the States to Newfoundland 
and from there to the U. K; and the communication' being 
completed, messages can be forwarded from this island to 
any part of the world. " [in Barty-King 1979: 31]. 
Just under two years earlier, on October 4,1870, the 
Barbados government, which was emerging as the leading instrument 
of British colonial policy in this field, had passed an Act 
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designed to "encourage and promote the establishment of 
communications by means of the electric telegraph between this 
island and the other West Indian colonies and the continents of 
Europe and America. " This Act stipulated that the entire regional 
cable 
-network should be laid and operational by October 4,1871, 
or else the sponsoring company would forfeit the £2,500 a year 
which that government had conditionally committed itself to 
paying for a period of ten years. 
With the failure to meet this deadline, the West India and 
Panama Company was deemed to have forfeited a year's grant. 
Besides the delay in completion, further dissatisfaction with the 
quality and high cost of the service was reported within three 
months of operation. According to the Barbados Times, telegrams 
often had to be repeated at a cost of up to 12 each before a 
reply was received again frequently in a garbled condition: 
"Complaints are becoming rife in these islands about the 
inconvenience which has been occasioned to the mercantile 
community and others by the growing carelessness or 
incompetence on the part of the Telegraph employees. Owing 
to the exhorbitant rate of the tariff, messages must be 
necessarily condensed as much as possible to avoid incurring 
a heavy expense. " (Barbados Times, July 6,1872, quoted in 
Barty-King 1979:, 32]. 
The reference to the 'mercantile community' and its 
inclination to ascribe the inefficiencies to the 'employees' 
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rather than to the company or its techniques, offers support for 
the view that in the Caribbean as elsewhere, the main users of 
the 'telegraph cable were commercial and governmental interests. 
It would `appear unlikely that either the general ex-slave 
population or ordinary British settlers would have been able to 
afford-C12 a message at 1872 prices for telegraph communication. 
The quality of the service improved by 1875, possibly in 
response to the pressure of the seemingly well-organised users 
group in Barbados. On this basis, the threat-Of further 
forfeiture of the annual subsidy was lifted and regular payment 
to the company resumed. 
An internal cable service appears to have been established in 
Trinidad well before any-other territory. This-is likely to have 
been the result of a continuation of the inter-island cable 
running north from the chain of islands, then onto landlines 
across Trinidad for fifty miles from Maqueripe Bay in the north 
to Venezuela. The Trinidad leg was not completed until October 
1871. But according to local historian, Edward Beckles, the first 
telegraph message was one transmitted between the Police 
Headquarters in Port of Spain and the St Joseph Police Station at 
9 p. m. on March 4,1870. 
The more basic landline technology, which was already in 
operation in England for over two decades, could have preceded 
the submarine inter-island links to Trinidad. As in Europe, the 
early landlines followed the route of the railway. Indeed, in 
- 
175 
- 
Trinidad, according to Beckles [1989: 72], it was the Railway 
Company which operated the only public telegraph system in the 
country, providing telegram delivery to within half a mile of the 
station to which it was transmitted. 
The new communications system would have been valuable for 
the railway's own signalling and maintenance operations, but 
local cable delivery added an additional element to the railways 
services: "Telegrams were accepted at any railway telegraph 
station or steamer depot and delivered free of charge to 
addresses within half a mile of the station or depot to which 
they were transmitted. The remarkable stability of the rates 
should be noted for between 1899 and 1934, despite the inflation 
in the rest of the economy, the rates remained at sixpence for 12 
words or any part of 12 words. By 1966, this had increased to the 
equivalent of 2 shillings [Beckles 1989: 72]. 
In contrast to the international or inter-island telegraph 
system in Barbados, what appears to be an earlier established 
local telegraph system served both a wider user base, as would be 
expected, as well as providing a low tariff and satisfactory 
service. The basic technology of land-based telegraphy appears to 
have been well established in Trinidad and elsewhere in the 
region before the close of. the nineteenth century. Beckles notes, 
however that control of the technology and operation of the 
early systems were confined to British expatriates: " The use of 
foreign workers to operate relatively sophisticated tasks would 
seem to have an early genesis, for all records suggest that the 
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operators and post supervisors were recruited from England. " 
[1989: 72]. 
Synopsis 
Britain was now particularly interested in penetrating new 
markets in the former Spanish colonies of South and Central 
America. The 
-historically dominant European power in Latin 
America, Spain, was beginning to lose its grip on the region. 
Many of the larger and more lucrative Spanish colonies had 
already secured political independence as Spain itself became 
preoccupied with internal economic and political difficulties. At 
the same time, internally consolidated United States of America 
was then emerging to project both its military and economic 
influence into neighbouring territories. The effect of these 
developments in London was a feeling that British influence in 
the Caribbean and Central America was being undermined. Every 
opportunity was therefore to be taken to extend its reach into 
Latin America and strengthen its hold on the Caribbean colonies. 
For these objectives, British dominance in the vital field of 
submarine telecommunications an ideal tool. 
By 1872, the inaugural transatlantic telegraph system became 
connected into the Caribbean, linking the region to Europe and 
the United States, telegraphically, for the first time. But, for 
technical convenience, the cable from. Florida in the United State 
intersected the Spanish colony of Cuba en route to Jamaica. The 
establishment of this linkage meant that the first inter-island 
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telecommunications connection was not between two 
English-speaking British colonies but rather between an existing 
Spanish colony, Cuba, and the largest English-speaking Caribbean 
colony, Jamaica. 
This fact was the source of dissatisfaction among leading 
elements in the Colonial Office in London, who felt that 
sensitive colonial despatches meant for the Caribbean colonies 
would first have to pass through Cuba, making them vulnerable to 
interception by European rival Spain. Others supported the 
alternative view that exploitation of the economic advantages of 
Spanish America and the Caribbean meant extension of cable routes 
into the Iberian region.. It was a conflict between the immediate 
political and the long term economic objectives of British 
imperialism, and an indication of the imperial political 
objectives which privately-run telegraph companies, were involved 
in fulfilling. The force of the political motives prevailed-over 
the economic aims, with the result that much effort and resources 
were directed towards altering this routing. The process was one 
of ensuring, as Galtung's model suggested, that all interactions 
between colonial periphery and the imperial centre were vertical, 
exclusive and direct. 
Within the periphery itself, it was significant that while 
the small colonial regimes in Caribbean were collectively 
contributing up toý17,000 a year to the project, they were 
neither offered nor claimed a-stake in the ownership of these 
vital arteries of communication. Indeed it was arranged that when 
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the capital project of constructing the telegraphs was completed, 
the system would continue to be operated by the construction 
company as a private concern at rates determined largely by the 
company. This attitude on the part of the colonial 
administrations and the central British state towards the big 
cable interests stood in stark contrast to the British 
government's own acquisition of its internal network. The 
favourable treatment of the entrenched multinational cable 
interests operating in the colonies also contrasts dramatically 
with the imperial government's attitude to Marconi, the 
non-British, fledgeling wireless competitor, as we shall discuss 
in Chapter 5. 
However, the conduct of the imperial Centre in relation to 
the Caribbean colonial periphery so far would suggest that while 
the British colonial authorities wanted mainly political control 
and power from the electric telegraph in Britain its objectives 
for this innovation within the colonies were both political in 
terms of colonial control and economic in terms of the expansion 
of private British multinational profit-making from the 
innovation. 
3.5.2 
- 
State Intervention: The Pacific Cable Board 
In 1901, the British Parliament passed the Pacific Cable 
Act, establishing a joint venture between Britain and its larger 
colonies in the provision of a submarine cable route from Canada, 
through the Pacific Ocean to New Zealand, the Australian colonies 
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and the 
-U. K. The new company, called the Pacific Cable Board, 
marked the first major involvement of the imperial and colonial 
governments in the ownership and operation of submarine cables. 
This new state venture represented a threat to the private 
monopoly of the cable conglomerate operated by John Pender, and 
the implications of this will be explored in Chapter S. However, 
the Pacific Cable scheme was of great significance to the renewal 
of the overall-communication system in the Caribbean area. 
An eastern cable route meant both an alternative network in 
the event of a breakdown on the transatlantic route. But it also 
meant the possibility that an increased number of countries 
could be contacted from the West Indies, even if indirectly 
and at great cost. In 1919, after the intervention of the 
First World War, the Caribbean region was directly linked 
into the expanded Pacific Cable network by a cable from Brazil to 
Barbados. The objective of this connection was to provide 
the British-owned Western Union Company of Brazil with a 
new route to Florida in the United States. But it also meant the 
establishment of important new sections of cable links between 
the West Indies and Latin America. 
Between 1920 and 1922 special attention was given to the 
Caribbean communications infrastructure by the West Indies Cables 
Sub-committee of the Imperial Communications Committee. One of 
the guiding assumptions of these deliberations was the need for 
increased government-funded renewal of the communications system. 
This was justified on the basis that the area, so close to the 
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burgeoning United States of America and to the vast potential of 
Latin America, was of strategic= importance to-the British 
regional interests. 
In October, 1922, the sub-committee disclosed its 
recommendations that Britain, regional governments and Canada 
should undertake the laying of a new cable in the region, with 
the Pacific Cable Board as the implementing agency. This was to 
be supplemented by a system of wireless communication, using the 
techniques developed by' Marconi to meet the challenges of 
inter-island linkages. [Marconi and the Wireless System are 
discussed further in Chapter 5]. 
The recommendations were approved and construction of the 
overall system began in 1923. The new cable system was designed 
to link London with Barbados via Halifax and Bermuda, with the 
Turks island as a relay station. By early 1924, the Turks Island 
to Barbados leg was laid as a new duplex cable paid out from the 
cable ship Faraday. Other lines were laid to Jamaica and Guyana, 
and later a spur from Barbados to Trinidad, completed in July 
1924. The centre of this cable network was Barbados, where the 
various lines met at Prospect, and connected by underground 
cables to a new telegraph station at a site called The Reef. 
3.5.3 
- 
THE REGIONAL WIRELESS NETWORK 
The next phase of implementation of the sub-committee's 
recommendations was the construction of a network of wireless 
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stations, again centred on Barbados. A wireless relay was 
constructed on The Reef site, using a 200-foot tower built by the 
American firm RCA. Counterpart stations were constructed in other 
islands throughout the region (See Table 4), to establish the 
Caribbean's first network of beam wireless communication. The 
combined PCB cable and wireless system was introduced in the 
Caribbean in December 1924. 
The intervention of the state authorities was quite timely. 
By the end of the first decade of the Twentieth century, the 
cable and telegraph equipment installed some forty years earlier 
by the West Indies and Panama Telegraph Company had begun to 
deteriorate and the company itself started to undergo severe 
financial difficulties. The network renewal, both in terms of new 
technology and alternative funding source represented by the 
state-owned Pacific Cable Board, was widely welcomed within the 
region. 
The difficulties of the WIPTC was caused in part by the 
loss of two of its cable ships, the' Grappler', which was 
destroyed off Martinique when the Mount Pelee volcano erupted in 
1909 
, 
and the, Henry Holmes' which had run into disrepair by the 
1920s. The company's problems were further complicated by the 
fact that its government subsidy was to lapse in 1924, and was 
not likely to be renewed, reducing revenues by 26,300 
annually [Barty-Ring 1979: 199]. 
In November, 1924, the Cuba Submarine Company made a bid for 
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TABLE 4 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
OPENING OF FIRST REGIONAL WIRELESS STATIONS 
---------------------------- 
Barbados 
- 
---------------------- 
December 1, 
-------------- 
1924 
St Lucia 
- 
December 1, 1924 
Dominica 
- 
December 1, 1924 
Antigua 
- 
December 1, 1924 
St Kitts 
- 
January 10, 1925 
Grenada 
- 
February 1, 1925 
St Vincent 
- 
March 1, 1925 
Montserrat 
- 
May 25, 1925 
Sources: Barty-King 1979: 198-9 
WIPTC Annual Report, Dec. 31,1924 
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the shares of the West Indies and Panama Company, and the offer 
was accepted by a huge majority of the shareholders. The 
Directors of the Company resigned on the last day of December, 
1924. Under new management and ownership, the company continued 
to operate, but much of its activities were made redundant by the 
Pacific Cable Board's new cable and wireless network. 
The Pacific Cable Board itself, however, was beginning to 
experience its own financial difficulties, and the competition 
between wireless and wireline services began to take-its toll in 
the wider economics of empire. Some colonies began to press for a 
consolidation of the empire telecommunications systems, a measure 
which was accomplished in 1928 with the creation of the Cable and 
Wireless monopoly. 
Under the elaborate arrangements of the merger, discussed in 
Chapter 6, the Caribbean beam wireless stations operated by the 
Post Office and the regional cable network which was only 
recently acquired by the PCB, were acquired by the new Cable and 
Wireless Communications Company. The regional communications 
operator continued to be called the West India and Panama 
Telegraph Company, until 1938 when it was changed to Cable and 
Wireless (West Indies) Limited. 
3.6 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
Against this historical background, it can be said then, 
that the'Caribbean's first telecommunications system for both 
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inter-island linkage and contact-with Central America, ' the United 
States and Europe began official operation in 1872. But the early 
system did not become a stable service until 1875. Tariffs levels 
were considered. exorbitant, and a heavy expense even to the 
'mercantile 'community' which, apart from government, appears to 
have been the main user. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings in quality and cost, the 
region's first telecommunications infra-structure had been'laid 
down, two decades after the world's first sub-marine telegraph 
system- was introduced in Europe. It had been introduced by 
private enterprise with a commercial motivation, ' but with the 
economic backing of the British colonial authorities for 
political objectives. The introduction of this telecommunications 
system led the way in opening up the region for the penetration 
by multinationals and for greater imperial control over the 
Caribbean. 
At the same time, because of the geographical location of 
the region, even that early Caribbean communications system was 
introduced via the United States,, and with the involvement of US 
commercial interests. This was later to become a marked feature of 
communications expansion in the region, moving to the competitive 
sphere for both markets and political influence. 
Work on the region's initial cable system also brought into 
conflict the competing colonial' interest of the European powers 
Spain and Britain. Cable expansion from Florida into the 
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Caribbean at that stage could easiest take place via Cuba, a 
Spanish colony until 1898. Major efforts were made for political 
reasons, to- by-pass Cuba, an experience which was again to be 
repeated for other political reasons in the mid 20th Century, 
under the U. S. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). [See Pantojas 
Garcia 1985: 105]. 
The cable telegraphy operators entrenched within the 
Caribbean, as in many other parts of-the British empire, in the 
late Nineteenth century, had monopoly control over that area of 
the empire in which they operated. The West India and Panama 
Telegraph Company, later to. become Cable and Wireless West Indies 
Limited, enjoyed this 
. 
monopoly for over one century, from its 
founding in 1869, despite the brief interrugnum of Pacific Cable 
Board involvement. Like the WIPTC, however, the PCB was later 
incorporated into the Cable and Wireless state run monopoly. But, 
the establishment of the Board marked the beginning of state-run 
telecommunications systems outside of the imperial centre itself. 
Its ownership, however, was confined to Britain and the larger 
dominion territories, despite the PCB's integral involvement in 
the network renewal of the Caribbean in early 20th century, 
including its operation of. the region's first wireless network. 
Despite political de-colonization, and modifications in the 
ownership arrangements for some territories, the external Cable 
and Wireless corporation has remained the dominant, virtually 
monopoly operator in Caribbean telecommunications for more than a 
century. 
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PART 2 
THE EMERGENCE AND TRANSITIONS OF CABLE AND WIRELESS 
CHAPTER 4 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
As a context for our examination of Cable and Wireless and 
its Caribbean subsidiary, Cable and Wireless (West Indies) 
Limited, we present and discuss in this chapter some of the main 
issues relevant to the operation of multinational corporations 
and their relationship with underdeveloped host countries. In the 
course of this analysis, we examine multinational corporations in 
their 'own right as instruments of capital accumulation in the 
global economy. But we also seek to highlight the close 
relationship between these international companies and their home 
governments in controlling the resources of the underdeveloped 
countries, and the more recent intermediation by western 
multilateral lending agencies in enforcing Third World conformity 
to the demands of multinationals and the world capitalist system. 
In the Caribbean, an annex to the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
establishing the regional common market and community 
acknowledged the need for foreign direct investment. But in the 
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article allowing for this provision, the, Community was also 
cognizant of the need for 'national participation' and 'common 
policy' in the regional approach to foreign capital: 
"(1) Member States recognize the need for continuing 
inflows of extraregional capital and the urgent 
necessity to promote development on the Less 
Developed Countries. 
(2) Member States shall keep under review the question 
of ownership and control of their resources with a 
view to increasing the extent of national 
participation in their economies and working 
towards the adoption as far as possible of a 
common policy on foreign investment [Article 44]. 
These CARICOM Treaty provisions are an acknowledgement of 
the importance placed by regional governments on foreign 
investment. But the reference to 'ownership and control of... 
resources', is also an acknowledgement of the felt need for 
self-determination and the preservation of policy control over 
economic and other resources. 
In the four and a half decades since the Second World War, 
global economic activity has been characterised by the rapid 
internationalization of productive activities. While the process 
pre-dated 1945, the intervening period has seen the unprecedented 
rise of extensive foreign direct investment through the vehicle 
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of large firms operating beyond their national boundaries. The 
stock of such companies in the'United States alone increased at a 
rate of 10% per year between 1958-1978 [Alschuler 1988: '7], and 
the dramatic global spread continues, encompassing in the present 
period-an increased emphasis on the intermediate or service 
sector. 
The strategies and corporate aims of Cable and Wireless as a 
multinational firm, can only adequately be understood within the 
framework of the global trends and practices of large scale 
foreign direct investment. But in our consideration of the issue 
here, two additional factors need to be highlighted. Firstly, the 
type of foreign direct investment under consideration extends 
beyond traditional manufacturing or extractive industries to 
include the expanding service sector. This sector, which includes 
the provision of telecommunications services, is characterised by 
its direct role in the globalization process and by the rapidly 
changing technology on which it is based. The second factor is 
that the host environment with which we are most concerned' 
consists of the small, open and vulnerable economies of the global 
south and the Caribbean region in particular. 
4.1 
- 
ISSUES OF MNC DEFINITION 
Dunning has identified two defining features of large-scale 
multinational investment which sets it apart as a 'separately 
identifiable vehicle of international activity': "First, it 
embraces, usually under the control of a single institution, the 
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international transfer of separate, but complementary factor 
inputs, viz equity capital, knowledge and entrepreneurship 
- 
and 
sometimes goods as well.... The second unique quality of direct 
investment is that- the resources which are transferred are not 
traded, they are simply moved from one part of the investing 
enterprise to another. " [Dunning 1971: 16]. Such firms, "with 
production facilities, offices or outlets in more than one 
country", are considered by Dunning to be multinational 
producing-enterprises (MPEs). 
Penrose [1968] describes the same corporate development 
in terms of the large international firm: "a firm that has 
substantial operating assets in a number of countries through 
branch offices, subsidiaries or affiliates owned wholely or in 
part... The firm (sometimes called a 'group') consists of the 
parent company and the subsidiaries or affiliates that are owned 
or controlled by it. " [1968: 40]. A problem frequently encountered 
is determining exactly the boundaries of large international 
firms. "Since many affiliates may be owned jointly with other 
firms, the boundaries of any one firm are not clear-cut. The most 
obvious measurements of the scope of a firm can be found in the 
consolidated financial and operating statements. " [Penrose 
1968: 40]. While we agree that these are the most accessible 
sources, annual financial and operating statements sometimes 
obscure as much as they clarify in terms of the scope and details 
of a company's performance. 
As Penrose notes, one of the central features of multinational 
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corporations is their sheer size and corporate reach. However, 
global statistics on their overall numbers and scope differ 
widely in criteria variables. Possible statistical disparities 
relate to how inclusive or exclusive is the definition adopted 
for companies falling within the multinational category. This is 
especially the case since an important distinction is often made 
between the operation of multinational firms and the existence 
of other forms of foreign investments [U. N. Report 1974: 3-4]. 
While MNCs are doubtless the major actors in foreign direct 
investments globally, they represent a distinct segment of the 
FDI range. 
"A study of multinational corporations must be 
distinguished from the study of foreign direct 
investment because the most important questions to be 
asked in connection with multinational corporations 
are not limited to, and in some cases are even 
independent of financial flows. They concern a host 
of other activities also, such as the transfer-of 
technology as well as goods, the provision of 
managerial services. and entrepreneurship and related 
business practices, including co-operative 
arrangements, marketing restrictions and - transfer 
pricing. " [United Nations Report 1974: 3] 
In determining further whether firms classify as MNCs, 
other distinctions sometimes relate to type of company activity 
(extractive, manufacturing), number of foreign affiliates (eg 6 
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or more) minimum percentage of foreign assets owned, and other 
attributes. Perlmutter [1969: 10], for example, recommends a 
criteria of the extent to which related companies are subject to 
a common management or operational strategy. He also identifies 
three corporate types on the basis of the scope of the company's 
strategies: the ethnocentric firm is oriented towards its home 
country, the polycentric firm orients its strategies towards the 
host country and the geocentric company is world oriented. 
Perlmutter notes that aspects of each of these strategic 
approaches may be evident in a single conglomerate or even 
applied in varied form across different functions (personnel, 
technology, production, accounting.. ) in a single subsidiary. 
Kindleberger (1969 : 179-185], conducting one of the 
earliest studies on large-scale corporate investment abroad, 
identifies distinct categories of such firms. The 'national firm' 
with foreign operations maintains the methods and even legal 
framework of the home country. A second category is the 
multinational corporation, which like Perlmutter's polycentric 
firm, is specially sensitive to local traditions 
, 
policies and 
jurisdictions. A third category is the international corporation, 
with global outlook, influenced neither by home country nor host 
country policy but responding more directly to global factors 
affecting efficiency. 
While elements of these early classifications of such 
companies are still relevant, and will be useful in our further 
analysis, a broader and more inclusive definition is required for 
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the purposes of our study. As a result, the definition frequently 
favoured by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations 
Department of International Affairs, will be the primary 
definition adopted in this study. Under this approach, which is 
close -to our earlier usage of Dunning,, a multinational 
corporation will be regarded as "any firm which performs its 
main operations, either manufacture or the provision of service, 
in at least two countries. "[UNDIA 1974: 131]. A practical advantage 
of this approach is that much of the available statistics on MNCs 
is denominated according to this wider multilateral definition. 
But even more importantly, it avoids the arbitrary exclusion of 
the increasingly important category of 'services' which often 
gets downplayed in traditional approaches emphasising industrial 
classifications such as extractive, manufacturing and other 
'productive' activities. 
Other terms requiring definition in our discussion of MNCs 
are: Parent Company, used here interchangeably with Holding 
Company to mean a firm which exercises control over other firms. 
The latter will be referred to as subsidiaries in the meaning 
adopted by Holmes and Sugden [1989: 114] as firms whose 
controlling company (a) holds a majority of the voting rights or, 
(b) has the right to appoint or remove directors holding a 
majority of voting rights at board meetings or (c) controls by 
agreement, a majority of the voting rights. " An Associate 
Company is defined as one in which the parent firm directly or 
indirectly controls a minority of voting rights. And the 
combination of the parent company, subsidiaries and associated 
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companies will be referred to as the Group or Conglomerate. 
4.2 
- 
TRENDS IN GLOBAL INVESTMENT 
A-European Economic Community Survey conducted in 1973 found 
that there were about 10,000 multinational firms operating in two 
or more countries. The number of constituent affiliates or 
subsidiaries was estimated to be 50,000. By 1977, according to 
Alschuler [1988: 7], the number of MNCs with head-offices in 
countries of the global centre had moved to approximately 11,000, 
with these companies holding shares in 82,000 foreign 
subsidiaries. 
Consistent with global trends in industrialization, the 
pattern whereby a great majority of MNCs are owned by a small 
number of western developed countries, has not altered 
significantly in structural terms over the last five decades. 
Despite the emergence of a small number of multinational 
companies outside of the western industrialised countries, 
[Kumar and McLeod 1981], multinational ownership remains 
preponderantly in the domain of these developed countries. 
According to Rolfe [1969: 20], in 1966 the total value of 
global foreign investment stood at US$ 90-billion. Of this, the 
substantial majority of US$ 55-billion was owned by the United 
States alone, with Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, Sweden 
and Japan sharing the remaining US$ 35-billion in foreign 
investment. 
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Kumar [1980: 3] indicates that the volume of direct foreign 
investment in 1973 stood at US$ 287.2-billion, a more than 300 %' 
increase on Rolfe's OECD figures of seven years earlier. In 1973, 
the U. S. share, according to Kumar, was US$137.2-billion, the UK 
US$32.1-billion, followed by Germany, Japan and Switzerland with 
between $18b and $19b each, then France and Canada with 11.9 and' 
9.8-billion respectively. - Using these statistics, Kumar points 
out that between them, these industrialised nations accounted 
for 86.9% of foreign direct investment. While the total volume 
and relative distribution of these foreign resources have 
altered, the relative North-South global balance has remained 
disproportionately in favour of the large industrialised 
countries. 
Kumar further notes that while MNC operations are pervasive 
in the global south the bulk of world MNC's foreign investments 
takes place as cross investment among industrialised countries 
themselves. 
"About 76% of the total direct foreign investment, that 
is about 191.66 billion dollars, was in the 
industrialised nations in the year 1975. In the case of 
developing countries, while there has been a 
significant increase in foreign investment (from 32.55 
in 1967 to 67.34 {$million} in 1975), its-relative 
share has declined. It was estimated to be 31%, in 1967 
and only 26% in 1975. " [Kumar 1980: 3]. 
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However, despite this overall, lower level of global MNC 
investment in the under-developed countries, such investments as 
exist are regarded as being of greater relative significance to 
the under-developed host country. In the Caribbean, for example, 
Levitt and Best note that the "dominant unit of production is a 
subsidiary or affiliate of a metropolitan firm. " [1975: 42]. The 
importance of foreign investment, given the size of many of the 
economies concerned, is immense compared with cross investments 
in the large industrialised countries. 
"Although the developing countries have received only 
about a third of the total estimated stock of foreign 
direct investment, that is, only half as much as the 
developed countries, the presence of foreign 
multinational corporations in the developing countries 
is generally of greater relative significance, since 
their economies account for much less than half of that 
of developed market economies. " [United Nations Report 
1974: 7]. 
The operation of multinationals tend to be a more sensitive 
issue where the external ownership establishes a vertical flow of 
profits from the subsidiaries in the global south to the 
investors and shareholders of the developed countries. Penrose 
[1968] regards the dominant industrialised nationality of the 
large international firm as being of special significance: 
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"in the first place, most of the shareholders of the 
parent are likely to share its nationality, and 
secondly, the foreign investment of a firm or 'group' 
is treated as an investment of the country in which the 
parent is incorporated. If there is little local 
ownership in the firm's foreign affiliates, there will 
be a flow of funds in the form of dividends from, the 
firm as a -whole, largely to citizens of the parent 
country. The particular geographical distribution of 
dividend outlays is, at least partly, a result of 
historical and institutional considerations related to 
the organization of the world's capital markets.... " 
[Penrose 1968: 40]. 
It would appear, then, that despite the 'multinational' 
designation and global reach of these large firms, the primary 
beneficiaries are the investors and supporting institutions in a 
relatively small number of industrialised countries. 'These 
beneficiaries include shareholders in terms of dividends, the 
corporation itself in terms of growth, profits, royalties and 
power; as well as the home country which benefits in terms of 
raw material imports, balance of payments support and the foreign 
sale of capital goods, spares and services. Such is the classical 
scenario of exploitation and imperialism described by Kumar: 
"Since the parent company does have a national 
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identity, and since it is normally controlled 
by directors of a specific nationality, or a 
small set of nationalities, the spread of multinational 
enterprise 
-appears to result in the-perpetuation and 
intensification of hegemonic domination by the 
industrial capitalist powers. In short the national and 
organizational loyalties of transnational businessmen 
may be expected to fuse with imperialistic force. " 
[Kumar 1980: 84]. 
The industrialised states have shown in the past their 
willingness to support, protect and defend their multinationals 
against threats from alternative structures whether in the 
under-developed countries or from other competing industrialised 
countries or their multinationals. While the impact of this 
nationalism can frequently be reciprocated by cross investment 
among the industrialised countries, this is often not the case in 
the under-developed countries which operate mainly as hosts or 
offshore production platforms in the global FDI process. 
The fusion of transnational business and hegemonic state 
power to which Kumar refers, was demonstrated earlier in the 
corporatist relationship which characterised the pioneering era 
in the global expansion of telegraphy. Private shareholders and 
the overall national economy in the industrialised home country, 
Britain, were the main beneficiaries of a global process 
described by Girvan as one of 'corporate imperialism' [Girvan 
1976: 11]. 
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4.3 
- 
APPROACHES TO CORPORATE CONTROL 
According to Murdock [1982: 123], approaches to the control 
of large corporations vary according to two sets of conceptual 
categories. The first 
-set is based on two alternative socio- 
economic perspectives underpinning corporate activities. These 
perspectives are (1) a straightforward capitalist-theory approach 
and (2) the pluralist industrial society approach. The second set 
of categories within these ideological perspectives relates to 
the factors used as the focus of any analysis: (1) whether the 
analysis focusses on the ACTIONS of personalities involved in the 
exercise of power within corporations or alternatively (2) 
whether analysis is directed more at STRUCTURES and factors 
constraining corporate decision-making:. 
"Action approaches to corporate activity revolve around 
the conception of power. They focus on the way in which 
people, acting either individually or collectively, 
persuade or coerce others into complying with their 
demands and wishes. They concentrate on identifying the 
key allocative controllers and examining how they 
promote their own interests, ideas and policies. 
Structural analysis, on the other hand, is concerned 
with the ways the options open to allocative 
controllers are constrained and limited by the general 
economic and political environment in which the 
corporation operates. The pivotal concept here is not 
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power but determination. Structural analysis looks 
beyond the intentional action to examine the limits 
to choice and the pressures on decision making. " 
[Murdock 1982: 124]. 
Murdock argues that while there has been a strong tendency 
for these two approaches to be applied separately or even 
antagonistically, this represents a false dichotomy. We support 
his view that an adequate analysis needs to incorporate both the 
action, approach, which asks the question "who controls the 
corporations? " and the structural approach which asks "what 
factors constrain corporate controllers? ". 
"A structural analysis is necessary to map the range 
of actions open to allocative controllers and the 
pressures operating on them. It specifies the limit 
points to feasible action. But within these limits 
there is always a range of -possibilities, and the 
choice between them is important and does have 
significant effects... To explain the direction and 
impact of these choices, however, we need an action 
approach which looks in detail at the biographies and 
interests of key allocative personnel and traces the 
consequences of their decisions for the organization 
and output of production: [Murdock 1982: 124-125]. 
In the case of the early development of Cable and Wireless, 
a structural analysis enables us to understand the role of the 
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parent-state, Britain, as an important external influence on 
corporate policy within the company or its antecendents. The 
decisions, for example, of British telegraph firms to avoid' 
intersecting non-British territories with their early telegraph 
cables- flowed directly from the general demands of wider 
political and empire policy. Failure to observe this principle 
could have a devastating effect on the capitalist operation of 
firms which ' depended extensively on business income from 
government sources. At the same time, within such structural 
constraints, we require the flexibility of action-approaches to 
analyse the decisive role played by personalities such, as John 
Pender and Guglielmo Marconi in creating some of these early 
corporate organizations and technologies which formed the 
foundation stones of Cable and Wireless PLC and of Caribbean 
telecommunications. 
While we agree on the usefulness in employing -both the 
structural-constraint and the individual-action approaches 
in our policy analysis, the same cannot be said about the use of 
both the Industrial Society and Capitalist orientations in the 
matrix proposed by Murdock. The theories of Industrial Society, 
as discussed by Giddens [1979: 100], is centrally concerned with 
industrial organization. Unlike the emphasis of the capitalist 
theory approach on issues of industrial ownership, industrial 
society theories associated with Saint Simon, argue that the 
importance of ownership as a vehicle of control declines with the 
rise in power of managerial elites and technocrats within 
corporations. 
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The professional managers and not the owners, it argues, 
are the new power brokers in a 'managerial revolution'. Applied 
in the context of mass media or other creative and technical 
fields such as telecommunications, this theory would argue that 
the most important decision-makers and corporate power sources 
are the administrators, producers, design engineers and software 
experts as well as the users and consumers, and not the corporate 
owners or directors in the boardrooms at headquarters. 
The capitalist-theory approach, on the other hand, argues 
that the ultimate and most potent source of power, even in modern 
corporations, are the owners organised in the Board of Directors 
or specialist Committees of the Board overseeing specific policy 
areas. In this respect, it stands in direct contradiction with 
the pluralist notions of 'industrial society'. Capitalist-theory 
approaches, founded on the ideas of Karl Marx, are premised on a 
critique of the fundamental inequality in the ownership and 
distribution of wealth and property under capitalism. 
Concentration in the hands of a relatively small capitalist 
class, of the means to produce this wealth, as well as the 
ideological apparatus in support of this order, is viewed as a 
source of disproportionate power and privilege. In this process 
of accumulation, however, the individual capitalist, as well as 
the class, are constrained by external economic and market 
forces as well as by intrinsic contradictions leading to strikes 
and other upheavals by an oppressed labour force or working class 
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in general. 
Applied to the communications industries, a capitalist-theory 
approach would argue that ownership and control of media and 
telecommunications networks are used by individual capitalists to 
enhance both their own further profit-making, as well as in the 
wider defence and protection of the capitalist class as a whole. 
Individual producers, engineers or administrators within these 
structures retain delegated power for only as long as they 
continue to operate generally in the corporate interests of the 
owners or their social class. Equally, corporate investment and 
collaboration abroad with countries or other firms external to 
the private corporation appear more likely to be conducted mainly 
in the interest of corporate owners than principally in response 
to public or consumer demands in host countries. 
Synopsis 
The capitalist-theory approach appears to be the more 
realistic and appropriate framework for our analysis of Cable and 
Wireless as a multinational corporation in the Caribbean. In the 
telecommunications sector within this region, the pluralist 
assumptions of the industrial society model are contradicted by 
the mainly monopoly nature of this service provider, its direct 
financial control methods, policy-making and profit remittance 
practices. But in applying the capitalist-theory approach of 
owner-dominance and control, it is important to take into acount 
the distinction between 'allocative' and 'operational' control. 
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Kotz describes allocative control as the 
the overall goals and scope of the corp 
decide 'on how productive resources 
operational control primarily attends 
profitable implementation of these 
[Kotz 1978: 14]. 
capacity to determine 
oration and the power to 
are deployed, while 
to the creative and 
allocative decisions 
Firms, according to Penrose, are essentially planning units. 
"Their administrative structure usually permits an extensive 
devolution of authority to departments and subsidiary units, but 
even where there is a great deal of de-centralization of 
responsibility, the activities of established firms are 
nevertheless conducted within an administrative planning 
framework with recognized lines of authority and responsibility. 
Boards of directors, assisted by high-level committees are 
responsible for the general structure of the organization, -lay 
down general lines of policy and provide for financial discipline 
and the appointment of senior executives. " [1968: 28]. 
In Cable and Wireless, as in many other similar MNCs, the 
critical instrument of allocative control is this "financial 
discipline', or in Brooke's terms, determination of the annual 
budget: "The core of a planning and control system is the annual 
budgets.... Control over investment represents the ultimate 
control over the operations of a subsidiary, and, as such, is 
almost always closely held by headoffice. " Brooke notes that the 
primary means of control was by limiting the amount of money 
which can be invested by the subsidiary without the authority of 
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head-office [Brooke 1970: 96-1031. 
4.4 
- 
INVESTMENT MOTIVATIONS 
Hamilton [1986: 17] indicates that among the many motivating 
factors for traditional transnational investment are cheap labour 
costs and higher profits related to resource extraction. Assured 
growth and reduction in uncertainty were often satisfied 
by the exploitation of cheap raw material- resources. Additional 
incentives such as tax holidays and restraints on collective 
bargaining frequently spurred investment in industrial enclaves 
and export-processing zones (EPZs) in under-developed countries. 
In contrast with this scenario, Jones [1986: 8] found that 
among British firms, market attraction' was a minority motive 
behind foreign investment decisions between 1914 and 1944. 
Presenting the results of a survey-of fifteen" private British 
manufacturing firms, Jones reported that the strategy of a 
majority of companies appeared to be defensive rather that 
aggressive. Tariffs and host government policies were among the 
most significant motivations reported, particularly tariff 
barriers in the United States during the second half of the 19th 
Century, when traditional-British exports were being squeezed 
out. The involvement of the British state was a requirement in 
tackling these issues. 
Increasingly then, overseas investment was being substituted 
for foreign trade, especially among large or industrialised 
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economies. The basis for this, Enderwick argues, was that "some 
familiarity with the local market through initial servicing 
by export, reduces investment risk.. " [1989: 238]. Many of the 
earliest European 'free-standing' [Jones 1986: 5] national firms 
started their global expansion in this way to help satisfy the 
export needs of the Industrial Revolution as well as to help 
overcome trading restrictions imposed on these products abroad. 
Later, service sector firms were needed to support these 
primary investments, providing international networks in areas 
such as banking, insurance, legal services, advertising, news and 
other forms of communication [Jones 1986, Dixon 1986, UN Report 
1974]. Other service enterprises, as Enderwick points out, 
entered some foreign markets independently, with the aim of 
profit generation in their own right, without the advance guard 
of manufacturing or extractive industries. Still others made 
investment abroad in response to home government incentives 
including subsidies and large government contracts [Kindleberger 
1969: 37-46]. 
4.5 
- 
MNCs AS VECTORS OF INNOVATION 
- 
The multinational corporation, however, irrespective of its 
origins and antecedents, cannot be viewed exclusively as 
performing a colonizing role in the modern world, and many 
arguments have been advanced in its defence as a dynamic source 
of investment, technology and enterprise. Where limitations of 
local technology constrain progress, or insularity and national 
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narrow-mindedness cloud wider visions of global economic 
interaction, the MNC is credited with the required scope and 
expertise to envisage and successfully implement projects on an 
international scale. 
Hirschman, for example, suggests that, far from intrusive and 
pushy attitudes, MNCs may have been too reserved in the drive to 
overcome national or regional fragmentation : "it is the foreign 
investor's mousiness which deprives the policy makers of the 
guidance, pressures and support they badly need to push through 
critically required decisions and policies amid a welter of 
conflicting and antagonistic interests. " (Hirschman 1972: 198). 
Although not endorsing this perspective, Kumar nonetheless 
acknowledges that MNCs directly or indirectly, contribute to 
the growth of entrepreneurship: "They train their employees in 
management, marketing, public relations, production processes and 
related skills. Taking advantage of their training and 
experience, some employees establish their own businesses or move 
to other firms. In addition, the mere presence of TNEs can have 
some favourable psychological effects as'it makes people aware of 
modern management techniques and production skills. " [ Kumar 
1980: 15]. The undoubted economic successes of some newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) particularly in the Asia and 
Pacific region, have been attributed to their open policies 
towards foreign direct investments and MNGs. 
Many of the arguments in defence of the MNC, have been 
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presented, even if not always in very credible terms, by the MNCs 
themselves or their academic representatives. In a study 
conducted for the International Chamber of Commerce in 1969, 
Rolfe summarises many of the arguments which are still at the 
core of the modern defence -of the role of the multinational 
corporation in contexts of economic under-development. 
He argues that this form of private investment has many 
advantages over inter-governmental financial flows. - Firstly it 
avoids the political strings of public finance, and secondly the 
investment is in equity-capital and not debt, repayment for which 
is usually demanded on fixed schedules regardless of fluctuations 
in foreign exchange revenues or growth. The third set, of 
advantages, which seem quite overstated in its claims, is 
outlined by Rolfe in much greater detail and is worth quoting at 
length: 
"Foreign direct investment initiates a veritable 
chain reaction of economic development capabilities. 
The international corporation transmits technological 
knowhow and access to new research developments. It 
trains and educates workers and managers, focussing 
their attention on the competitive process. it 
stimulates local entrepreneurship by encouraging 
independent firms to become suppliers to the 
international corporation 
- 
the process, known as 
'backward linkage' 
- 
as well as further manufacturers 
and sellers of products. In short, it transfers 
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business technology 
- 
the skills of production, 
accounting, marketing, finance and personnel 
utilization, honed to the discipline of a competitive 
cost-price calculus. Where the international 
corporation manufactures goods for export.. it provides 
those exports with ready markets through its affiliate 
channels, and in the process earns needed foreign 
exchange. Seen in this light, a nearly perfect 
symbiotic relationship would seem to exist between 
international corporation and the developing 
 
country. [Rolfe 1969: 29-30]. 
A great deal of the currently available literature, while 
ascribing important global economic functions to the NNC, calls 
seriously into question many of the roles which Rolfe appears to 
have so glibly granted to the MNC. Brooke [1973] in a discussion 
of the organizational strategies of the multinational 
corporation, correctly rejects any idea of 'a near perfect 
symbiotic relationship' between MNC and under-developed host 
countries. He argues more realistically, that : 
"general policies and particularly financial policies 
in multinational companies are specifically designed to 
further the goals of the parent company, and only 
incidentally those of subsidiaries or host countries. 
Such a built in bias is bound to create conflict 
between the different parts of the organization, 
between the whole -organization and its home and host 
- 
208 
- 
countries and between the home and the host countries 
themselves. Typical of such policies are the various 
schemes which are used to shift earnings from one 
country to another in order to avoid taxes, minimize 
risks and achieve other objectives. " [Brooke 1973: 289]. 
This assessment by, Brooke begins to provide important 
elements of the explanations for one of the critical questions 
of concern to us here: 'In whose interest does the MNC operate? '. 
Rolfe's claim of a systematic transfer of technology by MNCs 
would suggest that one of their primary functions is to enhance 
technological development in the Third World. This view is 
severely qualified by Hamilton's observation that, at least in 
manufacturing, "MNC's transfer old technologies to host 
countries. " He argues that not only does this maximize their 
profits from research and development by extending the 
operational life of many lines of equipment or products, but it 
also ensures greater in-house control of the process of 
technology diffusion. 
Some companies impose severe restrictions on the use of 
their technology, including controls on any independent local 
adaptations. In circumstances where a large proportion of this 
technology is inappropriate in original design and usage, such 
restrictions can significantly inhibit experimentation for local 
solutions. Taking into account the two view points, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that while MNCs can and often utilize 
advanced technology in the global South, they do so largely in 
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their own self interest. The quality and appropriateness of the 
technology as well as the associated restrictions are also 
important issues in the process. 
In some situations, more relevant to the service sector, the 
same arguments of inappropriateness can be advanced regarding 
training. Many under-developed countries lack the institutional 
and financial resources to provide training either in a local 
context or with an appropriate national orientation. The result 
is that this role, especially in technical fields, is performed 
within existing multinationals or their home countries. In such 
circumstances, trained managers or technical experts are subject 
to the priorities and agenda setting of the industrialised 
countries in terms of course content. Where the training takes 
place within a company, recruits from the south are also subject 
to transfers away from their national regions; and where it is 
not in-company, many trained specialists find it difficult to 
return to work in their national economies because of the 
disincentives of low pay, de-skilling resulting from workplace 
technology and circumstances and to some extent subjective social 
disorientation from their national environment. 
Brooke's reference to MNC tendencies toward the avoidance of 
taxes through schemes to shift earnings from one country to 
another is rendered by Rolfe as channels for the ready export of 
-locally manufactured products leading to important foreign 
exchange earnings. The more prevalent practice in MNCs appears to 
support Brooke's reference to what is often described as transfer 
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pricing. Penrose describes how such transfers are implemented, 
resulting in not more, but less, foreign exchange earnings for a 
host country: 
"The prices charged to any given affiliate for the use 
of research results, 'know-how and patents, for 
managerial and- other services and for goods supplied 
by the parent or by other affiliates, can be adjusted 
over a wide range depending on the particular 
circumstances. Costs must be 
-allocated and transfer 
process must be set, but the choice of appropriate 
criteria is necessarily arbitrary from an economic 
point of view. Moreover, just what charges are made is 
often very easily concealed even from internal revenue 
authorities, and especially in countries whose 
administrative expertise is very limited or who are in 
a weak position to stand up to large international 
firms [Penrose 1968: 43]. 
Some MNCs are able, in addition, to take advantage of the 
location of subsidiaries in low corporate tax 'havens', to effect 
further tax minimization schemes, with major consequences for 
income distribution and the balance of payments position of 
other host countries. 
Not all multinationals engage in such practices, but these 
methods are widespread enough to warrant attention. By such means 
as well as by legitimate business practices, the major 
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multinational corporations have been able to earn higher 
profits abroad than in their home markets. According to Hamilton 
[1986: 17], U. S. Department of Commerce surveys in the 1970s 
indicated that the dependence of U. S. 
-based MNCs on foreign 
profits has grown at an accelerating rate since the mid-1960s and 
there is every reason to believe that a similar trend is 
occurring for Japanese and European companies. 
This is likely to be especially the case as competition 
intensifies among industrialised countries and among their large 
international firms for 'market share'. In such competition, 
where size and global power are important factors, the tendency 
has been towards the dominance of a few very large international 
operators controlling specific industries in the extractive, 
manufacturing and service sectors. This process was recognised by 
the U. N. Economics Department, which pointed out in its 1974 
study that 'firms subject to oligopolistic competition 
frequently reach abroad in the effort to capture large shares of 
the world market' [1974: 33]. 
In addition to business objectives linked to national goals, 
the outreach of many MNCs are still facilitated by their home 
government's financial support and pressures related to national 
influence and regional power. This aspect, in its more recent 
manifestation, is discussed by Webber, Moon and Richardson [1984) 
in relation to' government financial support for the rapid 
expansion of the European Information Technology industry, and by 
Jones (1986) with reference to the origins of early British 
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multinationals. 
Synopsis 
Multinational corporations can play an important role in the 
global disemmination of technical innovation, in. training and in 
providing a dynamic productive element to stagnating national 
economies. But*this role is carried out, first, and foremost in 
the interest of capital accumulation on the part of the 
multinational corporation and its home government. The spread of 
technical innovation is not the same thing as the international 
transfer of technology. Many third World countries host the 
production of goods or the provision of services using advanced 
technical means, but still do not control or enjoy independent 
access to. the technologies. Alternatively, old or inappropriate 
technologies are passed on to societies which are unable to 
independently evaluate their usefulness or technically incapable 
of adapting them to local requirements. 
Where MNC training is provided, it can serve as a useful 
beginning for the development of the technical capacity and 
expertise. of nationals in various sectors. However, much advanced 
level training from these sources is provided overseas andserve 
as techniques of acculturation of employees into company-specific 
values and often leads to a 'brain drain' away from either 
physical location oA psychological commitment to national 
objectives. 
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In the case of the Cable and Wireless corporate practice, 
the company maintains training institutions in the Caribbean and 
other regions -for entry level employees and workers employed in 
basic technical skill areas. But all senior level staff, 
managers and planners are -trained at the company's Porthcurno 
training establishment in England. In this way, within the 
company, senior level training and promotion have become 
associated with overseas qualifications and attachments 
abroad. 
4.6 
- 
OWNERSHIP AND HOST COUNTRY COMPETITION 
In terms 
-of subsidiary ownership policy, multinational 
corporations appear to prefer their subsidiaries "abroad to be 
wholly , owned. On the'other hand, as we noted from Article 44 of 
the annex to Caribbean Community -(CARICOM) Treaty, - regional 
states placed a high priority on 'increased.. national 
participation in their economies". The generality of this treaty 
clause, however, and its relegation to an annex of the Common 
Market provisions, reveal a sharp division among CARICOM member 
governments on the question of the extent of participation and 
control which should be exercised either from the instruments of 
regional integration or in national policy-making [Axline 1979: 
142-145]. 
This division reflected the variation which existed in 
ideological outlook of member countries in the 1970s, as well 
as variation in internal economic. structures. Guyana, - which 
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led the demands for a regional agreement on foreign investment, 
advocated strong policies of national state control and 
intermediate and community co-operative enterprise. The other 
MDC's to varying degrees supported stronger regulatory control 
over foreign investment. Trinidad and Tobago had long pursued 
nationalist policies in land ownership and to aspects of its 
petro-chemical industry. Jamaica, then operating within an 
ideological framework of 'democratic socialism' also supported 
investment codes including those over its bauxite and alumina 
deposits. 
The Less Developed Countries (LDCs), however, considered 
themselves less 
-able to impose conditions on foreign investment 
given their low levels of natural resource endowments and the 
openness and fragility of their economies. This situation 
constitutes an example of the duality and unevenness in 
development which the dependency theorists attribute to the 
variable, self-serving patterns of imperialist investment in, the 
periphery, and which reinforce internal or regional divisions. At 
the July 1974 meeting of the CARICOM Heads of Government, a draft 
agreement on Foreign Investment and the Development- of 
Technology, prepared by a working party, was presented for 
decision. However, given the marked differences. within the 
movement on the issue, it was not surprising that 
-the leaders 
were unable to agree on the terms of the Draft. To date, the 
issue has never re-emerged at the level of the Heads of 
Government for policy determination. The treatment of foreign 
investment therefore reverted to arena of exclusive national 
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policy-making, a feature which further underlines the 
fragmentation of policy approach in the region. 
In contrast to this fragmentation, multinational 
corporations with subsidiaries across many regional countries, 
maintain a single corporate strategy for the region, including 
policies of maximizing to the MNC the percentage of corporate 
ownership. Such increased ownership tends to accord more 
effective control by the externally-based policy-makers as well 
as by the locally-based expatriate operational controllers, over 
such critical areas as intra-firm transfers and technology 
protection. The optimum condition for such control, is of course, 
the wholly-owned subsidiary, an objective towards which Cable and 
Wireless policy in the more developed territories of the region 
appears to be geared. 
Where the wholly-owned subsidiary dominates its sector, as 
is often the case in small island economies, it gains major 
opportunities for the appropriation of monopoly rents from sole 
incumbency or technological advantages in the host country. These 
special advantages, referred to as economies of common 
governance, provide the investing company with a strong 
competitive edge over other potential foreign competitors. In 
terms of local factors, however, some variations from this 
scenario can arise from the demands for participation by national 
governments, regulatory limitations and the need to diversify 
product lines by the incorporation of specialist inputs 
controlled by local entities. 
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The preference for wholly-owned subsidiaries appears to 
have developed as a major strategy among British multinationals 
only after 1945. The previous strategy among manufacturing 
multinationals favoured joint ventures, but this operated only 
until the British investing partners were sufficiently 
established in an overseas market to operate independent 
subsidiaries. ' 
Jones [1986: 11] argues that the management of these 
British firms, faced with a narrow range of options in 
manufacturing, initially welcomed joint ventures as a source of 
outside capital and technology. This strategy was. particularly 
important for small firms, for whom joint ventures helped to 
spread risk. Jones suggests that besides increased business 
confidence, the reversal of the joint venture trend was also 
influenced by managerial and business disagreements. Table 5 
indicates that while in the pre-1914 period 71 % of the firms 
surveyed were joint ventures, the proportion contracted to 33 % 
after 1945. And wholly owned subsidiaries increased from 29% 
before 1914 to some 67 % in the period after the Second World 
War. 
In the period after the Second World War, therefore, the 
tendency was towards increasingly wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
However, in a significant minority of cases where this level of 
ownership did not operate, the resulting shared ownership also 
threw up its own policy requirements for management and optimal 
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TABLE 5 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
U. R. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP PATTERN 1914-1966 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
JOINT VENTURE VS WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES 
------------------------------------------- 
Status 
------ 
Pre-1914 
-------- 
1914-1944 
---------- 
1945-66 
------- 
Wholely-owned 29% 47% 67% 
Joint Venture 71% 53% 33% 
# of Subsidiaries 24 34 15 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source : Survey by Geoffrey Jones 1986: 10 
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methods of control. In the absence of total control, most 
investing MNCs prefer majority control of both operations and 
profit allocation, "although at times, such control can be 
exercised from a minority position. " [UN Report 1974: 15]. As an 
indication of this greater MNC preference and support for wholly 
owned or majority controlled subsidiaries, the U. N Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs found that in the mid 1970s "At least 
80% of U. S. affiliates and 75% of U. K. affiliates are either 
wholly-owned or majority controlled. In terms of stock of 
investment, these two countries have placed about 90% in 
affiliates that are at least majority owned. ". 
Like most other forms of business enterprise, the 
multinational corporation exists to maximize its economic 
advantages. In most cases it targets increased productivity and 
higher profits. Its ability to do so and to adapt and grow 
in the process, contributes to its permanence as a viable 
institutional form. Kindleberger [1969] points out that, though 
necessary, these are not sufficient conditions for the operation 
of a world class multinational company. The corporation, he says, 
also needs to be 'indispensable', performing for the world or 
its host country functions which no other institutions are 
perceived to be able to carry out as efficiently in similar 
circumstances. 
In competition with national firms in host countries, the 
aim of the multinational enterprise to be indispensable can often 
easily be accomplished through economies of scale, particularly 
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in production operations where its critical mass accords major 
advantages. Such economies can be complemented by special access 
to parent-company services, including the intra-firm transfer of 
production or process inputs, the availability of advanced 
technology or specialised staff, as well as the application of 
internationally tested production and control procedures, based 
on superioreresearch and development (R&D) facilities. 
On the other hand, MNCs sometimes operate in situations of 
no significant national competition, as is the case with Cable 
and Wireless in the Eastern Caribbean, and to a lesser extent in 
the more developed parts of the region. Competition from other 
MNCs in telecommunications is 'traditionally inhibited by the 
firm's advantages of incumbency, re-inforced by exclusive 
long-term licences or contractual arrangements. 
In many circumstances, such as where the internal 
technological base is weak, only another multinational 
firm may be equipped to secure a market share against well 
established MNC operators. While initially introducing an element 
of competition, such a situation often results In important 
national sectors being controlled by oligopolies. Where, however, 
indigenous competition exists, the multinational corporation can 
face significant disadvantages. These can arise in local markets 
where the national competitor, being smaller, can often be more 
easily managed; where the competitor enjoys a greater familiarity 
with the nuances of the indigenous market; and where the 
competitor may be accorded special concessions flowing from its 
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local nationality. 
Under such conditions, the traditional key intrinsic 
requirements for an 'indispensable' level of corporate 
performance by the multinational corporation are described by 
Enderwick [1989: 17] as the need for 'firm specific advantages' 
(FSAs). These are distinctive qualities which are transferable 
within the international company to its subsidiaries abroad. 
These specific advantages, varying in significance from firm to 
firm, include such features as international reputation, goodwill 
or brand-name, specific production or marketing practices like 
fast food output techniques or emphasis on special types of high 
quality products. Firm specific advantages provide a basis for 
product or service differentiation derived from company history, 
policy, technology or business practice. It is these advantages 
which the MNC can deploy in outstripping local competition and in 
dominating markets. 
To gain advantage, particularly in competition with other 
multinational- corporations, the large international firm also 
traditionally requires 'location specific advantages' (LSAs) 
[Enderwick 1989 : 18-30]. These advantages are achieved by 
consolidating a base in the host country or from acquiring 
multiple site or service locations in a national or regional 
market. Locational advantages can also be acquired by securing a 
presence in, or alternatively away from, a geographical 
concentration. of firms specializing in common products or 
services. Extractive multinationals, for example, would not 
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enjoy these advantages if they were not prepared to 'establish' 
mines in locations of richest mineral deposits. A national mining 
enterprise, on the other hand, may lack this capacity to quickly 
re-locate, and in this sense, the MNC enjoys the economic 
advantages of locational flexibility. 
As conceptual tools, both firm specific and location 
specific advantages, have been traditionally applied to 
manufacturing and extractive industries. As we are concerned here 
with a service-sector firm, it is important to examine how useful 
these concepts are to the activities of the tertiary sector 
Enderwick has noted that both these types of advantages can be 
successfully applied to MNCs in service areas as diverse as 
accounting and news agencies. However, he advises that important 
modifications may be necessary in applying the concepts globally 
across the heterogenous range of services. 
The experience of Reuters News Agency in the Caribbean, for 
example, helps to reinforce this cautionary note in terms of 
universal application of these principles. Reuters', as a 
service-oriented multinational company, established a Caribbean 
Bureau for the first time in 1974, after years of 'servicing' the 
region from its London headquarters. In the company's' 
calculations, this regional location was an advantage it lacked 
in the face of expected competition from the 'then emerging 
regional Caribbean News Agency (CANA). Within two years, however, 
the Reuters Caribbean bureau was abandoned, overtaken by local 
competition. In this case it was the local competitor, CANA which` 
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enjoyed the firm specific advantage [FSA} of writing from a 
distinctive regional perspective, which it combined with location 
specific advantages of bureaux in several national capitals of 
the region. 
This particular case indicates that LSAs and FSAs are by no 
means the exclusive preserves of multinationals in the service 
sector, where sometimes more personalised, indigenous or 
small-scale characteristics are distinct advantages. Nonetheless, 
in other services requiring greater levels of technology, 
international bargaining or specific management expertise, the 
peculiar advantages of multinational corporations may far 
outweigh other attributes of local competition. The 
telecommunications sector, with which we are concerned here, 
falls more within this category. 
4.7 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing discussion of multinational corporations in 
the global economy, though not exhaustive of the topic, is 
sufficient to indicate the formidable scope, power and array of 
techniques which such companies have at their disposal in their 
relationships with host countries. In the face of this, we have 
tried to show the particular vulnerability of the economically 
under-developed host countries, and especially small island 
economies such as those which characterise the economic landscape 
of the English-speaking Caribbean. Where such countries are 
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internally weak or regionally' divided, the multinational 
corporation enjoys greater scope for optimum control of policy 
within its sector by dominating ownership. 
We have presented the arguments, as put forward by the 
leading researchers and theorists, of both the benefits and the 
apparently overwhelming disadvantages to national economies of 
pervasive multinational control. MNC's`can play an important role 
in the global spread of technical 'innovation, but this is a 
different function from the transfer of technology. While many 
multinational corporations are keen to operate with the most 
advanced technologies, they are reluctant to impart these 
technologies to host countries. Brooke suggests that where such 
technology is made available, it is sometimes outdated and 
inappropriate. The general policies of MNC's, he notes, "are 
"designed to further the goals of the parent company and only 
incidentally those of the 
.. 
host countries. " 
Despite the disadvantages in their relationships with MNC's 
countries of the global South face a dilemma in the absence, 
in extant circumstances, of clear-cut viable and less costly 
alternatives. The situation is worsened for these countries by 
the lack of indigenous policies and planning structures. The MNCs 
are able, through highly developed techniques, to make their 
services appear 'indispensable', and so maintain their global 
expansion and consolidate their advantages over competition from 
privately operated or state-run local enterprises. 
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We have shown how the MNCs operate mainly from head-offices 
based in the capitals of the western industrialised countries and 
how their activities abroad are often carried out in close 
collaboration with these home governments. Contrary to Rolfe's 
perception of a "nearly perfect symbiotic relationship between 
the international corporation and the developing country. " 
[1969 : 30], it appears that it is the collaborative relationship 
between the MNCs and their home government which constitutes the 
more dicisive nexus in the global power and presence of foreign 
direct investment. 
As we have argued, the foreign and economic policies of 
these developed countries, under more recent neo-colonial 
conditions, is increasingly being mediated through global 
multi-lateral agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, creating additional advantages to the 
MNC. IMF demands for government divestment and privatization of 
telecommunications systems in the under-developed countries, for 
example, are likely to operate in the interest of the foreign 
multinational corporations, which are frequently the only 
entities, governments aside, with the necessary resources to 
acquire the de-nationalised firms and industries. 
This situation raises the issue of whether these agencies 
are the modern collective successors to the more traditional 
processes of colonialism and conquest once pursued by individual 
European states. And a parallel question is whether, on the 
global scale, the modern MNCs are the main beneficiaries of the 
- 
224 
- 
policies of these institutions. While detailed investigation of 
these issues is outside the scope of our current study, they 
arise here because of their integral connection to the issue of 
the role of telecommunications in development when the 
telecommunications companies are externally owned and the state 
systems in host countries like those in the Caribbean, 
historically weak. 
At the same time, our analysis of the failure of CARICOM 
proposals for a common approach to foreign investment, offers 
some insight into why many poor countries retain or invite 
multinational firms into their territories, ýoften without equity 
participation or adequate regulatory controls. In part, our 
foregoing discussion of the economies of, scale, historical 
incumbency, carefully cultivated images of 'indispensability' 
linked to monopoly contracts and support from industrialised home 
governments, provide us with important elements of the answer. 
The combined effect of these factors accords with our earlier 
analysis of imperialism and its traditional and more modern 
consequences of dependency and multinational dominance. 
writing from a Caribbean frame of reference, Girvan 
expressed this power relationship between the imperialist state 
and the multinational corporation as 'corporate imperialism': 
"Dependence, underdevelopment and endemic conflict are related to 
the integration of these economies into a system of corporate 
imperialism. By corporate imperialism, we mean a system of 
international capitalism that has two basic characteristics. 
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First, fundamental power in this world system is held by the 
owners and managers of capital, who exercise this power over 
other groups and institutions in order to appropriate surpluses 
and accumulate further capital. These other groups - governmental 
bureaucracies, workers, peasants and the unemployed, are to a 
greater or lesser degree dominated, dependent, exploited and 
underdeveloped. The second crucial feature is that these 
relationships are institutionalised within the framework of 
large, integrated transnational corporations. The TNCs as a group 
constitute the institutional base of the system; individually, 
they are its principal instruments of action. The hierarchy of 
roles and the network of dominance/dependency relationships 
within the individual corporation are a microcosm of the roles 
and relationships within the total system of corporate 
imperialism... " [Girvan 1976: 11-12]. 
But, these global factors alone, important as they are, do 
not provide a complete and adequate explanation for persistent 
under-development and debt, existing side by side with 
multinational affluence and growth in these economies of the 
south, including in the Caribbean. As we argued earlier, problems 
of internal weakness [Krasner 1985: 4], difficulties of policy 
formulation and implementation, class and social inequality as 
well as regional disunity, are also central factors inhibiting 
development and greater control over external forces. 
Nonetheless, the fore-going discussion provides us with a 
useful analytical context within which to examine the policies 
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and economic activities of Cable and Wireless as a multinational 
corporation with over one hundred and twenty years of involvement 
in the Caribbean. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MULTINATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF CABLE AND WIRELESS 
Qn the basis of the features identified by both Dunning and 
Penrose, as well as the definition applied by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, it is clear that the 
company which is the focus of this study, Cable and Wireless, 
classifies as an established multinational corporation. Although 
becoming re-geared as a private MNC only since divestment less 
than a decade ago, our study, indicates that the Group has a long 
tradition in MNC investments and outreach. The company's history 
dates back to over 140 year ago, when a series of acquisitions of 
small telegraph firms led to the establishment of, an early 
conglomerate: Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies. Cable 
and Wireless is the result of further mergers mainly between this 
group and Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, which pioneered 
long distance radio communications as an- alternative or 
complement to cable. 
In this chapter we present and consider the data on the 
formation and growth of Cable and Wireless as a multinational 
corporation. Because we aim to conduct this analysis in the 
framework of the company's close association with the British 
State and colonial empire, we begin with a brief examination of 
the Group's British nationality and instances of the role which 
this relationship between the parent state and-C&W has played in 
early telecommunications policy in the periphery. We then turn 
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to the historical processes leading to the formation of the 
Group and the origin of, -its influence and dominance in the 
smaller British ex-colonies, such as those in the Caribbean. 
The on-going interplay between the private and state sectors in 
the ownership and formulation of policy for the early telegraph, 
wireless and later combined telecommunications systems receives 
particular emphasis. 
5.1 
- 
BRITISH NATIONALITY AND STATE INFLUENCE 
In 1988, Cable and Wireless PLC spanned some 46 countries 
[Financial Times Business Information 1988: 99],: covering regions 
as varied as Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, Africa and 
the India Ocean area, Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America and 
the United States. In the same year, it was operating some 
39 declared major subsidiaries or associated companies-in these 
areas. The worldwide activities of this British conglomerate are 
co-ordinated from corporate headquarters in London, by a Board of 
Directors consisting entirely of British nationals. 
These features are not only consistent with Dunning's model 
of a geographically diverse global network 'under the control 
of a single institutionl[1971: 16), but also with Penrose's and 
Kumar's characterization of MNCs as being typically owned in the 
industrialised global north, 
. 
ýith most of the shareholders of 
the parent... likely to share its nationality [Penrose 1968: 40]. 
According to the company's 1989 Annual Report, the seven- 
locations for shareholders meetings were London, Cardiff, 
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Leicester, Edinburgh,,, Liverpooll Leeds and Brighton, all U. K. 
cities. Similarly, according to the company's 1989 Annual Report 
[40), all thirteen members of the 'Court' of Directors, were 
British. Notwithstanding the company's wide international profit 
base, therefore, its exclusive-U. K economic ownership structure, 
directorate and executive management, conform to the typical 
MNC practice of confining ownership and control of the parent 
firm primarily to home-base nationals. [Poulantzas 1975: 18 
-20]. 
As we saw earlier, this a policy about which some theoretical and 
policy observers have been critical. 
Equally, consistent with our earlier discussion, Cable and 
Wireless operates a subsidiary ownership policy based on a 
preference for wholly-owned subsidiaries, and where this is not 
possible, it seeks for majority shareholding or other means of 
effective control over its investment units. In the Caribbean, 
for example, the government of Antigua and Barbuda encountered 
strong resistance, while still a British colony, to its. attempt 
to secure by negotiation some equity participation in the wholly 
owned Cable and Wireless subsidiary which had traditionally 
operated the country's overseas telecommunications network. 
According to the local Minister of Communications, "government's 
attempt to participate in Cable and Wireless has been stringently 
resisted. In 1978, when negotiations began, we-hadto back off, 
because we were in the heat of independence talks and no other 
island in the British West Indies had to go through the strong 
test which we were forced to undergo. It was then felt to shelve 
it because it could have created another obstacle. "[Vere Bird Jnr 
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in CANTO Conference Proceedings 1989: 250]., 
Similarly, in the early years of Cable and Wireless' 
penetration of Hong Kong, the. company, then commercially- 
run under British government supervision, utilised, its 
connections with the parent State to advance its hold on services 
in the colony. In a confidential exchange of correspondence with 
the company in-1944, the Colonial Office, indicated the conditions- 
under which certain services in Hong Kong were transferred to 
Cable and Wireless: "When the negotiations were conducted'in, 
1937, as a result of which an exclusive licence was granted to 
Cable and Wireless Limited to supply and operate the external 
fixed station commercial radio communications of the colony, 
certain services, eg. mobile, meteorological, broadcasting, 
aeronautical, police, harbour, navigation, multiple wireless 
news service etc. were reserved for the government. The 
commercial radio communication of the colony was, a source of 
substantial revenue to the Hong Kong government, and CONSIDERABLE 
PRESSURE HAD TO BE EXERCISED ON THAT GOVERNMENT TO PERSUADE THEM 
TO HAND OVER THE SERVICES TO CABLE AND WIRELESS LIMITED IN RETURN 
FOR AN ANNUAL SUBSIDY. " (my emphasis)[Public Records office File 
CO 937 
-11/6,1944]. 
Both the relatively recent case of Antigua and these earlier 
'negotiations' in Hong Kong, illustrate the resistance of the 
company to host-country ownership or equity participation in 
profitable telecommunications 
-ventures. But they - also 
demonstrate the critical alliance which frequently operates 
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between the multinational corporation and the home government. In 
one case, it was the perception of a host country minister that 
negotiations for national independence from Britain could have 
been 
-compromised by any sustained demands for host-government 
participation in the equity of a British multinational firm. In 
another it was the actual exercise of imperial State power over a 
colony which secured control of the sole viable segment of the 
telecommunications system for the company. It is on this 
foundation that Cable and Wireless, now a private conglomerate, 
can describe Hong Kong as a location at which the Group "has 
established market leadership" [Annual Report 1988: 13]. It is 
also largely on this basis that Cable and Wireless has survived 
and expanded as a multinational corporation. 
According to Roger Cowe of the Guardian "cash from the 
territory [Hong Kong] has paid for the huge investments in 
Xercury and in the international fibre optic network which the 
company dubs the 'global highway"' [14/6/90: 9]. Initial access to 
this originally profitable location was provided on a monopoly 
basis to Cable and wireless by the political dominance of its 
home government over the colony. Although the company's own 
investment has contributed to Hong Kong's profitibility as a 
telecommunications market today, the early role of the British 
government in the colony, as in Antigua, appear to lend support 
to Kumar's view that "the national and organizational loyalties 
of transnational businessmen may be expected to fuse with 
imperialistic force" of their home governments for the creation 
or preservation of XNC markets and control [Kumar 1980: 84]. 
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Synopsis 
The indications from these two cases would seem to support 
the view that it has largely been the pervasive influence of the 
British 
-imperial state which historically 
-operated as a 
midwife to the emergence and early development of Cable and 
Wireless in the Caribbean. The indications from Antigua suggest 
that while this British state influence may be on the wane since 
the era- of de-colonization, it has not been eliminated as a 
factor in telecommunications policy-making in the contemporary 
Caribbean. The historical evidence also suggests that this 
State/company interaction was even more dominant among the small 
colonised territories of the region, providing fruitful soil for 
C&WIs antecedent companies. 
5.2 
- 
MNC ORIGINS AND TRANSITIONS OF C&W. 
The most widely held existing perception of the large 
multinational corporation is probably that of a privately founded 
and commercially run conglomerate. In an initial interview, 
[23/2/89], the Cable and Wireless archivist Peter Travers-Laney 
emphasised that, unlike this scenario, Cable and Wireless had 
emerged through a much more complex series of transitionst 
including multiple mergers, government regulation and eventually, 
outright government ownership. In all this, however, its mandate 
to generate profit from investments and subsidiary offices 
particularly in the British sphere of influence abroad, had 
- 
233 
- 
remained intact since its late 19th century formal beginnings. 
Geoffrey Jones notes that until 1939 Britain was the 
world's largest multinational investor. "The roots of this 
investment go back to the Nineteenth century, when Britain was 
the world's largest capital-exporting economy. It used to be 
maintained that the bulk of this capital was portfolio 
investment, involving the acquisition of foreign securities 
without any control over the foreign institutions or companies 
concerned. However, it now seems that as much as 40% may have 
taken the form of foreign direct investment, involving the 
ownership and manag - ement of a foreign operation. " [Jones 
1976: 3). It is not surprising, therefore, that one Of 'C&W'B 
main antecedent companies, The Eastern Telegraph Group, 
was one of 'the most well-established British multinational 
corporations of the 19th century. 
Though not the leading investor, the founder of the Eastern 
Telegraph Group, John Pender was a shareholder in the first 
successful transatlantic submarine cable laid in 1866. The 
completion of the cable represented a strategic triumph for the 
colonial authorities who earnestly required rapid and reliable 
long distance communications with the outer reaches of a far 
flung empire. But, it also represented a commercial and 
technological watershed, in terms of the potential earnings from 
the manufacture and laying of vast stretches of cable in the 
service of both'business and government. Pender, a Manchester 
based textile manufacturer, was also involved in the manufacture 
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of telegraph cables, as Chairman of TELCON, the Telegraph 
Construction and Maintenance Company. According to Baglehole 
[1969: 1], Pender, also felt that investment in submarine cables 
in the Mediterranean region offered bright prospects both for 
immediate returns and for future expansion to link the great 
colonial capitals of Asia to their global centre, in Britain. 
In discussing large corporations, and the communications 
industry, Xurdock urged consideration of both who controls the 
corporations as well as what structural factors determine 
corporate decisions [1982: 124]. Placed in this, context, both 
John Pender as a leading actor, and the 19th century conglomerate 
Eastern Telegraph, which he led, performed significant roles in 
the early development of Cable and Wireless. Pender was motivated 
by the need for greater efficiency in capital accumulation from 
raw material in the British colonies of the East. The corporate 
corollary to improved political administration with'the telegraph 
was that arrangements for the shipment and importation of 
textiles could be more efficiently and profitably handled through 
improved communication. Pender became personally committed to 
this business objective and invested significant portions of' his 
textile fortune in the telegraph. Eventually, cable manufacture 
and telegraphic services also became profitable ventures in their 
own right and were vertically integrated into his corporate 
empire. 
Pender, therefore founded the Anglo-Mediterranean Telegraph 
Company in 1866, and soon afterwards a clutch of other companies, 
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including the British India Submarine Telegraph Companyt and the 
Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta Telegraph Company Limited. His own 
cable construction company, TELCON, formed the home base of an 
extensive investment in the telegraph. Pender's early strategic 
objective was the control of all colonial cable communication 
to and from the eastern sector of the British empire, with 
the primary aim of joining the different subsidiary lines to 
create a direct link between India and Britain. This objective 
was achieved in 1870, marking the first chain of Eastern 
submarine telegraph cables to link directly with the early 
British mainland cable network [Baglehole 1969: 3]. It represented 
an improvement on the earlier but more circuitous route to India 
established in 1865 (Barty-King 1969: 19]. 
By 1872, the chain of companies involved in the linkage with 
India were merged to form the first global conglomerateto, which 
the continuity of Cable and Wireless as an MNC may be traced. 
Eastern Telegraph Company had a capital ofC3,397,000 and gross 
revenues of-4376,900. According to Barty-King [1979: 79] its 
assets included 8,860 miles of submarine cable, 1,200 miles of 
land line, 24 stations worldwide and two repair ships. Besides 
the initial chain of cables to India, Pender embarked on a 
strategy of globalization of his investments beyond Asia and 
the Mediterranean. He founded the British India Extension 
Telegraph Company Limited to link India with Singapore and the 
Far East, as well as the British Australian Telegraph Company to 
extend the network to Australia. Even earlier,, in 1869, Pender 
had also established the China Submarine Telegraph Company which 
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linked Saigont Hong Kong and Singapore. As with the pioneering 
companies which created the link to India, the companies of the 
Far East were also merged by 1873 to form the Eastern Extension 
Australasia and China Telegraph Company Limited [Baglehole 
1969: 4]. 
As would be expected, John Pender's Group was by the mid 
1870s in a 
-position to project its corporate power into the 
transatlantic and South American regions, where a number of 
smaller independent telegraph companies had started operations. 
Among these independent companies was the Great Western 
Telegraph Company, formed in 1872 to link the U. K. with New York 
and to extend the telegraph lines southwards to Brazil. Even 
while this project was underway, the Eastern Telegraph Company 
established a competing subsidiary, The Brazilian Submarine 
Telegraph Company in 1873 to link Brazil and other locations in 
South America with Europe via Portugal. Again with the technical 
support of Pender's Cable Manufacturing company TELCON, and his 
cable ships, the company successfully completed this Lisbon to 
Pernambuco line by 1874, thereby establishing a firm foothold 
in the telegraph concessions business in the Western world. 
Many other such South and Central American companies fell 
to the Eastern conglomerate, including the eventual takeover 
of the independent competitor, the Great Western Telegraph Co. 
From this initial South American foothold in Brazil, the Eastern 
Telegraph Company and its associated manufacturing arm TELCON 
rapidly expanded into Latin America. "In 1876, TELCON formed the 
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West Coast, of, America Telegraph Company to run the telegraph they 
had built linking Peru with Chile, the Lima Valparaiso line. The 
company was re-constructed the following year and given closer 
ties with John Pender's Eastern Company" [Barty-King 1979: 51]. 
By the end of 1887, notes Barty-King, the company's official 
historian, "it owned 22,400 miles of submarine-cable and had 
sixty four stations 
... 
The capital wasI5,900,000 and gross annual 
revenue of4650,971.11 [1979: 76] 
Important policy implications can be surmised from this 
global process of expansion by Eastern Telegraph Company and 
other 
- 
early ventures in telegraphic cables. In the first 
place, we are concerned to establish to what extent this 
expansion was materially or. otherwise ýsupported by the home 
government, Britain, which was then a major industrial power and 
centre of a vast colonial empire. And, secondly, we hope to show 
the initial-resistance by the state to, accommodate the new 'and 
alternative technology of wireless which was perceived as a 
threat to the economic interest of the cable interests with which 
the authorities traditionally identified. 
British government policy on ocean telegraphyll as with 
inland telegraphy initially, was the promotion of British private 
investment in the cable industry, in improving message quality, 
expanding cable routes and in monitoring rates and tariffs. 
Parallel to this aspect of official policy, however, was the 
provision of the political backing, such as we saw in the case of 
Hong Kong, technical support including the use of, the vessels of 
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the British navy, and financial support in the form guaranteed 
subventions for schemes in which government had a political 
interest, such as communication with India and across the 
Atlantic. 
The government's dual policy of private sector ownership 
with'public sector subsidy was most dramatically demonstrated by 
the early case of the Red Sea and Telegraph to India Company in 
1858. According to Barty-King, the British government undertook to 
provide this venture with a subsidy of 4 1/2 % of its total 
capitalization ofE800, OOO. The only condition imposed for this 
subsidy was the successful operation of the line between Suez, 
Aden and Karachi, with an eventual link to Britain. Despite its 
monopoly position, the company's attempts to lay the required 
lines failed. 
However it continued to receive the government subvention, 
with an accumulated total loss offl, 800,000 [Barty-King 1969: 
15]. The failure of this model of public support for private 
ventures gave rise to an overall review of policy by a government 
Committee of Enquiry in ý1859. The Committee's conclusion, 
however, focussed more on the technical shortcomings of the 
process. However, the experience led to more caution in the 
commitment of public funds for such ventures, and to the 
introduction of legislation, including a strengthened Limited 
Liability Act to protect shareholders. 
The development of a strong lobby of cable investors sought 
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to reverse the official reluctance to offer subventions. By the 
time of the launch of the pioneering transatlantic cable in 1866, 
this policy reservation had been overcome. The Atlantic Cable 
company, in which John Pender was an early investor, managed to 
secure an 8% guarantee on its capital ofC600,000, involving the 
payment of'C20,000 a year from the British government and a 
similar sum from the government of the United States. [1969: 16]. 
An identification of the interest of the state for an expanded 
cable network, and that of the company for government assistance 
proved a powerful motivation for the alteration of policy. 
Thereafter, subventions and other forms of support from the 
British government and 
-its colonial administrations overseas, 
became an integral part of public policy towards private cable 
and telegraph investments. - 
British cable policy was directed towards active support 
for private ventures such as Eastern's 
-a policy which secured 
for Britain a pre-eminent role in global cable manufacture, 
ownership and maintenance. [See network maps in Appendix]. The 
state relationship with the dominant Eastern Telegraph group 
supports the explanations of Foreman-Peck, offered earlier, 
for the success of this policy: "The political situation in 
continental Europe and similarity of resource endowment, 
historically, directed British economic interests into long 
distance trade and specialization, importing food and raw 
materials and exporting manufactures and semi-manufactures., So in 
the 1850s, Britain's most important trading partner wasý the 
independent U. S., and second in importance was the colonial 
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Indian empire. 'Naturally, communication with these two areas was 
a priority, hence the State support',, both for reasons of imperial 
security and economic interest. "[Foreman-Peck, Correspondence 
10-7-90]. 1 
The role of Eastern Telegraph Company Limited raises the 
issue of the monopoly control'which dominated the operation of 
global telecommunications in the latter half of the Nineteenth 
century. John Pender's original industrial connections related to 
textiles, the manufacture and trade in which brought him into 
contact with Eastern reaches of the empire. The principal source 
of raw cotton, then, was India while that for wool was Australia, 
New Zealand and several other territories in the East. As private 
entrepreneur, he, like the public administrators in government, 
recognised the great potential for the enhancement of-trade which 
the new telegraph technology represented. Although he first 
invested in the pioneering transatlantic submarine cable, Pender 
the textiles manufacturer was soon to focus his own initiatives 
on communication with Asia and the Far East. This was a route 
which also suited the imperial involvement in India, led by the 
Colonial office. 
What resulted was an extraordinary industrial concentrationt 
which dominated the cable and telegraph industry in Englandr 
Europe and the British empire through most of the latter half of 
the 19th century. Despite attempts to break its monopoly controlt 
the Eastern Group remained dominant. This may be accounted for in 
part by the political connections in Britain of the company's 
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leading directors, particularly Pender. Britain as an industrial 
power faced competition from -the French and particularly the 
Americans. The government in London, therefore preferred to 
support a British firm with an established performance record, 
and was not particularly concerned with its monopoly position, 
once the firm could preserve British control over the cable 
routes by confining them to British territories. TELCON, a part 
of the group, was independently an important source of external 
earnings for Britain, manufacturing and laying 80% [Foreman-Peck] 
of the world's undersea telegraph cables in that period. 
Besides such geo-political considerations, other important 
economic factors also contributed to this powerful convergence. 
The original motivation of enhancing the trade in textiles from 
the East were overtaken by a direct economic interest in the 
telegraph itself. Business units were therefore established in 
such colonial centres as Singapore, China, Malta and-in India, to 
exploit the new technology of cable telegraphy. As these 
developed, a series of mergers reduced overhead ýcosts, and 
economies of scale were effected by such backward and forward 
linkages as cable manufacturing and maintenance by TELCON and the 
opening of service bureaux directly to the public. Eastern 
thereby successfully employed multinational practices of direct 
investment and the establishment of subsidiaries, which though 
registered in Britain operated extensively overseas. 
In addition, as we noted in discussing the character of large 
international companies, the factor of size creates important 
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advantages in undermining competition from smaller rivals. This 
factor enabled the Eastern conglomerate to dominate its sector. 
By 1873, when inter-governmental decision-making on tariffs was 
in force, Pender sought to reduce the impact of this rate 
regulation on any single cable route by cross-subsidizing routes 
through ýthe merger, for example, between British Australian with 
the China Submarine and the British Indian Extension 
-companies 
to 
-form the -powerful Eastern Extension Australasia and China 
Telegraph Company. An additional economic-factor ýwaB the high 
fixed cost and low variable cost, of-cableB. which constrained the 
entry of smaller firms. This factor "created some, elements of 
natural monopoly, while national restrictions on, landing rights 
established barriers to industry 
, 
entry. " [Foreman-Peck, 
Correspondence 10-7-90]. 
By 1875, certain particularly keen shareholders began 
to criticise what then appeared to them as questionable intra- 
firm transactions in which existing routes were being duplicated, 
possibly with colonial subsidy, with the cable being manufactured 
by group company TELCON. Accusations about "arrangements with the 
Construction company" and practices of "Jobbery" led to heated 
exchanges at Eastern Telegraph's Extraordinary General Meeting 
on December 16,1875. ['Reports and Accounts and Proceedings at 
General Meetings' for Eastern Telegraph Company Limited, from 
1872, C&W Archives, London]. 
Sir John Pender's upper class background, his extensive 
involvement in British Parliamentary politics and his established 
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'corporate standing in the textiles, sector were likely to have 
enhanced his capacity to withstand or counteract such criticisms 
and to maintain the momentum of expansion of the Eastern Group of 
Companies overseas. As chief architect of the expansion, Pender 
served for many years as a Liberal-Unionist member of the British 
Parliament. Barty-King notes that Pender 'moved in high political 
circles, and claimed with some- reason, to have the ear of 
government ministers" [1969: 55). His "skilled extra-parliamentary 
agitation", even while out of office was a noteworthy part 
of his overall drive for control and expansion within the 
telegraph industry of the nineteenth'and early twentieth century. 
These factors are consistent with our earlier view, in agreement 
with Murdock, that while structural factors such as company size 
and state support are important in corporate control, so too are 
the individual action and power factors such as who controls the 
corporation (Murdock 1982: 124]. 
As the Eastern Group entered the Twentieth century, two 
important factors had a decisive impact on its future operation 
and on the private telegraph cable industry in general. The first 
was the introduction, at the instigation of the Canadian colony, 
of a competing publicly-funded company within the empire's 
telecommunications structure, called the Pacific Cable Board 
(PCB). The second was the development and eventual acceptance of 
Marconi's wireless telegraphy as an alternative to cable 
telegraphy and as an intermodal competitor to the Eastern 
Telegraph monopoly. Our examination of these two developments are 
in the context of their influence in challenging the Eastern 
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Telegraph Company's comfortable monopoly on both the routes and 
the technology in early 20th century telecommunications. We 
examine the. determined resistance of the entrenched Eastern Group, 
and the attitude of the British state, to this innovation. We are 
concerned with the influence of these new -actors on the 
reformulation of telecommunications policy both in-, the wider 
empire and in the Caribbean colonies. 
5.3 
- 
THE PACIFIC CABLE BOARD 
The idea of a trans-Pacific cable was first mooted by the 
Canadian engineer Sanford Fleming in 1879. His proposed cable 
would extend from the Australasian colonies through to Canada and 
on to England. His plan-was designed to create an alternative 
route to the monopoly enjoyed by the Eastern Telegraph Company, 
and in this way reduce the tariffs charged by Eastern. This was a 
scheme to introduce meaningful competition into empire 
communications, to allow for participation by the emerging 
self-governing coloniesýand dominions and thus "bestow upon South 
African, Australian, Canadian, Englishmen, Scotchmen and 
Irishmen, West Indian and East Indian, the great boon of cheap 
telegraphy.,, [Johnson 1903: 300). 
The motivation of this project, then, was to acknowledge and 
give practical expression to the rising nationalism and keen 
interest of the Nineteenth century colonial periphery around 
issues of technology transfer, and economic independence. But the 
practical factor of inordinately high'telegraph tariffs imposed 
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by Eastern's monopoly position, provided the immediate 
agitational basis for proposing alternative structures. As could 
well be expected, the Canadian proposal drafted by Fleming 
incurred both the vigorous opposition of the Eastern conglomerate 
and the passive resistance of the imperial authorities in London. 
Fleming himself noted that "the mere advocacy of the Pacific 
Cable has already benefitted Australia by lowering charges levied 
on messages fully fifty per cent. " [Fleming 1901: 32]. 
As part of its opposition, the Eastern Company consistently 
lobbied the British government, and presented a range of 
technical problems which-it claimed could be'anticipated by the 
laying of cables in the 'Jagged precipices, of the Pacific Ocean. 
Eastern was acting in defence of its monopoly route eastwards 
from Europe to India, Australia and New Zealand. Besides waging a 
shrill propaganda campaign, the Eastern Group began to negotiate 
exclusive long term agreements, specifically excluding any new 
entrant. As part of this, exclusive access to the British colony 
of Hong Kong was secured by the Eastern Group: "Under the 
agreement, dated 28th October, 1893, the Eastern Telegraph 
Extension Company strengthened its monopoly by having Canada and 
the Australasian colonies telegraphically excluded from Hong 
Kong and forbidden to lay, or assist in laying, any new cable to 
that port for a period which does not expire until twenty years 
from the present date. (1898)" (Fleming 1901: 19]. 
The determined bid for liberalization by the Canadians, 
however, was undeterred. "Fleming had to overcome first of all 
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the apathy and indifference of the people of the great 
self-governing colonies; then the masterly inactivity of the 
British government; finally the active, resourceful and powerful 
opposition of the group of wealthy cable companies which held a 
monopoly of the business between England and Australia, and, 
naturally enough, were loath to part with it.,, [Burpee 1915: 154]. 
With the support of some of the Australian provinces, Canada 
managed to secure a preliminary discussion of the proposed scheme 
at the 1887 Colonial Conference in London. To build on this, the 
Canadians undertook the hosting of another in the regular 
series of Colonial Conferences, this time in Ottawa in 1894 with 
the proposed Pacific Cable as a major item on the agenda. At this 
meeting, much progress was made in undermining the influence of 
the Eastern Group. There was preliminary agreement on a ýpossible 
joint venture between Britain and the dominions in, the 
establishment of the Pacific cable route. Two years 'later, in 
1896, a Pacific Cable Committee was formed to make 
recommendations on a formula for ownership. The Committee 
recommended an approximate three way split of ownership between 
Britainr Canada and the Australian states, with New Zealand as a 
a minority partner. [For detailed share allocation see Baglehole 
1969,: 13]. 
Significantly, those colonies included in the scheme, and 
particularly its protaginist, Canada, were staking an important 
nationalist claim to a share of ownership and power over their 
telecommunications environment. Mainly, they wanted reduced rates 
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which'would-enable access to the telegraph by a'greater number of 
people and' not-' just the government and-business interests. The 
role of 'Unwilling partner initially played by the imperial 
government''in Britain'is consistent with its-traditional support 
for its own British entrepreneurs, and, the Eastern group 'in 
particular. But other judgements also increasingly had to be 
taken into account, including the possibility of London being 
excluded from this inter-colonial joint venture among some of its 
largest and most important self-governing dominions. 
In - 1901, after further negotiations, the British Parliament 
passed the Pacific Cable Act, setting up the joint venture 
Pacific Cable Board '"to provide for-'the construction and working 
of a submarine cable from-the island of Vancouver to New'Zealand 
and to Queensland. " (Baglehole 1969: 13]. The project marked "the 
first major involvement of the British government in direct 
ownership of trans-oceanic submarine, cables, although decades 
before it had acquired ownership of the entire internal landline 
network of Britain. In that respect', the struggle by the Eastern 
Telegraph Group against the venture was one of strategic 
self-preservation. with the Pacific Cable Act in force however, 
the feeling of vulnerability on the part of private owners of the 
global network of submarine cables was understandably heightened. 
The new PCB was provided with headquarters in Westminster, 
,. 
London, - with regulations for annual reports to be made to the 
British Treasury and its accounts-to be presented to the House of 
Con=ons. Copies ' would then be forwarded to 'the other 
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participating memberst including Canada who was assigned the task 
of overseeing the construction and maintenence of the new cable. 
In this overall undertaking, Canada was regarded as performing 
the role of a sub-imperialist power within the empire, but also 
as providing an anti-imperialist, progressive leadership function 
among the colonies and dominions of the empire. [Thompson 
1989: 9]. 
It is this duality of policy in Canada, embodied by Flemingr 
which played a decisive role in controlling the power of the 
Eastern Telegraph Group. It also marked the beginning of the 
process of diversifying away from the-centre, the resources and 
technology for telecommunications self-management in the empire. 
Significantly, however, we shall see that this process did not 
extend to the smaller colonial territories such as those in the 
Caribbean, hence Cable and Wireless, continued dominance in these 
and other smaller colonies in the succeeding century. 
5.4 
- 
MARCONI AND WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY 
Wireless telegraphy presented the second major challenge to 
the dominance of the Eastern Telegraph Company-In the closing 
decade of the Nineteenth Century, Italian scientist, Guglielmo, 
Marconi created a system of electro-magnetic waves, capable of 
carrying coded messages without cable over long distances. He 
later transferred his experiments to England, where in 1897t 
Marconi formed the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company, and 
registered a patent for his innovation. Within-three yearsy 
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Marconi had generated widespread interest among private investors 
and governments alike in his new technology. To help protect his 
innovation, he renamed his company -Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company Limited, and soon opened offices in Ireland, Canadal 
Australia and in the United States. In the face of a dominant 
cable-based lobby in England, it would appear that Marconi 
considered that the survival and propagation of his techniques 
required exposure both within the faster developing colonies as 
well as in the United States as a rising industrial giant. 
But,, Marconi retained his head-office in England, the -seat 
of the colonial empire, where he could agitate for strategic 
decisions. Initially he presented proposals for ship to shore 
communication using wireless, and after some delay, the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act of 1905 granted a modest experimental contract 
with the Admiralty. Although a positive beginning for Marconi'in 
the process of breaking the existing technological and commercial 
monopoly, it did not incur the sustained opposition of the vested 
cable interests, as they could provide no equivalent ship to 
shore service. 
However, detailed proposals to the British government 
for the establishment of a wireless telegraphy network throughout 
the Empire was a different matter altogether. Eastern's resolute 
opposition and the bureaucratic obstruction of the British 
government to Marconi's attempt to break the then existing 
monopoly provides an illustration of the consequences for new 
entrants of an alliance between the State and the leading 
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industry operator. Despite the advantages of his innovationt 
Marconi, with his Italian background and American investor 
connections, was regarded by the Colonial office as an- outsider. 
In the succeeding section we analyse the detailed exchanges of 
correspondence and contacts dating between 1910, when Marconi's 
first empire-wide application was submitted, and-1912 when a 
heavily modified version of his proposals, was eventually 
accepted. 
"I have the honour to submit for your consideration the 
following proposals made on behalf of Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company Limited, for the establishment of a network of-wireless 
telegraph stations throughout the British Empire, by -means of 
which the different portions of the Empire will all be put-in 
communication with one another at greatly reduced rates to those 
at present in force" [Post Office Correspondence, West India 
Reference Library, Jamaica, File 12450/G]. Godfrey Isaacs'letter 
of March 10,1910, on behalf of Marconi, to the Colonial Office, 
directly addressed a major weak-point of the Eastern Group: 
prohibitive telegraph rates. It also immediately addressed the 
unfulfilled Imperial need for a truly empire-wide network for 
political and commercial contact. 
The Marconi Company was also sensitive, however, to the 
requirement of British nationality and loyalty of any firm to be 
entrusted with the provision of this network. "We have reason to 
believe that we shall obtain licencest if we require them, on 
foreign territory, but we are a British Company and desire to see 
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the worldwide wireless, network of stations erected on British 
possessions at which we wish to erect stations. " Among-eighteen 
key locations identified under the proposals. 
-were main cities 
in India, East Africa, South Africa, - Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Australia, New Zealand and the West Indies. It was therefore 
seeking licences in a direct challenge to some of the main routes 
operated by Eastern, on the basis that it was offering a more 
cohesive network which could more rapidly link England to its 
overseas empire. 
The justifications for presenting the proposals, as outlined 
in the Marconi company's letter, explicitly indicate not only a 
new and competitive form of technology, but-also an alternative 
financial and policy regime to that operated by the Eastern 
Group. "The existing rates would be cut in-half and in some case 
still further reduced, resulting in a much greater volume of 
traffic... Owing to the small initial capital outlay necessary, 
(we) can afford to give low rates, AND WE DO NOT ASKFOR ANY 
SUBSIDY (their emphasis) for any portion of the system. " Marconi 
argues further that cheap and improved communication-could be 
expected to lead to increased trade between England and the 
colonies, "as well as enable many settlers to keep in touch with 
their relations in the mother country, which they are unable to 
do at present, owing to the high cable charges. " The company 
anticipated greater knowledge and interaction among peoples in 
the Empire from cheaper wireless press rates. 
The most decisive blow against the prevailing policy of the 
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Eastern competitors, however, was the proposals of a "purchase 
clause" under which the Company offered'to sell the network and 
facilities to the government at the end of-20 yearsf to prevent 
"the establishment of another monopoly and ensure that the system 
may eventually become State-owned. " The inclusion of this -clause 
was of considerable significance to the evolution of early'state 
ownership policy of international telecommunications networks. 
It opened the way for easier State acquisition of privately held 
network facilities, in the same way that the Pacific Cable Board 
pioneered the pto-active public sector role in initiating network 
construction. 
In the shorter term, Marconi also offered further upgraded 
marine and naval communication at a time of increasing challenge 
to British traditional dominance of the high seas. Acceptance of 
Marconi's new scheme would ensure that "every 'ship in 
the British Navy- can be in direct communication with the 
Admiralty.. and all ships at sea, properly'equipped can receive 
daily news and messages throughout their voyages. " An overall 
effect was-'a "substantial reduction in the government's annual 
telegraph bill" and aI system of communication which "would be 
British owned, and in the event of war, would be in' the complete 
control of the Government. " 
Despite the urgent, patriotic and attractive content of its 
letter, the Marconi Company received no reply except a polite note 
nine months later, in December 1910, indicating that "the matter 
is still under consideration" (Colonial Office to Marconi Company 
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December 2,1910]. on December 28th of the same year, the 
Colonial office indicated further that the matter would be 
discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1911r with 
representatives of the Dominion 'governments. Little further 
progress was reported until 1912, when Marconi's draft tender was 
returned,. citing a number of objections and requiring a range of 
clarifications. These were re-submitted the following day by an 
increasingly 
-exasperated but determined Marconi management. 'The 
re-submitted draft tender, however, incorporated several new 
concessions to the government which amounted to a private-public 
sector joint venture inýwireless for the Empire. 1ý 
According to the company's letter of February 13,1912, 
Marconi would provide. - install and test the "complete wireless 
apparatus for duplex working and fast speed automatic working 
mastsf 'earth connections and duplicate power plant at each 
station for the sum ofý60,000 per station. " However at the--end 
of a test period of six months, "the company shall hand the 
stations over to be worked by the Governments concerned. " 
Marconi's on-going revenues were to come "by way of royalty 10 % 
of the gross receipts of the stations.. " However, this 
arrangement would only run for 18 years, with a possible 
extension to a maximum of 28 years from the date of completion of 
the first five stations. 
The agreement for on-going technology transfer -to the 
governments of Britain and the dominions was contained in 
Condition 8 of the Marconi Tender: "The Company and Mr Marconi 
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will, during the continuance of the said Agreement give to the 
Post Master General- the right to use at the stations erected 
under the provisions of the said agreement all inventions, 
improvements and patents to which they or he are, or may become 
entitled, and of which they or he are or may become possessed, 
and over which they or he have control and power to use and which 
may be used by them or him and all improvements in such 
inventions and patents without any payments beyond those 
specified in the said Agreement. " The all emcompassing nature of 
the demands being made indicates the price which-was-to be 
extracted from the new entrant. [braft Tender Agreement, February, 
1912] 
The British State, through the Post Master General, 
was prepared to offer very little in return for this privately 
developed technology: "The Post Master General shall-have the 
right to introduce into the stations at his absolute discretion 
any patents or inventions in wireless telegraphy in addition to 
or in substitution of those of the Company. The Post Master 
General, shall, however, seek the advice of the Company before 
actually introducing such Patents and Inventions. If at any time, 
during the term of the said Agreement, the Post Master General 
shall find it advantageous to use a system entirely independent 
Of the Marconi system, and should no longer use any of the 
apparatus of the company in regard to which a patent is in force 
for the purpose of working the stations, the payment, of royalty 
to the company shall cease. "[Draft Tender Agreement, February, 
1912]. 
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Clearly, Marconi was to be an unequal partner to an 
inequitable agreement. The British government further demanded 
royalty reductions related to any reduced usage of the Marconi 
technology, and the right to freely "impart any information about 
Marconi apparatus or the mode of working it to other departments 
of the Imperial, Dominion or Colonial Governments.. " While 
agreeing to indexation of royalties to usage levels, the company 
sought the right to technical inspection to prevent "manufacture 
or use without payment for any of the apparatus in regard to 
which information is furnished. " However,, the State'B demand 
for free access to the technology by all departments of the 
Empire bureaucracy represented the limit of Marconi's 
accommodation. By letter of March 5.1912, the Company rejected 
this provision in part, confining disclosure only to those 
"government departments, colonial governments and the government 
of the dominions which take part in the agreement. " 
The significance of this addendum was that the Company was 
willing to accept as party to the Agreement any colonial or 
dominion governments wishing to start independent collaboration 
with it. The British government did not maintain an objection to 
this clause. it knew that colonial authorities had no 
independent status to enter such agreements, and at the same time 
did not mind off-loading some financial responsibilities of 
royalty payments and other costs to the self-governing Dominions. 
But Britain ensured the inclusion of another clause which 
entrenched its imperial ownership of the initial network of beam 
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wireless stations: "It-will be necessary to make provision that 
the Post Master General's rights under the agreement, and in 
particular under conditions 7 and 8, shall not be affected if the 
company should be absorbed by or amalgamated with, some other 
company. " [Letter from General Post Office to Marconi Company, 
March 5,1912. ] 
We shall- see, in hindsight, that this provision proved 
pivotal to the deepening of British government ownership of the 
overseas network. Whether its inclusion was a reflection of 
fore-sight and planning on the part of colonial policy-makers is 
a matter of speculation, but considerable importance was placed 
on its inclusion during the negotiations with Marconi. 
The imperial government was by now beginning to realize that 
their prolonged negotiations and stringent demands were starting 
to produce diminishing returns, even while the need for Marconi's 
technology was becoming more urgent. By 1912, the threat of a 
First World War was beginning to emerge as a possibility, and the 
Dominions themselves were becoming restive. In a letter to the 
Treasury, [24-2-1912] A. F. King of the Post, Master General's 
Department had estimated that the total cost of the wireless 
project was ý1-million 
, 
and that "this should be 
taken in hand at once. The-scheme met with the approval of the 
Committee of Imperial Defencei who urged that the stations should 
be put up at the earliest possible date. " Accordingly, after some 
minor attempts to extract additional concessions, the General 
Post Office notified Marconi by letter of March 7,1912 that the 
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Post Master General, "accepts your tender-for the erection of the 
imperial chain of-wireless stations.. " 
From 1909 when it first tendered for the entry level ship-to 
shore-. service, it had taken the Marconi Company close to 4. years 
to become accepted, in 1912 as an operator within the Empire's 
telecommunications system. And'even this eventual acceptance was 
on the basis of stringent contractual arrangements of the kind 
the vested cable interests were never confronted with and would 
never have accepted. But the Marconi Tender Agreement marked. the 
second wave of technology transfer to the Dominions, following 
their establishment of the Pacific Cable Board. And it opened the 
way for State-takeover of privately-developed telecommunications 
networks within the periphery of the Empire on the basis of the 
need for reduced rates and hence universal service, not simply 
government and business access to the network. 
Despite the active policy of opposition and, resistance by the 
Eastern Group, the British government now found the prospects of 
the new system irresistable. Its distinct speed, cost and long 
distance advantages outweighed its occasional unreliability under 
certain conditions. Widespread interest in its advantages both by 
the Press, the Dominion governments and even the Pacific Cable 
Board led to the positive recommendation by the Imperial 
Conference of 1911, contributing to the acceptance that 
-an 
empire-wide network of beam-wireless stations should be 
established on the Marconi principle. The Dominion participants 
may have foreseen in this innovation the basis for their future 
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technological independencer as the network of wireless stationst 
unlike the Eastern multinational cable offices, were to be owned 
by the Dominion governments. 
Those territories classified as colonies were not however 
to be beneficiaries of this policy of technology transfer and 
ownership. Where the Pacific Cable systems and beam wireless 
stations were"introduced into colonies, such as in the Caribbean 
region-J, in Singapore and Hong Kong, the network remained 
under British imperial ownership and the technology under foreign 
control. 
5.5 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
From as early as the 1870st the foundation companies on 
which Cable and Wireless was built operated with discernable 
multinational corporation practices, and did so in close 
collaboration with the British colonial government. These 
relationships involving the interaction between the interests of 
the imperial State and the commercial concerns of the 
multinational corporation, play an important role in the 
formulation of both public and corporate policy in empire 
telecommunications. The economic advantages of reduced overhead 
costs of wireless telegraphy were witheld from Britain and 
the empire for a protracted period because of the close and 
mutually protective relationship which existed between the 
imperial government'and the cable conglomerate: Eastern Telegraph 
Company. 
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Subsequently, it was the factor of cost and the plausible 
advantages of the new wireless technology for both naval defence 
and merchant shipping which overcame both personal influence and 
entrenched structural relationships, in-, the policy-making 
process. But the price to the new entrant, of this shift in 
telecommunications policy from official cable monopoly to a dual 
mode, was considerable. The state demanded important controlling 
interests in the technology, a foothold which was to mark the 
start of the process of central government acquisition of the 
empire telecommunications system. 
Eastern's monopoly grip on both the cable telegraphy and 
imperial state policy also created major difficulties for the 
collaborative efforts of the more influential colonies whose 
demands for the setting up of the Pacific Cable Board marked the 
start of a public service objective for telecommunications in the 
then peripheries of the empire. But like Marconi and the 
technology of wireless, the Pacific Cable Board helped in 
loosening the degree of control exercised by private monopoly 
capital on empire ownership and communications policy. In this 
respect, the Pacific Cable Board was both an alternative physical 
route and an alternative policy path to the development of empire 
telecommunications. 
However, the confining of ownership participation in the 
scheme to the larger self-governing colonies represented an 
example of the controversial distinction in colonial policy 
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between the 'Dominions, as they were called, and the black 
African, the Asian and the Caribbean regions which remained mere 
colonies. Among the reasons often advanced to explain this 
distinction, 'is that the Dominions were by then more advanced 
democracies and "that they were self-governing-" [Foreman-Peck 
10-7-90]. While it is-true that many smaller colonies (which are 
now independent) were viewed as mere dependencies, 
-it appears 
inescapable, that subjective imperial judgements determined the 
composition of this category of colonies. It is significant that 
the vast region of India, which was also- internally 
self-governing, and which was among the early laboratories for 
western democracy in the east, was not among the-official 
dominions, as South Africa and Rhodesia later became, and was not 
a participant in the PCB scheme. 
The significance here, of the classification which was 
made, is that the category designated colonies, and particularly 
those in the Caribbean, became the least likely beneficiary, 
if at all, of any positive changes in imperial government 
policy on technology transfer, ownership or control of internal 
telecommunications systems before independence. As we argue in 
the succeeding chapter, such artificial and subjective divisions 
persisted in empire policy-making throughout the period leading 
up to the end of the Second World War and the era of political 
de-colonization., 
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CHAPTER 6 
.1 
MERGER: THE MODERN BEGINNING OF CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 
By 1925,, it ý became clear to the Dominion governments, 
owners of the Pacific Cable Board (PCB), that operation, of the 
dual systems of the beam wireless and telegraph cable facilities, 
while providing alternative modes of communication, was far too 
costly. In 1928 the PCB reported a loss in revenue for that year 
alone off80,000, which was directly attributable to competition 
from the beam wireless service operated by the Post and Telegraph 
Departments. In that same year, a special conference was convened 
in London "to examine the situation which has arisen as a result 
of the competition of the beam wireless with theýCable Services, 
to report thereupon, and to make recommendations with a view to'a 
common policy being adopted by the various governments 
concerned. " [Report, Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference: 1928]. 
This conference marked a watershed in- the development of 
empire telecommunications and in the history of both Cable and 
Wireless and Caribbean communications structures. In this 
chapter, we consider some of the events surrounding the 
conference, including important policy implications arising from 
the conference recommendations. The subsequent development of the 
policy process through to the start of political -. decolonization 
is also analysed. 
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The Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference, under the 
chairmanship of Britain, was attended by representatives of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealandr South Africar and the 'Irish Free 
State'. In a break with the past, the vast colony of India was 
also invited to participate. But the smaller colonies, including 
those in the Caribbean were still not'directly represented. Their 
spokesman was the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. The Canadians, who felt that the Caribbean was within 
their sub-imperial sphere, also took an interest in development s 
affecting the Caribbean region, primarily out of a sense of 
competition with-the United States. 
The convening of this conference and the nature of its terms 
of reference led the private sector interests in both the cable 
and the wireless sectors of the industry to become very concerned 
at the possibility of a total government takeover of the empire's 
telecommunications systems in 'the same way that the internal 
landline network in Britain was earlier acquired by the state. 
In an attempt to forestall any such action, the two 
principal companies, Eastern Telegraph and the Marconi Company 
began negotiations for their voluntary co-operation and even 
merger. In March, 1928, even while the Conference was still 
deliberating, the companies announced that they intended. to 
merge. The terms of the proposed merger suggested, however, that 
this was effectively yet another takeover by the Eastern Group. 
The merger arrangements envisaged the establishment of a holding 
company with capital of 54-million. Proceeds"from this would be 
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used to purchase all categories of Marconi shares and debentures. 
But only the ordinary share capital of the cable companiesý: would 
be acquired, leaving their preference shares and debentures 
untouched. The cable company shareholders would be allocated 
56.25- % of the new holding company, while Marconi's shareholders 
would be granted the remaining 43.75 %. Consistent with this 
arrangement, the cable interests would provide 12, directors to 
Marconi's eight [Cable and Wireless Archives: Proposed Capital 
Allocation in New Company 1929]. 
Within -the.. Conference itself,, however, the objectives were 
much wider than simply the preservation of the two main operating 
companies. Numerous submissions were received from British 
private sector groups like the Federation of British Industries 
and the London Chamber of Commerce reinforcing demands for 
continued private sector control of the industry. But other 
submissions, such as those from the Empire Press Union sought 
assurances of lower. tariffs for press-cables and improvements- in 
both speed and reliability of messages. The Dominion governments 
themselves were concerned to increase their level of 
participation in decision-making, if not immediate ownership and 
control over their segment of empire telecommunication. 
On July 6,1928, after deliberations of close to six months 
spanning 34 meetings, the Conference announced its main 
conclusions: all overseas cable and wireless resources of the 
empire would be merged. A new holding company, to be called 
Cables'and Wireless Limited, would be established to acquire all 
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the ordinary shares in Eastern Telegraph Company and the Marconi 
Company, which would then be offered shares in the new -holding 
company. The technical and operational tasks of providing an 
integrated telecommunications service for the empire would be 
provided by a wholly-owned subsidiary firm appropriately to be 
called Imperial and International Communications Limited. This 
operating company would assume control of the technical, 
facilities, cables and stations of both Eastern and Marconi 
companies in exchange for its own--shares. The cableýnetwork 
across the Pacific and extending in the Caribbean as part of the 
network of the Pacific Cable Board, would be bought for cash and 
the beam wireless facilities owned by the Post and Telegraph 
Departments would be leased for 25 years [- Public Records Office, 
File C. O. 937/973]. 
In a gesture to encourage continued independent innovationj 
Marconi's high technology manufacturing unit, i- as well as the 
cable manufacturing company TELCON, were excluded from the merger 
arrangements. In this way, the engines of innovation would remain 
within independent private firms in England and not dispersed 
throughout the empire as part of the new arrangements. These 
exclusions, however, are likely to account, at least in, part, 
for the absence of any manufacturing or Research and Development 
division within the modern Cable Wireless. The larger Dominions, 
however, were eventually able to gain access to technology and 
research from other global centres of innovation, particularly 
the United States where initial experimentations were already 
advanced on the technology of the telephone. As colonies within 
- 
265 
- 
the empire*, the smaller territories were neither allowed to 
secure the technology directly from their imperial centre nor 
from alternative sources. ' 
6.1 
--STATE CONTROL: FRACTURING CORPORATISM 
A number of detailed specifications in the arrangements 
outlined in 1928 allow an insight into the inherent conflicts 
which were embodied in the communications policy envisaged for 
the Empire by the Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference. 
Contrary to the worse fears of the private companies, the 
Conference did not recommend a whole-scale takeover of the 
communications system. This could in part be attributed to the 
success of the merger manoeuvres and intensive lobbying by the 
Marconi and Eastern Companies and their private sector 
supporters. But if government acquisition was averted, increased 
government regulation and control were equally evident outcomes 
of the deliberations. Both the holding company Cables and 
Wireless and the operating firm Imperial, were to have identical 
boards of directors, ' two of whom, including the, chairman, were to 
be approved by the British government. In this way, the central 
imperial government would be able to monitor and exercise 
greater control over the private sector investors. 
Corporatist control by negotiations and the pursuit of 
common objectives between the state and the large private 
interests was beginning to break down, as the state became a more 
powerful partner in the relationship. The increasing 
- 
266 
- 
assertiveness of the dominion governments in favour of a stronger 
role by the state succeeded in fracturing the mutual solidarity 
which had earlier existed between the imperial state and its 
capitalist elites. The imperial Wireless and Cable Conference 
marked- a decisive turning point in the transformation of the 
private telegraph oligopoly from autonomous interests into, a 
merged single agent of outright government policy. The industry 
was indeed in transition to becoming an acknowledge part of the 
official state bureaucracy. 
The regulatory institution recommended by the Conference was 
the establishment of an Imperial Communications Advisory 
Committee. All matters of policy, including any tariff 
adjustments, had to be referred to this Committee, which 
consisted of representatives of the dominion governments in 
attendance at the meeting. While central British control was 
ensured by its permanent location in London under British 
chairmanship, this regulatory body represented the first direct 
forum of on-going policy direction to involve the dominion 
governments of the empire. And it was also intended to be an 
institutional restraint on the freedom of the private sector 
owners of the holding and operating companies, particularly in 
the area of tariff regulation. 
Besides approving the appointment of two directors and 
controlling policy and cable rate increases, governments were 
given the right to assume direct control of all cable and 
wireless systems in the event of an emergency. While this was 
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standard colonial policy being applied to the telegraph sectort 
it indicated the great significance which had been attached to 
telecommunications in terms of national security. This provision, 
also enhanced the reserves of ultimate control of the central 
government itself, which retained responsibility for security, 
emergencies and national defence in the dominions, colonies and 
protectorates. 
In a provision against the threat of participation by the 
Americansl who had a minority stake in the Marconi Companyt the 
Conference explicitly recommended a nationality clause within the 
terms and conditions of the new arrangements. It provided that 
control of the companies was at all times to remain British. This 
colonial policy had a long lineage, emerging from the days of the 
Navigation Acts of the Sixteenth century mercantile regimes, 
under which all trade by the colonies was to take place 
exclusively within the Empire and all shipping conducted in 
British ships. 
The cable companies of the late Nineteenth century were 
subject to the same conditions, under which the British 
government would only provide subsidies for routes which did not 
intersect non-British territory. In the instance of the Twentieth 
century merger arrangements, it was to be guaranteed that all 
empire communications business would take place exclusively 
within British companies. But, as with the traders two centuries 
before, enforcement of these regulations were more easily said 
than done. Introduction of this condition in the Twentieth 
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century relationships, however, did indicate the continuity and 
scope of elements of empire policy. 
Detailed regulations were also drafted governing levels of 
profitability and disposal of revenues. A standard net revenue of 
6% of the capital, or a sum of 1.865 million, was designated 
for the operating company. This was exclusive of- the 
non-telegraphic investment revenues. It was specified that a half 
of any net revenue in excess of 6% would accrue to the company 
and the other half used either to reduce rates or for any other 
purpose approved by the Advisory Committee. These provisions were 
an early form of rate of return regulation, and represented an 
implicit acknowledgement for the first time of the entitlement of 
telecommunications users to benefit from industry profitability 
in the form of reduced rates. "The object of this provision was 
to prevent any exploitation of the users of public telegraph 
services for the benefit of shareholders. " [Public Records Office 
File CO 937/3/4]. 
While there was some basis for the claim of the then 
Labour Party opposition in Britaint that the government was 
"disposing of valuable state undertakings to private interests" 
[Barty-King 1979: 209], the purported aim of the Conference was 
a reduction in the autonomy and power of the private companies 
and an increase in the influence of the dominion governments. It 
was also to set the stage for a more active role for governments 
in telecommunications within the British empire. 
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After presentation to the British Parliament, the overall 
recommendations of the, Conference were accepted, and their 
implementation , began under the chairmanship of Sir Basil 
Blackett. However, many contradictions and operational 
difficulties were inherent in the new arrangements. Was the new 
company to be a private-sector enterprise motivated by profit and 
responsive to the demands of shareholders, or was the company a 
statutory body to be operated in the wider public interest? 
Where necessary, should profit be sacrificed in the cause of 
universal service delivery, low telegraph charges and in response 
primarily to political and social criteria? 
In addition, what was the status of the increasingly 
independent-minded governments in the dominions? Were they really 
empowered to control policy, or would they be marginalised both 
by the operational logic of a privately run firm, and by their 
remoteness from the decision-making? Assets takeover by this new 
company also meant a diminution of such control by the colonies 
and Dominions over technology as existed when they operated the 
Pacific Cable Board and the Marconi beam wireless stations. These 
and other deficiencies in the 1928 Agreement were soon to 
re-emerge as critical issues. 
6.2 
- 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Five years into the new arrangement, in 1934, the name of 
the operating company was changed from Imperial and International 
Communications Limited to its current designation of CABLE AND 
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WIRELESS. The cumbersome nature of the previous name is suggested 
[Baglehole 1969: 17] as the reason for the change. However, that 
decision appears to indicate much, more significant developments 
which were taking-place following the 1928 re-structuring of the 
industry. Several of the empire governments, among them Canada 
and Australia, were uncomfortable with the arrangement which 
placed the assets of their segment of the empire telegraph 
network into the day to day management of a largely ýprivate 
British monopoly. 
The available primary data indicates the on-going nature of 
this dissatisfaction. The Imperial Communications Advisory 
Committee, in its report. to the Commonwealth governments in 
January, 1937, provides a useful evaluation of the role of the 
Dominion governments and of the effectiveness of the 1929 
regulatory arrangements. 
"While we have endeavoured to carry out our duties 
to the satisfaction of the governments which we 
represent, we feel bound to say that the present 
machinery is ineffective in relation to the really 
vital point, namely the framing of the Company's major 
policy. Our authoritative powers are rarely exercised, 
and when exercised, often affect only minor points on 
which no real issue arises 
.... 
on major issues, the 
Company is required to consult us before adopting any 
scheme for extending or restricting its operations 'in 
so far as such scheme involves questions of general 
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policy and not only questions of ordinary business and 
management. ' In practice, this distinction is unreal in 
dealing with the affairs of a commercal undertaking. 
Policy and business and management are inextricably 
interwoven. We are necessarily out of touch with the 
ordinary run of the Company's affairs, and it almost 
inevitably results that important questions of policy 
do not come before us until a- final stage when the 
issues are practically determined. " CICAC Report, 
January 21,1937 PRO File CO 937/3/4]. 
What the report'appears to be highlighting is, the conflict 
of interest between the requirements of commercial enterprise for 
maximum flexibility in the pursuit of efficiency and profit, and 
the public service -requirement for reduced rates, broad 
consultations and collective decision-making. During the period 
between 1928 and 1937, this bifurcation of objectives became 
evident, and faced with a choice, the private entrepreneurs which 
still controlled the merged company opted for commercial rather 
than public service considerations. And that. was a source of 
considerable disquiet among the dominions. The private sector 
interests at Cable and Wireless had failed to realize that' power 
had shifted decisively in the direction of-the stateýboth in 
Britain and throughout the empire, and that the imperial state 
itself was now subject to mounting pressure from both the 
Dominion governments and the United States. 
The name of the regulatory body was a further and constantly 
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irritating reminder of the subordination of Dominion governments 
to an increasingly resented imperial power. Consequently, the 
regulatory agency, Imperial Communications Advisory Committeer 
was, re-designated the Commonwealth Communications Council (CCC),, 
which- suggested a more independent range of objectives. In line 
with this alteration and with the earlier change of name of the 
operating firm, the name of the holding or merger company Cables 
and Wireless was also changed to CABLE AND WIRELESS (HOLDINGS) 
Limited in 1934. However, these were cosmetic changes from the 
point of view of the associated Dominion governments who sought 
greater effective involvement in the running of Cable and 
Wireless and in the setting of its rates, tariffs and policies. 
Among the Dominion governments' proposals in 1937 was for 
the appointment of seven additional directors to the company, 
each approved by one of the participating governments on the 
ICACI which would then be disbanded. This proposals was, however, 
rejected. Nontheless, demands for reductions and reform in the 
telegraph rate structure could not be ignored and in response to 
the client governments, demands, a special conference was 
convened in 1937. This meeting agreed on a reduction in the 
maximum overseas telegraph rate, and a reduction in the allowable 
annual standard net revenue of the company from 6% on its 
capital to 4%, amounting to a maximum net revenue of 1.2 
million. The effect of this was to enable a half of all revenues 
in excess of this now lowered level to be applied to a reduction 
in rates. 
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The- 1937 Conference also approved the freehold transfer 
to the Company of the leased beam wireless stations owned by the 
U. K. Post Office. But in return, the Company was required to 
transfer to the United Kingdom government a shareholding interest 
of 2--6 million shares in the company out of existing capital of 
30-million. In this way, the British government acquired its 
firstý direct involvement in- the shareholding and finances of 
Cable and Wireless, appointing a. representative of the Treasury 
to monitor and report on the performance of the Company. Although 
the 1937 conference was called at the insistence of the dominions 
in the hope that it would result in their greater involvement,, it 
in fact concluded with increased direct control by the central 
British government. It also marked the implementation of direct 
British state control over Cable and Wireless. 
But while this outcome to the 1937 Conference satisfied 
the British government's requirement for greater control over 
telecommunications in the wake of an impenqing War, it did little 
to meet the demands of the dominions, to say nothing of the 
weaker colonies, for more control over their segment of the Cable 
and Wireless empire-wide network. It was an issue which remained 
unresolved and could only at best be deferred following the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. 
6.3 
- 
CO-OPTION INTO THE WAR EFFORT 
Cable and Wireless Limited, in which the government then had 
a financial interest, was the single largest owner of telegraph 
- 
274 
- 
and wireless communications globally (See Appendix 1). Both the 
direct involvement of the government and the extensive nature-of 
the network were to provide the Allies- with a major 
communications advantage at the outbreak of war in September 
1939. 
-The communications historian Charles Greaves notes that it 
was the active, almost statutory functions performed by the still 
largely privately-owned Cable and Wireless which facilitated the 
operation of the Allies during the war: 
"It was fortunate, therefore, for Great Britain,, - that 
Cable and Wireless owned no less than 155,000 miles of 
of the 350,000 miles of cables throughout the world, as 
well as 91 wireless circuits 
- 
later increased to 138 
- 
which covered another 200,000 miles of the earth's 
surface. It- was over this arterial system of Empire, 
through these thin red lines, that the life blood of 
Empire communications flowed, enabling the Allied 
Governments to co-ordinate their policy, strategy and 
supplies; newspaper and broadcasting agencies to 
receive the latest war news, and families at home to 
exchange messages with their evacuated children or 
their men fighting overseas. " (Greaves 1947: 9]. 
The existence of both cable and 
-wireless technology 
within a single non-competitive merged company appears to have 
accorded a high degree of flexibility to the Allied War effort. 
Important messages could be interchanged between the systems to 
help ensure delivery. Where inclement weather rendered the 
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wireless messages useless, cable provided an alternative, and 
destroyed or bugged cables could be backed up by wireless. 
On balance, despite its, drawbacks, it appeared the wireless 
technology was more extensively utilised during the hostilities, 
not just in the naval operation,, but also in the need for rapid 
general contact. 
According to Greaves, cable ships and other communications 
equipment were at times, deployed in military operations. On one 
occassion, "the Admiralty duly arranged for one of the company's 
cable ships to lay anti-submarine loops in the Channel, three 
weeks before Hitler marched into Poland. on September 3rd, 1939, 
the Cable ship Cambriajoined in this good work. " [Greaves 1947: 
10). Equally, many of the Company's installations and offices 
were threatened during the war. The elaborate arrangements for 
their security demonstrates the importance then attached by the 
state to the role of the company: 
"Although Cable and wireless ran some 200 overseas 
bases, there were just five, in England 
... 
All were 
linked to the Central Telegraph Exchange, but 
secret conduits had been laid so that Electra House, 
Cable and Wireless, specially strengthened headquarters 
in London on the Victoria Embankment, could take over 
operations in the event of Moorgate, which in effect 
was the centre of the. Empire, being knocked out by 
sabotage or air raid. Supposedly bomb- and. gas-proof 
Electra House also accommodated a staff of 100 cable 
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censors and the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence 
Department (which subsequently became the Political 
Warfare Executive). " [Nigel West 1986: 142]. 
In effect, the government had operationalised its provision 
for take-over of the company in time of war, although it did not 
do so formally. The state had co-opted the services of the 
Company into the War effort, a measure which was effectively a 
prelude to outright government take-over. But at the time, 
the absence of formal takeover could be mistaken for a vote of 
confidence in private sector ownership: "It was the greatest 
compliment ever paid to private sector enterprise that, when 
Britain finally declared war on Germany, the company was allowed 
to function without government interferencellf wrote Greaves 
in 1947. Ironically, he himself noted in the same paragraph that 
along with the telegraph cable service, "All the other 
facilities of the company, too, were immediately placed at 
the services of the Empire in September 1939.11 [Greaves 1947: 10]. 
While some company input was voluntary and patriotic, the 
company's involvement took place in an overall regime of scarcely 
disguised state hegemony over the affairs of the company. 
"Since 1928, Cable and Wireless had appeared to' enjoy 
an independent existence... In reality, Cable and 
Wireless was another clandestine method of, acquiring 
raw intelligence for GCHQ (the British intelligence 
gathering and electronic evesdropping agency-HD). The 
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Official Secrets, Act of 1920 had required all cable 
operators to supply copies of their traffic to the 
British government, and all this material had been 
delivered to Room 47 of the Foreign Office for 
.. 
scrutiny". [Nigel West 1986: 141]. 
The sentiment thatýthere was no government interference was 
far removed-from the reality. The then secret minutes of, the War 
Cabinet discloses the existence of the Official Committee on 
Empire Telecommunications-Services, which both articulated the 
telecommunications requirements of the War as well as provided 
policy guidance on possible post-war structures and 
relationships [Public Records Office File CO 937/3/4, November 
1944]. In addition, Cable and Wireless- itself was under the 
control of Government-appointed Chairman, Edward Wilshaw, and so 
no additional formalities of control may have been deemed 
necessary. 
During the 1939-1945 War, therefore, even though Cable and 
Wireless was still nominally a privately-owned company, 
-its 
British nationality, and legal responsibilities to the British 
state were exploited extensively. The Company virtually became a 
department of the War Cabinet, although its commercial revenues 
during the war soared as a result. of these special duties and 
increased official traffic. Once again, the immediate political 
and military interest of the state interacted with the financial 
and commercial goals of private industry in the defence of 
empire. But by now, this was occurring less in a corporatist 
G 
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framework and more on the basis of the overpowering influence of 
the imperial state. 
--- Nevertheless, many of the Dominion governments were acutely 
awareýof, the role being performed by Cable and Wireless, and were 
therefore not unmindful of the importance to their own national 
security of a domestically-owned, national telecommunications 
agency. Theý resulting demands of the Dominion governments 
later played an important part in determining the future of, the 
empire communications network and of Cable and Wireless itself. 
For one thing, the company's functions began to be regarded as 
too important to be entrusted to the primarily financial 
motivations of a privately owned corporation. Within Britain 
itself, domestic public opinion was moving in favour'of the view 
that telecommunications and other services could be more cheaply 
and efficiently delivered through state ownership. 
6.4 
- 
NATIONALIZATION 
I ýSoon after the end of the War, the Labour Party government 
of Clement Atlee came to power in Britain on a manifesto of 
extensive nationalization. Government take-over of inland 
transport, coal, gas, electricity, the Bank of England, the iron 
and-steel industries were all specifically targetted in a public 
sector led programme of re-construction and development in 
Britain. Among the justifications offered in the 'Declarationý of 
Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation'. were 
arguments that "amalgamations under public ownership will bring 
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great economies in operation and make it possible to modernise 
production methods and to raise safety standards.. " It 'was 
further argued that "public ownership.. will lower charges, 
prevent competitive waste, open the way for co-ordinated research 
and development..,, [Chester: 1975: 1]. 
Although the overseas telecommunications system was not a 
specified sector in the party's pre-election manifestor the 
Labour government regarded its landslide election victory as a 
mandate for the principle of nationalization. Many of its 
arguments could, also be applied to the ownership and structure 
of the national and empire telecommunications system. But what 
may have been the decisive factor was the realization that its 
policy thrust was consistent with the thinking and deliberations 
of the Commonwealth Communications Council (CCC), whose 
membership was made up of representatives of the dominion 
governments, Britain and a single representative, (named by 
Britain) of the numerous other colonies in the Empire. Even 
before the end of the War or the change of government, the CCC 
had Submitted to the specialised War Cabinet committee a number 
of recommendations for a thorough re-structuring of empire 
telecommunications, and by implication, of Cable and Wireless 
itself. Among the recommendations, dated May 10,1944, were the 
following proposals. 
"(a)A Government-owned public utility corporation should 
'-be established in the United Kingdom to acquire Cable 
and Wireless (Holdings) Ltd. The United Kingdom, the 
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Dominions and India would be expected to bear their 
full share of the responsibility for the maintenance 
of the cables by the United Kingdom -Corporation. 
(b) The establishment of the United Kingdom Cable and 
Wireless Corporation, should be followed as soon as can 
be conveniently arranged having regard to local 
conditions,. by- the establishment in the Dominions and 
India of similar Government-owned public utility 
corporations to take over from the various authorities 
at present administering them, the external 
telecommunications services in their respective 
territories" [ETS (44) 12,, PRO File CO 937/3/41 1944], 
Cable and Wireless vigorously opposed this proposal from the 
dominions of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the 
colony of India. It meant the break-up of the Company as an 
operating entity in the major empire territories, although other 
aspects of the ANZAC proposals envisaged a continued minority 
(25%) shareholding in the new dominion corporations by the 
reformed U. K. 
-based 'parent' company, which would offer to each 
a5% participation in its own stock. But this very U. K. 
-based 
'parent' firm was to be government-owned under the ANZAC scheme, 
leaving the private sector interests in Cable and Wireless 
once again greatly alarmed about their future. 
As an alternative, Cable and Wireless proposed the 
establishment of a privately run single Empire-wide corporation, 
with the government in each territory guaranteeing a fixed 
- 
281 
- 
interest (3 on the equity of shareholders. The company would 
be run by a multinational Board of Governors, appointed by the 
British sovereign on the recommendation, of the governments of the 
dominions and India and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The Board, however, would operate out of headquarters in London. 
There, ' it would supervise- an operational Management Board 
consisting of a Director General and five 'or six Regional 
Directors with geographically-based management jurisdictions. 
Under this plan, the company proposed that government control 
would be exercised through exclusive licences, in the case of the 
dominions and by way of the terms of the Charter in the case of 
central 'Imperial control. The proposal envisaged an empire-wide 
monopoly by this corporation, including control of the emerging 
telephony networks, 'as well as possibly the manufacturing and 
ship-to-shore communications companies [Single Empire Scheme: 
Proposals of Cable and Wireless, C&W Archives; PRO File CO 937/3]. 
By the time the Labour Government came'to consider Cable and 
Wireless within its overall policy of nationalization in 1945f 
the arguments were already extensively canvassed within the 
industry with' positions hardening on either side:, outright 
nationalization,, - "or re-structured private-ownership including 
increased Imperial and Dominion government involvement. In 1944, 
the Official Committee on Empire Telecommunications, in its First 
Report, identified the 'Essential Requirements' of a future 
system of empire telecommunications. These included "Unity of 
Policy and Control", "Local Autonomy" and "Sharing of 
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Responsibilities". 
On the basis of these policy criteria, and after 
consideration of the merits of the two schemes, the Committee 
recommended that the Cable and Wireless single empire corporation 
was "far superior to the scheme recommended by the CCC, and we 
are satisfied that the advantages of the single Empire 
Corporation are so great that every effort should be made ýto 
secure the consent of the dominions and India to the adoption of 
this basis in principle. " [Part 4,, Official, Reportj, - PRO File CO 
937/3]. 
6.5 
- 
AUTONOMY TO THE DOMINIONS' 
In practice, the Dominion governments themselves were to 
have the last word on the matter, however, and the new government 
convened a Commonwealth Communications Conference in London in 
July 1945, under the chairmanship of Lord, Reith. Delegates at 
this Conference rejected the single Empire scheme of Cable 
and Wireless, demanding instead separate organizations in each 
dominion territory. The meeting felt that the form of the 
organization adopted, either a publicly-subscribed company or a 
wholly government-owned corporation, should be uniform in, order 
to facilitate anticipated common transactions. Where a common 
type of company was not practicable, the meeting'suggested that 
the telecommunications functions 
-should be taken over by a 
recognizable government department (Chester 1975: 453]. 
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A major sub-theme of the 1945 Conference was thefuture 
relationship between the British empire telecommunications 
network and commercial and government interests of the United 
States of America. During the pre-war era leading up to the 
convening of the conference, the U. S. made active representations 
for direct commercial wireless circuits to British colonies and 
dominions. These were consistently rejected, together with an 
American request for a commercial wireless station in England 
itself. While the central British government was concerned about 
the threat of American competition, the Americans argued that 
excessively high 
-rates were being charged and routes unfairly 
protected by the British government in order to bolster the 
revenues of the Cable and Wireless state monopoly [Barty-King 
1979: 286]. 
6.6 
- 
MEETING U. S. 
-DEMANDS 
Following the intervention, of the United States into the War 
on the side of the &Iliest the British government agreed to the 
direct wireless circuits, despite the objections raised by Cable 
and Wireless. Clearly, in 1942, in the middle of the War, 
military considerations predominated- over sectoral commercial 
interests. But these wartime decisions on telecommunications were 
to make a profound contribution to loosening the stranglehold of 
Cable and Wireless on empire telecommunications. The decision by 
the post-war 1945 Telecommunications Conference not only endorsed 
as permanent the United States wireless circuits in the empire, 
but also went some way to meeting the American demands for an end 
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to imperial state monopoly on international telephone and 
telegraph services across the vast British empire. [Report, 
Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference, Chapter D, pp 16-23, 
PRO File CO 937/3/2]. 
Despite strong press criticismst some possibly orchestrated 
by the Cable 'and Wireless lobbyr the government accepted the 
main conclusions of this Conference. In a letter to the Secretary 
of Cable and Wireless Limited in, october, 1945, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer informed the-company that "the United Kingdom 
Government has accepted the recommendations in the'(Conference) 
Report. This involves a change to public ownership of the 
Commonwealth telecommunications services". The , method for 
implementing the decision was set out in the Chancellor's letter: 
"the simplest method of effecting the change-of ownership would 
be for the government to acquire those shares of Cable and 
Wireless Limited which they do not already hold. " [E 48047/9/3 
Oct. 6.1945, File CO 937/3/2 PRO]. 
Synopsis 
Between 1928 and 1945, three successive deliberations were 
convened on the-future of the empire telecommunications networký 
From a comfortable corporatist relationship between the telegraph 
industry and the British government, the situation was 
transformed to one of increasing state control. Power over 
decision-making and over the structure of the industry was less 
on the basis of negotiations and more in terms of government 
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directives and eventually outright ownership. But instead of 
being shared with the private industrialists, state power was 
progressively being shared with the emerging dominion 
governments, who were concerned about an exclusively British 
monopoly of either a private or imperial character. 
The exigencies of war provided a significant opportunity to 
practice this strengthened state role, as well as to respond to 
the demands of a wider world order. The emergent United States of 
America succeeded'in this period, to gain important wireless 
circuit access to the hitherto closed telecommunications markets 
of the empire, thereby strengthening the demands of the dominion 
governments for greater self-determination in telecommunications 
policy. By the end of the war in 1945, the Cable 
. 
and Wireless 
monopoly on empire telecommunications had been irrevocably lost, 
and both the dominions and the United States enjoyed greater 
freedom and interchange in telecommunications development. But 
the telecommunications systems of the smaller colonies remained 
within the restrictive fold of a contracted imperial network, 
from which many of the Caribbean territories have still, ' not 
escaped. 
In 'denouncing the decisions of the 1945 Conference, the 
Scotsman newspaper of November 5,1945, complained of the secrecy 
of the deliberations. Irrespective of its views on the details of 
conference outcome, the paper was expressing a legitimate concern 
about the secret manner in which major public policy decisions 
were being taken. The same secret approach had been adopted in 
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1928 and 1937. In each of those previous cases allowance was 
made only for written submissions considered at meetings which 
"were private and their proceedings confidential". This approach 
allowed the wider public opinion in Britain to be moulded and led 
by the lobbying and campaigning articles of mainly the private 
vested interests. This was in line with the previously prevailing 
corporatist ethos of limitations on the direct involement of 
representative institutions, such as Parliament, and on public 
debate, while issues were being decided. 
The Times newspaper, for it part, while giving support to 
the company's letter to stockholders deploring the decision, 
discreetly pointed out that "this view clearly commands respect, 
though as the United Kingdom have accepted the proposals, it may 
not alter muchý in practice. " [Times, Nov. 2,1945]. In this 
instance, as in others, the decision-making process preceded, 
even pre-empted, public debate. The Scotsman, while acknowledging 
the difficulties and contradictions in the implementation of the 
1929 re-stucturing, was editorially forthright in its praise of 
the company's position: "It has in fact combined very happily the 
duties of a public service with the efficiency and enterprise of 
private enterprise. Now, in place of the co-ordinated system 
which it has built up despite great difficulties, there is to be 
a de-centralised system, which will bring with it all sorts of 
fresh problems.,, [ Editorial, Scotsman, Nov 4,1945]. But such 
public comments were being offered after the event, with no 
effective bearing on policy decision-making. 
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Nonetheless, after-1945,, the larger territories of the British 
empire secured their right to establish their own institutions 
for qxternal telecommunications. In these areas, Cable 
-and 
Wireless was retained in a temporary advisoryýcapacityr but the 
period marked the end of the company's role as an empire-wide 
telecommunications owner and operator. In all the dominion 
territories, public utility corporations were established to 
succeed Cable-and Wireless. 
In keeping with other recommendations of the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Conference, a Commonwealth Telecommunications 
Board was also established, with Britain, India and each Dominion 
territory represented. The Board would provide a collaborative 
framework for the new entities, including administration of a 
special accounting arrangementr(known as the first wayleave 
scheme) for settling charges and mutual transactions. Until their 
independence, the smaller territories enjoyed no automatic right 
of participation in these arrangements, and thus were, once again 
left to the benevolence of the British Colonial Office. 
The Telecommunications Board has since been re-constituted 
into the current Commonwealth Telecommunications Organizationr 
consisting of an Executive Council, and Secretariat known as the 
Bureaur all still based in London. 
6.7 
- 
C&W: ENFORCED RE-STRUCTURING 
In 1945,, two aspects of the re-structuring remained 
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to be resolved. The first was the form to be taken by the British 
government's own external telecommunications entity, and the 
second was a decision on how the telecommunications needs of the 
remaining colonies were to be provided. In the eyes of many 
colonial administrators this was one and the same problem. A 
memorandum from the Colonial Office to the War Cabinet's Official 
Telecommunications Committee made this clear: 
"[A]lthough there had been no opportunity for consulting 
colonial governments in regard to the Council's 
proposals, the view of the Colonial office was that it 
would, in general be desirable for the overseas 
point-to-point wireless telegraphy services and the 
overseas wireless telephony services to be taken over 
by the United Kingdom Corporation. It is felt that in 
the majority of cases, the 'Colonial governments 
concerned would welcome the operation of these 
services by the United Kingdom Corporation... 
[Item ETS (0) 44, PRO File 937/3/4, Aug. 2,1944]. 
The absence of consultations with the colonies stood in, 
stark contrast with the assertiveness and initiatives of the 
larger dominions in successive conferences and deliberations. As 
in the pre-war period, when political and even ethnic kinship may 
have determined a priority role for the large white dominions', 
a weakened post-war Britain-was even more inclined to co-operate 
with dominions whose economic potential now placed them in the 
frontline of the emerging de-colonization process. on the other 
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hand,, the aspirations of the smaller, economically weaker, and 
more easily dominated 'colonies' were viewed with scant regard. 
Their eventual independence was scarcely envisaged, and 
their 
-role was consigned mainly to their strategic importance 
as indefinite appendages of Britain. "No specific mention of the 
c6lonies is made in the first Interim Report of the Commonwealth 
Communications-Council, but it seems clear from paragraph 36 (ix) 
of the Report that it is the intention that the United Kingdom 
Corporation shall be responsible, as a strategic requirement, for 
the upkeep of the cables to and between the Colonies. " [Colonial 
Office draft memorandum item 22905/1/44, PRO File CO 937/3/41 
July, 1944]. It is apparent at this stage that the future of 
the telegraphic cable system, the embrionic telephone network and 
the beam wireless systems in the colonies were to be resolved in 
line with mainland British strategic requirements'. 
'In determining the form that Britain's own external 
telecommunications agency should take, after the break-up and 
nationalization of Cable and Wireless, the preponderant view 
within the bureaucracy was that, as with the dominions, a new 
state-run public utility corporation would be established. As we 
have seen, this scenario also envisaged that this corporation 
would take charge of the network in the colonies. "The changes in 
the Colonies will, I think, have to take place concurrently with 
the changes in the United Kingdom, since the establishments in 
the Colonies will become the, responsibility of the United Kingdom 
Corporation. " (Memorandum from Colonial Office to Official 
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Committee on Telecommunications Services, item 22905/44, July 14, 
1944]. However, the government's decision andý actions which 
followed, departed significantly from this scenario. - 
Well before the decision was made, Cable and Wireless had 
re-doubled its lobbying efforts for a continued role in empire 
telecommunications. By September 1944, in its long memorandum of 
self-defence, Cable and Wireless was already pointing out the 
lack of consideration given by the Commonwealth Communications 
Committee to the needs of the colonies, "which seem to have been 
neglected in this and other respects by the C. C. C. in its 
Report.,, [ETS (0) (44) 11, September 20,1944]. 
After considerable deliberation and delay, it was decided 
that responsibility for U. K. external telecommunications would 
be assigned to the Post Office, which already operated Britain's 
internal service. Despite disadvantages such as a removal-of 
inter-service competitiqný(for example between the telegraph 
air mail) and the lack of a profit motive, the government 
assessed that the advantages were more significant. These 
included economies in common administration, including joint 
research and development costs and savings from the elimination 
of competition. 
As it turned out,, the need for, more effective 
intelligence gathering on an empire-wide basis was also an 
important consideration in centralizing telecommunications 
services within the General Post Office, whichýwas an important 
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part of British intelligence network. Accordingly,, ý. under the 
Commonwealth Telegraph Act of 1949, the U. K. assets of Cable and 
Wireless were transferred to the Post Office, which assumed 
overall charge of both external and internal telecommunications 
for Britain. The only remaining major unresolved issue was what 
was to be done with the disparate group of small colonies. 
6.8 
- 
FATE OF THE SMALLER COLONIES 
Some colonial governments themselves were,, by then, 
beginning to make their own muted demands for a measure of 
self-determination, which received acknowledgement in a Colonial 
Office Draft memorandum in July 1944: 
"There is no doubt that certain colonial governments 
would be capable of running some of their external 
wireless communications. For instance the Hong Kong 
government used to operate highly remunerative overseas 
wireless services, but as these services were generally 
in 
-direct competition with the cable services 
operated by Cable and Wireless Limited, the Colonial 
government agreed under pressure from the Secretary 
of State to hand over the external fixed station 
commercial radio communications to Cable and Wireless 
Limited. " [Item 22905/l/44, July 1944]* 
Within the Caribbean area itself, as well as-elsewhere'in 
Asia, small countries had acquired sufficient command of the 
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existing technology and were demandingr like the dominions, the 
right to run- these services themselves. In the same 
correspondence, it was noted that: 
"Certain other colonial governmentst e. g. Ceylon and 
Bermuda would no doubt be capable of handling their 
own overseas wireless traffic and the Bermuda House of 
Assembly has in fact already made- tentative enquiries 
as to the possibilities of the Bermuda government 
taking over the Bermuda wireless station when the 
present licence of Cable and Wireless Limited expires 
in 1946. But if it were decided that on strategic or 
other grounds the cables to the colonies in question 
should continue to be maintained and operated, such 
wireless services would be in direct competition with 
the cables. Moreover, it would seem to be impossible 
for any colonial government to establish adequate world 
coverage without at some stage transferring the message 
either to some foreign communications company or to the 
system operated by the new (Dominion) Corporations. " 
[Item 22905/l/44, July 1944]. 
Against this background, it was not surprising, that the 
representations by some of the colonies to run their own external 
services were discounted by the British colonial authorities. 
Again, a combination of economic and political motives governed 
colonial policy. In economic terms, the British parent state was 
acting in protection of its now state-run transnational companyl 
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as well as in protection of imperial security and strategic 
requirement. The strategic interest was advanced even more to the 
fore when the same Colonial Office memorandum contemplated the 
cases of Jamaica and Barbados: 
"Further. it should be borne in mind that the wireless 
stations now operated by Cable and Wireless Limited in 
certain colonies form an important-link in other empire 
wireless telegraphy servicesi e. g. the Cable and 
Wireless station at Barbados serves as a relay-station 
for the circuit between the United Kingdom and 
Australia 
, 
and the Cable and Wireless station at 
Jamaica forms a link in the overseas communications for 
British Honduras and the Bahamas. " 
In consequence of these interlinked empire interests, 'the 
operation of the communications of the colonies was unlikely to 
be assigned to the colonies themselves where possible. At the 
same time, the Post Office, which was to be charged with the task 
of operating the U. K. based external services, proved an 
unsuitable entity in- which to vest control of the colonial 
network. Protracted Cable and Wireless lobbying was about to-- pay 
off. In the eyes of the imperial policy-makers, the next best 
alternative was a retention of the now State-owned Cable and 
Wireless, to operate this residue of small but 'strategic' 
colonial network. Support for this option was already being 
expressed in 1944 by the lead officer in-the Colonial Office, 
J-Megson: 
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"Generally, I think that Cable and Wireless Limited are 
in a better position to conduct the overseas radio 
telephone services of the colonies than the colonial 
governments. In many cases, particularly in the West 
Indies, Cable and Wireless Limited already-- have the 
equipment there to start such services, and I do not 
think that in the smaller colonies'. colonial 
governments have the operating staff or the technicians 
to conduct such services. I think that there would be 
some advantage in having all the staff operating radio 
telephone servicest wireless services etc. in the West 
Indies under one body, so that the staff are 
interchangeable and visits by superintending officials 
can easily be arranged.. " [Memo of J. Megson on 
'Aspects to be Considered by the Official Committee,, 
July 14,1944, PRO File CO 937 /3/4]. 
It was this line which prevailed, and Cable and Wireless was 
granted the responsibility to operate the telecommunications 
system of the smaller colonies of the empire, even while the 
company was being denied a role in Britain itself or in the more 
developed dominions. 
6.9 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is against this overall background that Cable and 
Wireless developed. From classical private sector beginnings 
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linked to a corporatist relationship with the state, to strong 
state hegemony and eventually nationalization which lasted for 
over three decades. Through its historical evolution, the company 
benefitted from the consistent support of a parent state for 
which 
- 
control over communication was essential to the 
geo-politics of a colonial empire. Cable and Wireless, the 
company providing these vital links, managed to survive three 
major policy review conferences in 1928,1937 and 1945, and many 
other challenges including route and technology competition, 
state ownership and war before then. Throughout all these 
challenges, the process of policy-making by the state was marked 
by a consistent absence of public involvement and a lack of 
consultation on policies affecting the smaller colonies which 
lacked the economic leverage of the larger dominions. 
Unlike many other telecommunications MNCs. C&W inherited a 
global network, even if on a reduced remit, following loss of its 
home market and larger overseas client base. However, it returned 
the support and loyalty of the British state by remaining very 
much a British company. State-ownership and, British nationality 
ensured that it did not pursue a geocentric strategy, as might be 
expected. Instead, its operations within the British colonial 
empire and eventually outside of it, were conducted on the basis 
of an ethnocentric approach, oriented towards its home country. 
This strategy is evidenced by its profit remittances, sustained 
British nationality and ownership and eventually its re-entry via 
Mercury into the national home market to which it had always 
aspired. 
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The nationalization of the company's holdings in the larger 
ex-colonial territories of Canada, Australiar New Zealand, India, 
South Africa, Ireland and Southern Rhodesia, meant that the 
development of the company over the last forty five years relied 
on its retention of remaining British colonies, such as Hong Kong 
and parts of the Caribbean, as well as other small colonial 
states which continued to provide a base for the company. Unlike 
the options offered to the dominions, the colonial territories to 
which Cable and Wireless remained attached were neither consulted 
nor given a choice of operating their own telecommunications 
systems. Indeed, as we have seen, even colonies which were 
willing and able to take-over their networks, such as Hong Kong, 
Bermuda and possibly Jamaica and Barbados, were denied this role 
by the colonial authorities in-favour of strategic advantages 
to Britain of a continued Cable and Wireless, ownership and 
management. 
In analysing the distinction which was maintained by the 
Centre between the colonies and the dominions, Amin ''argues that 
"all the regions that were integrated in'the world capitalist 
system with peripheral status have remained like that to- the 
present. " He goes even furthur in arguing that the large white 
dominions were hardly even members of the periphery at all. He 
uses as his criterion the character of the state, with Centre 
formation having state systems capable of facilitating 
lautocentric capital accumulation' while peripheral'states are 
structurally incapable of this and instead facilitate local 
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penetration by external forces of worldwide accumulation. "We 
make clear that according to this thesis, New E ngland, Canadar 
Australia and New Zealand were never peripheral formations; by 
contrast Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia - with the 
exception of Japan 
- 
were and have remained so. " [Amin 1990: 
169-170]. 
In this respect, British imperialism can be regarded as 
operating at two distinct levels with regard to its 
telecommunications policy of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Its first priority was responding to the 
demands of the dominions as a means of retaining its influence 
over their tendencies towards independent policies. At a second 
level, the interests of the colonies were either not considered 
or regarded as relatively unimportant. The position of these 
colonies, which include those in the Caribbean, was that of a 
periphery one stage removed from the dominions on the fringes of 
empire. 
It is within this historical context that Caribbean 
governments and other interest groups have to formulate modern 
policy. C&Wls existence was entirely premised on the patronage of 
the parent state and on the latter's power and influence in 
maintaining colonial relationships. By the 1960's when a second 
wave of decolonization exposed Britain's political inability to 
sustain this influence, the company once again entered into a 
period of crisis, which was only really resolved in 1981 with the 
British programme of renewed privatization under the policies of 
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the former Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. 
By then, the reserve of experience accumulated by Cable and 
Wireless in negotiating with governments from both home and host 
countries and the extent of its knowledge of the Caribbean region 
had spanned close to a century and a quarter of MNC operation. In 
contrast, to this, many of the current host governments in theý 
region have had less than three decades of experience in direct, 
independent interaction with the company, whose corporate size 
had also grown to well in excess of the national-budget of some 
of these regional domestic economies. 
In the succceeding chapter, we examine the power and global 
scope of Cable and Wireless PLC, as a modern, private 
multinational corporation. Although owing it global reach to 
historical factors of empire, the company now operates fully as a 
capital accumulating enterprise, uninhibited by the direct 
political considerations of a state company or the mixed motives 
of its earlier corporatist forebears. But the image of the 
company as part of the beneficial colonial heritage of British 
imperialism persists, and is even cultivated by corporate image 
makers unwilling to dispense with important firm specific 
-and 
location specific advantages built up over generations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CABLE AND WIRELESS 
-THE MODERN MNC 
Cable and Wireless was among the, earliest group of British 
state-owned enterprises to be privatised by the Conservative 
government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Since its return 
to private sector operation in 1981, the company has undergone 
significant re-structuring, and re-definition of its corporate 
objectives and strategies. The period since then has been marked 
by an unbroken record of profitability and 
-expansion, including 
the acquisition and launch of Mercury as_ the sole national 
network competitor to British Telecom in the United Kingdom 
telecommunications sector. 
But is the company's pattern of growth. uniform across its 
global span of regions? How does its current 
-corporate strategy 
benefit from its historical associations and what are its new 
corporate strategic targets? In this chapter we profile the 
modern multinational corporation into which Cable and Wireless 
has grown since privatization. Our examination- of its modern 
scale and scope provides a useful perspective on the new 
negotiating partner across the table- from national 
telecommunications policy-makers in the small and indebted states 
of the Caribbean. 
- 
300 
- 
7.1 
- 
COMPARATIVE SIZE OF C&W 
, 
Global profitability and levels of overseas investment have- 
been incorporated by--Penrose in her discussion of decision-making 
in multinational corporations. She notes that the-most obvious 
measurements of the scope of a firm are to be found in the. annual 
operating and financial statements [Penrose 1968: 28-29]. On that 
basis, Cable and Wireless, according to the Financial Times.. 
Business Information Unit, ranks among the top 100 U. K. firms 
[FTBI 1988: 98]. 
This groupingr however, includes a very wide band of-firms. 
It is therefore useful, in order to appreciate the relative 
-size 
of Cable and Wireless to make a limited comparison, with two 
other similar British firms. We will use British Telecom-, which is 
similar in basic function to Cable and Wireless (and formerly a 
part of it) and is one of its current major competitors with an 
interest in the Caribbean. Secondly, we will use Reuters Holdings 
Limited, which developed in a similar historical pattern to Cable 
and Wireless. For example, where an antecedent company to Cable 
and Wireless was instrumental in establishing the first permanent 
trans-atlantic telegraph link in 1866, Reuters wasýamongst the 
first corporate users of it. Both companies have benefitted, from 
a close association with the implementation of British government 
colonial policies. All three. firms currently have extensive global 
business interests within the international service sector. Some 
comparative financial indicators are set out in Table 6. 
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In 1987-1988, the market capitalization of Cable and 
''but only about a Wireless was nearly twice that of Reuters, 
quarter that of British Telecom. Cable and Wireless, a more 
labour intensive operation, employs three times the number of 
Reuters' employees, yet appears miniscule in comparison to the 
staffing, turnover and profitability levels of British Telecom. 
The U. K. Companies Act, 1989, [Section 13 (1)] provides 
three criteria by which a company is adjudged to be a small 
or a medium sized firm. The differentiation between these two 
categories and that of a large firm is important because 
companies qualifying as small or as medium sized firms, ( as 
against those classified as large corporations) are exempted from 
certain requirements of the Companies Act, although as we shall 
see, large companies falling outside these two categories, can 
also benefit from certain other exemptions. [Holmes-and Sugden' 
1989: 1]. In terms of the small and medium-sized criteria, 
classification is on the basis of firms meeting any two of the 
three standards set out in Table 7. 
On the basis of the Companies Act criteria at Table 7 and 
the comparative statistics at Table 6 it is clear that C&W ranks 
as a large multinational service firm. While being considerably 
smaller than the main United Kingdom national carrier British 
Telecom (B. T. ). it is larger than Reuters and considerably 
exceeds the official British criteria for a small or medium-sized 
company. 
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TAýBLE 6 
----------------------- -------------- ----------------- 
----------- 
SELECTED COXPARATI VE INDICATORS: REUTERS, C&W, B. T. 
----------------------- 
1987-1988 (4) 
-------------- ----------------- ----------- 
Firm Capital 
---- ------- 
Turnover 
-------- 
Pre-tax profit 
-------------- 
Staff 
----- 
Reuters 1.902 bn. 11003 mn. 215.4 mn. 10,064 
C&w3.376 bn. 1,244 mn. 356.0 mn. 30,, 000 
B. T. 13.287 bn. 9.424 mn. 2.067 bn. 234,400 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources : Compiled from Annual Reports of Reuters, C&W, 
and British Telecom 1987-88 
TABLE 7 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING FIRM SIZE (0 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
INDICES SMALL FIRM MEDIUM-SIZED FIRM 
------- ---------- ----------------- 
Turnover not exceeding 2m 8m 
Bal. Sheet Total below 0.975m. 3.9m. 
No. of employees below 50 250 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Companies Act 1989 Section 13 (1). ' 
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7.2 
- 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
In financial year 19BB-1989, The Cable and Wireless Group of 
Companies recorded pre-tax profits ofC420-million, an increase 
of 18% on the previous year's level ofe356-million. In 1989, the 
company had net assets of. <1,555.5-million and a turnover of 
1,534-million. By turnover is meant the gross amount accruing to 
the group from all sources of income within the financial year. 
An examination of these accruals can give an insight into the 
main sources of income for the company, while providing an 
indication of its core corporate activities. 
Table 8 indicates that the company's main income-generating 
activity is the provision of public telecommunications. This 
includes the provision of international telephone services, 
facsimile and data transmission facilities, domestic telephone 
services and other telecommunications-related sources such as 
leased circuits, management fees and maritýme communications 
services. Within this grouping of corporate activities, it is 
significant to note that international telephone services 
represented well over half of the firm's telecoms turnover. This 
reflects both the greater profitability of international 
telephone services over domestic services, and the company's own 
traditional emphasis on the international aspect of 
telecommunications operations. In 1989, it was providing external 
telecommunications for 35 countries and internal 
telecommunications for 22. [C&W Directors Report 1989: 41]. 
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TABLE 8 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 
TURNOVER 
- 
1988 & 1989(tm) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
ACTIVITY 
(PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS) 
International Telephone Services 
Domestic Telephone Services 
Other Telecommunications Services 
SUB-TOTAL 
(OTHER ACCRUALS) 
Equipment Sales and Rentals 
Cableships and Contracts 
TOTAL (m) 
TURNOVER 
1988 1989 
562.4 700.5 
254.5 324.5 
267.1 285.2 
------ 
1244.1 
------- 
1310.2 
94.5 '160.2 
65.6 63.7 
------ 
1244.1 ------ 1534.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources : Compiled from Cable and Wireless Annual 
Reports 1988,1989 
i 
i 
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Other categories comprising turnover are equipment sales and 
and rentals, cable ship revenues, contracts and consultancy fees. 
The company's non-franchise equipment transactions involve the 
maintenance of terminals and communications systems. Particularly 
since its acquisition of the U. K. firm Telephone Rentals in", 1988, 
the Group has also been engaged in the sale, lease andzental of 
equipment, reflected in significant growth in this non-core'area. 
Cableship turnover derives from the commercal chartering of 
the firm's 9 cable ships and 2 submersibles to other cable owners 
and manufacturers. And the 'contracts, sub-category brings in 
revenues from consultancy fees and other short term contracts. As 
Table 9 also indicates, this category: equipment sales, 'cable 
ships and contracts, while recording a modest increase, over the 
previous year, still remained a minor income area for the'firm in 
1989. However this area, particularly equipment sales and rental, 
is a prospective important growth sector for the group in- such 
areas as personal communications networks (PCNs) and mobile 
telephone networks like the group's Callpoint service, operated 
by subsidiary Mercury. 
Overall C&W turnover in 1989 increased by1290-million on 
the previous year, with the greatest single contribution being 
made by it's international telephone services. As Table 9 
indicates, this area grew by4138-million compared to an increase 
of 70-million in the domestic telephone services category. The 
statistics confirm Cable and Wireless, core activities to be in 
the provision of (1)international and (2)domestic 
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telecommunications services in conditions of both profitability 
and growth. 
As we noted earlier, however, annual company reports while 
being the most accessible source of data on financial 
performance, often obscure as much about the company as they 
reveal. While we know from these reports that Cable and Wireless 
is operating In conditions of sustained profitability, more 
detailed analysis of the company's performance is inhibited by 
the absence from its annual reports of the parent firm's profit 
and loss account. The legal basis for this is the U. K. Companies 
Acts of 1985 and 1989. The latter, according to Holmes and Sugden, 
provides that the parent. company's Profit and Loss account may be 
omitted from the consolidated accounts provided the parent 
company's balance sheet shows the parent company's profit or loss 
for the year. [Holmes and Sugden 1989: 120]. Because the balance 
sheet spells out less and condenses more of the operating details 
of the firm, some companies opt to provide only this minimum 
degree of information. ".. In practice, one seldom, if ever, sees 
the parent company's own profit and loss accounts. " [Holmes and 
Sugden 1989: 120]. 
Accordingly, Cable and wireless, 1989 Annual Report notes that 
"The company has taken advantage of the exemption contained in 
the Company's Act 1985 from presenting its own profit and loss 
account. " While this policy may be convenient for the firm in 
terms of limiting the access of competitors to information, it 
does conceal from public analysis specific areas such as loss 
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TABLE 
CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 
SELECTED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (Lrn) 
1981-1989 
------ 
Year 
---------- 
Turnover 
---------------------- 
Pre-tax Profit 
----------------- 
Net profit % 
-------- 
Return* 
----- 
1981 
------- 
294.9 
- -------------- 
64.1 ---------- 40.6 
------- -- 
1982 359.4 89.2 45.0 
19Q3 418.4 156.7 97.7 
1984 673.1 190.1 112.8 23.6 % 
1985 861.5 245.2 143.7 26.7 % 
1986 907.0 295.0 179.5 23.6 % 
1987 912.9 340.5 215.4 23.4 
1988 1,244.0 356.1 261.0 23.8 
1989 11534.0 420.0 414.0 24.5 % 
Sources 
---------- 
Cable and 
--------- 
Wireless 
---------------- 
Annual Reports 
-------------------- 
1981 
- 
1989. 
*Return Return on average net assets after tax. 
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making activities, a detailed break-down of staff costs and 
investment costs by subsidiaries, as well as taxes paid or liable 
to specific host countries. 
Notwithstanding the limitation of information on Cable and 
Wireless, profit and loss account, there is enough data to show 
that the company's 1989 pre-tax profit increased by Z64-million, 
and its trading profits increased by somet8O-million or by 28% 
over the previous year. This performance marked the eighth 
successive year of profit growth since the company was privatised 
in 1981. Table 10 provides some ýselected indicators of the 
company's performance over these years. It has been characterised 
by accelerating growth. According to Sir Eric Sharpe, the 
company's retiring Chairman, the pre-tax profit of Cable and 
Wireless PLC grew at a compound rate in excess of 24 % per 'annum 
over the period since 1981. 
7.3 
- 
PERFORMANCE BY REGIONS AND SUBSIDIARIES 
In the case of its Caribbean and other subsidiaries, the 
company does not publish individual performance figures. 
Instead, the out-turn is incorporated within regional statistics, 
making it difficult to disaggregate individual subsidiary 
performance. The British Companies Act [1989: Section 5]f 
requires the presentation of only parent company accounts and the 
overall group accounts. Consistent with this minimum statutory 
requirement.. Cable and Wireless, accounts , comprise a 
consolidation of the accounts of the Company and, all its 
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subsidiaries together with the Group's share of the results and 
net assets of its associated companies. 11 [Annual Report 1989: 49]. 
However, since the subsidiaries are often also registered 
companies within the United Kingdom home base, Cable and Wireless 
is obliged by law to lodge details of the annual performance of 
each subsidiary with the U. K. Registrar of Companies. While 
recourse to- delayed submission is available to the companyt 
information on subsidiaries, when completely submitted, should 
include annual performance summaries, copies of Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, share capitalization and details of 
directors and secretaries. On the basis of these sources, we can 
gain a closer insight, later into the operations of the Caribbean 
subsidiary Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited. However, 
performance details on Cable and Wireless (W. I. ) Limited are 
themselves consolidated results for the parent company's multiple 
Caribbean undertakings, and therefore will not provide data for 
meaningful Caribbean country by country analysis. These Companies 
House data are nontheless useful in examining overall Caribbean 
investment policies and performance, and will be considered 
later, together with annual reports of the associated companies 
registered in the Caribbean itself. 
In terms of contribution to overall corporate profitability, 
Cable and Wireless, own group structure is based on a wide 
geographical classification, in regions'. In this respect it 
falls within Brooke's Type B company category, where geographical 
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organization is the main link, with an expansionary foreign, 
operation. [1970: 25]. Cable and Wireless regions are : Asia and, 
Pacific; Middle East, Indian Ocean and Africa; Western Hemisphere 
and United Kingdom. This poorly defined geographical structure 
while rooted in the historical development pattern of the company 
has been retained in use possibly because of its generalised 
and therefore obscure character. It affords a competitor or 
analyst little information on the specific national sources of 
income particularly since the company does not list the countries 
falling in each region. In some cases, country locations can be 
assumed, such as Hong Kong falling within the Asia and Pacific 
Region. In others it is not-as clear. Using the company's own 
group structure,, however, we will briefly examine the group's 
existing policy and performance. 
7.3.1 
- 
Asia and Pacific 
Close to 70% of the revenue of the company comes from its 
Asia and Pacific Region. In 1989, that region had a turnover-of 
893.6-million from an overall annual turnover offl534.1 M. The 
main countries constituting C&W investments in this region are 
Hong Kong, Japan, China, Thailand, the Phillipines and Macau. By 
far the largest portion of regional turnover is likely to be 
contributed by Hong Kong, which dominates Cable and Wireless 
investment in that area. In'1981,,, Hong Kong alone contributed 
nearly two thirds of company profits (Guardian, June 14,1990: 9], 
and despite modest reductions in the company's stake in'the 
colony since then, it remains the single most important 
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investment 
-location for Cable and Wireless. The Group owns 75.2 % 
of Hong Kong Telecommunications, which is the largest company 
quoted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In 1988, C&W1s stake in 
Hong Kong was reduced by 4.2% : 0.1 % having been sold to the 
Chinese government and 4.1% in a public offer taken up by 
investors from Hong Kong and the United States among others. 
The Asia and Pacific Division, and Hong Kong in particular, 
demonstrates the case of a large multinational corporation being 
dependent on a single region for-its annual profitability. Where 
this 
-region is not the home market,, we see a continuation if the 
trend identified by Hamilton [1986: 17] of MNCs becoming dependent 
on foreign profits in order to confront oligopolistic competition 
in the home market. This dependence on Hong Kong by, Cable and 
Wireless is a particularly sensitive policy problem for the its 
corporate strategists. It dramatises only too visibly - the 
arguments of the structuralists that multinational surplus 
appropriation from the periphery contributes directly towards 
capital accumulation in the industrialised countries [Girvan 
1976: 12]. 
Currently, Hong Kong is a burgeoning telecommunications 
market. In 1989 the number of local telephone lines increased by 
8.4% over the previous year, making for a total of 2.2 million 
lines in a population of 5.5 million people. Demands for business 
lines increased by 16 % in 1988-89, and the expansion of 
international telephony is even more dramatic. According to Cable 
and Wireless itself "The total of all outgoing calls including 
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operator assisted, facsimile and data calls exceeded 441 million 
minutes, an increase of almost 40 %" [Annual Report 1989: 8]. 
Against this encouraging background of explosive growth and 
rising profitability is the daunting political prospect of the 
re-integration of Hong Kong into China in 1997. The company is 
increasingly conscious of its vulnerability to political events 
over which neither its parent government nor itself has effective 
control. Major elements of corporate strategy, affecting all 
other regions, is therefore driven by uncertainty concerning the 
future of the company's principal income source. 
Within the Asia and Pacific regions itself, the strategy 
involves building up co-operative relationships with the Chinese 
government, reflected in the sale of 0.1 % of Hong Kong 
Telecommunications to the Guangdong provincial PTT, the further 
sale in March 1990 of 20 % of Hong Kong Telecom to the Chinese 
Investment Agency CITIC, as well as the extension of a 
fibre-optic overland cable between Hong Kong and Guangzhou in the 
People's Republic of China. These moves, while building up 
strategic relationships, have also assisted in the objective of" 
reducing dependence on this principal income source. It is 
estimated that from a pre-divestment high of close to 80%. Hong 
Kong's contribution to overall group profits in 1988 -was some 
62%, with the company's Chief Executive Officer projecting that 
this would be reduced to about 30 % of group profit by the end of 
the century. [Toronto Globe and Mail, August 8.1989: B6]. 
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The main significance of our analysis of Cable and Wireless 
strategy in the Asia and Pacific Region is to show the dominance 
of historically determined patterns of growth in the company, and 
the influence of this on overall corporate strategy. While 
political independence meant the loss of a secure monopoly in 
most major former British colonies, Hong Kong's 
- 
remaining 
constitutional status as a British colony preserved for Cable-and 
Wireless a unique, dominant role, exploited while the company was 
still a department of Her Majesty's government. This beneficial 
relationship continued to serve the company in the decade since 
privatization, providing a cash source for aggressive investment 
strategies in other regions, including a consolidation of its 
position in the Caribbean, the development of a market base in 
the United States and especially in the re-establishment of the 
company as a force within the telecommunications market of its 
home base in the United Kingdom. 
As the role of Britain continued to wane and the last 
vestiges of its colonial empire disappear, Cable and Wireless has 
been faced with the necessity to adjust its international 
strategy in line with less reliance on the pro-active parent 
state. Nonetheless, the company has grown up and continued to 
benefit 'from the foundations laid in the previous era as a 
state-owned or quasi-statutory institution. Host governments 
and other actors in the global periphery that form the main 
income sources of the company will need to be aware of both 
-the 
historical and contemporary factors influencing adjustments in 
corporate strategy and adjustments which affect the operation of 
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each region. 
7.3.2 
- 
United Kingdom Region 
Parallel to the initiatives to reduce reliance on Hong Kong, 
the company has been moving to strengthen its income generation 
and presence in the U. K. market, its home base. Its historical 
role as a telecommunications carrier for the colonial empire 
emerged in 1947, when it was nationalised and its U. K. operations 
taken over by the Telecommunications Branch of the Post Office 
(the latter becoming British Telecom in a later re-organization). 
Cable and Wirelessr therefore, lost its home base, and was left 
to operate the empire's telecommunications system on 
concessionary arrangements with the respective colonial 
governments. 
The emergence of a majority of colonies into independence, 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, saw many of the new 
national governments either opting to operate their own 
telecommunications systems or to otherwise increase national 
control over Cable and Wireless, operations within 'their 
territories. The resulting diminution of the company's 
concessionary business, stimulated renewed attention to greater 
investment and trading activities at home. 
The company's divestment in 1981 provided a further impetus 
to this search for a local base to supplement international 
activities. The process was initiated in earnest with the 
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acquisition of a minor percentage of the small UO-K. 
telecommunications firm Mercury. In 1984, Cable and Wireless 
completed the takeover of Mercury with the purchase of the 
remaining 50 % of Mercury shares from British Petroleum. Mercury 
has become the centrepiece of the company's strategy to recover a 
share of the British telecommunications market. In 1986 Mercury 
announced the launch of a national and international telephone 
service in Britain, initiating an alternative to the then 
existing British Telecom monopoly. The new company invested 
extensively in new technology with a focus on the business user. 
Within two years it had established an inter-city British 
fibre-optic cable networkr and began negotiating a series of 
co-operative agreements for international switched telephone 
services, including with AT&T in the United States. After an 
initial loss-making period spanning 1984-1987, Mercury is claimed 
to have broken into profitable trading in 1989: "Its turnover has 
increased by 148 % fromL73-million to /-181 
- 
million, whilst 
last year's trading loss of 11 million has been turned to a very 
satisfactory trading profit of418 million. " (Chairman's Report, 
C&W 1989: 3) The acquisition of the firm Telephone Rentals 
represents part of this consolidation of the U. K. region, whose 
trading profit has grown from less than 1% to some 10% of total 
group trading profit in 1989. 
Prior to 1984, the financial performance of Cable and 
Wireless was entirely -dependent on the prevailing conditions 
outside of the United Kingdom. This flowed from the situation 
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preceding nationalization in which "the commercal basis of the 
group's operations and the economic environment, including pay 
and prices, in which it works, are determined by the policies of 
the governments concerned" [Select Committee Report 1976: 2]. In 
1974-75, for example, 98% of the group's gross revenue of179.8 
million was earned overseas, primarily from Hong Kong, the 
Caribbean and the Middle East. In response to this failure to 
build up U. K. earnings, the company is seeking to recover a 
substantial segment of its home market by taking advantage 
of its position as an international carrier, to accumulate 
revenues on the Mercury account from its incoming calls. The 
development of the United Kingdom region, remains an important, 
though as yet unachieved element, in a global strategy to'become 
the 'world telephone company'. 
The main operational form of this new geocentric strategy 
is the company's concept of providing a 'global digital highway', 
offering alternative telecommunications routing to and from most 
destinations in the world. In that respect, the development, of 
Mercury, important as it is in exploiting the home market, should 
be seen as but another link in a wider global strategy of a 
company embarked on a new expansionary phase. The acquisition in 
1989 of a 20% interest in the U. K. firm Export Network Limited 
signals the intention of Cable and Wireless to expand beyond 
conventional telecommunications services into the computerised 
desk top information trading networks which have catapulted the 
Reuters Group into higher and more secure profitability. The 
international reach and firm-specific advantages of C&W will be 
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of major benefit in the pursuit of these global objectives. 
7.3.3 
- 
Middle East, Indian Ocean And Africa Region. 
This region is by far the smallest and least profitable 
within the Cable and Wireless Group. It contributedt45.4 million 
to Group turnover in 1989 and ended the period with a trading 
profit ofý14.7 million,, down some12 million on the previous 
year's performance. The largest income earner for the region was 
the Group's 40 % interest in the Bahrain Telecommunications 
Company. However, in January 1989 a half of this shareholding 
was acquired by the Bahrain government. The company retains small 
holdings in the telecommunications systems of the Yemen Arab 
Republic, Seychelles and Saudi Arabia, where Cable and Wireless 
provides important elements of communication to the Saudi 
National Guard, under contract with the United Kingdom Ministry 
I 
of Defence. 
In Africa, where the company's involvement was never 
extensive, its only remaining significant investment is with the 
Sierra Leone External Telecommunications Limited in which the 
Group owns 49 %. Among the main new investment in the overall 
region is in a new digital network for the Falklands/Malvinas 
Islands, under a 22-year licence negotiated with the British 
controlled Falklands Islands government. 
Cable and Wireless' 'Middle Eastr Indian Ocean and Africa' 
Region has been the area most affected by withdrawals of 
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concessions and by nationalizations as countries became either 
independent, economically stable or otherwise capable of 
operating their own telephone and telecommunications systems. 
Numerous countries which even in 1975 were among the Group's 
important business clients, were no longer listed as 'principal 
subsidiary companies, associated companies and trade investments' 
by 1989. In this region alone, these include Botswana, Kenya, the 
Cameroons, Sudant the Gambia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar and Oman. Nationalism and an 
-early identification of 
telecommunications as development tools are likely to have 
contributed to the withdrawal or reduction of concessions to the 
externally based Cable and Wireless. In the case of the Middle 
Eastern countries, rapid economic development derived principally 
from oil revenues, as well as American competition, would also 
have played a role in reducing the region's dependence on 
maintaining concessions with the company. 
7.3.4 
- 
The Western Hemisphere Region 
The level of instability faced by Cable and Wireless in the 
Middle East,, Indian Ocean and Africa region contrasts 
significantly with the relative stability which the Company has 
experienced in the Caribbean over the last decade, and the 
significant growth which has taken-place in the United States 
operations over the same period. Indeed, in the Caribbeant Cable 
and Wireless has been INCREASING its equity holding and 
investment control during the last five years, despite some 
earlier post-independence adjustments in the company's equity 
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status in the larger territories. Detailed consideration of'these 
issues relating to Cable and Wireless and the Modern Caribbean 
will, be undertaken separately, and therefore our discussion here 
of the Western Hemisphere Region will proceed in relation to the 
non-Caribbean components of the region, primarily the-United 
States. 
Cable and Wireless' operations in the United States take 
place primarily in the non-concessional sector. It involves the 
management and operation of private telecommunications networks, 
consultancies on telecommunications projects-in both the private 
and public sectors, provision of data processing facilities and 
the distribution of telecommunications and allied equipment. Its 
operation in the US market has been significantly boosted by 
liberalization of telecommunications in that country as well as 
by a series of company acquisitions and joint venture projects. 
Cable and Wireless Communications Inc., the Group's U. S. 
- 
based telephone marketing subsidiary (formerly TDX) provides a 
digital coast to coast network covering some 17,200 route miles. 
The network is largely operated by another Cable and Wireless 
subsidiary Cable and Wireless Management Services Inc, providing 
inter-city route diversity for a growingýnumber of business users 
and local carriers. In 1988, the company reported that-more than 
2DO of the USA's heaviest telecommunications users, including '30 
communications carriers, have ýalready' leased capacity, while 
another 50,000 North American businesses increased their use of 
the Group's long distance services by 21% to pass 630 million 
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minutes of traffic over the network. '[Annual Report 1988: 18]. As 
an indication of the pace of growth, the customer base of this 
service increased by 20% in the financial year ending March 1989. 
Between 1985 and 1988 traffic on the network increased by 
approximately 100%, and in 1989 alone grew by a further 33% 
[Annual Reports 1985: 11,1989: 10]. 
While providing alternative routes and interconnectivity 
within the United States itself, the U. S network also forms'an. 
important segment of the the company's major strategy for the 
establishment of a global network described as the 'Global 
Digital Highway'. Cable and Wireless, 1989 joint co-operation 
agreement with the American long distance carrier-US Sprint laid 
the foundation for enhanced international marketing of the 
jointly-owned trans-Atlantic optical fibre cable system called 
PTAT. The PTAT system, with a spur to the Caribbean via Bermuda, 
will also create an important link between the United States 
network and the growing United Kingdom infra-structure operated 
by Mercury. 
Another 
-linkage via the Private Pacific Cable (PPAC), 
will connect these networks into the Japanese and -other- Pacific 
systems operated by Cable and Wireless and its partners. PPAC, is 
operated by International Digital Communications(IDC) which is a 
joint venture between Pacific Telesis of the United States, 
Cable and Wireless, and C. Itoh and Toyota of Japan. This and 
other joint projects represent significant undertakings 
by Cable and Wireless within the United States, which now forms 
- 
318 
- 
the major contributor to corporate turnover within the Western 
Hemisphere Region. 
. In 1989,, that region had a turnover oft317.6 million. 'But 
only 460.3 million was declared as the regional trading profit, 
suggesting a high level of operating costs and investments. The 
1989 performance compares favourably, however with the previous 
year when turnover was1289.5 million and trading profits 448.8 
million. On the basis of a 1989 regional analysis of the trading 
results of the Group, the Western Hemisphere Region represented 
the second most profitable region for Cable and Wireless, despite 
the rapid growth recorded in the United Kingdom Region over the 
last three years. Although the leading region, Asia and the 
Pacific, returned profits well over four times that of the 
Western Hemisphere in 1989, growth trends in the Western 
Hemisphere Region and projected reductions in dependence on Hong 
Kong would seem to indicate a larger role for the Western 
Hemisphere region, including the Caribbean and the United States. 
The central corporate strategy of the 'global digital 
highway, appears to rely heavily on continued access to the U. S. 
market, while the company's data transmission plans are heavily 
linked to Caribbean labour conditions, particularly in Jamaica 
and St Lucia where experimental, teleport facilities have been 
sited. 
7.4 
- 
CONCLUSION 
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On the basis of the foregoing research data and analysist 
there can be little doubt that Cable and Wireless has become' a 
highly profitable and expanding Group. Its levels of 
profitability has increased many times over in the last decade 
since it has been operating as a private company. An inevitable 
question is what accounts for this remarkable profitability and 
growth. Over the last decade, Cable and Wireless' rapid corporate 
growths may be attributed to several factors. Performance was 
considerably boosted by the continued growth in the global 
information and telecommunications services sector, which the 
company exploited both in the United States and particularly in 
its traditional major income source, Hong Kong. Its large global 
operation meant that the company was able to benefit from, both 
economies of scale and from the adoption of already developed new 
technologies without incurring any major research and development 
expenditures of, its own. 
The company's increased corporate flexibility arising from 
its divestment also made an important contribution. State 
ownership had reduced the imperative of internal efficiency as 
the sole basis of the organization's survival.. Privatization 
brought greater flexibility and an emphasis on improved 
management, contributing significantly to enhanced international 
confidence and internal morale. The clear articulation of a 
renewed global development strategy lent dynamism and focus to 
the company's modprn image, thereby attracting to it a range of 
new commercial partnerships and investment opportunities. 
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Even while establishing a pattern of growth, the company 
managed to increase its investment in new and potentially 
dramatic growth areas. Its successful launch of Mercury and 
acquisition of Radio Rentals, its continued expansion in the 
United States market, and its investment in teleport and data 
entry facilities in the Caribbean are all intended to further 
diversify its income sources away from the Asia and Pacific 
Region, which the company nonetheless continued to develop 
through new agreements with China. 
In some of its traditional markets, however, the company's 
position was facilitated by an increase in the- level of 
external debt by partner governments, leading to greater 
multilateral lending agency demands for telecommunications 
divestment. While such policy approaches may be beneficial in the 
industrialised economies, their application to the problems of 
underdeveloped regions has increasingly been called into 
question [Beckford and Witter 1980: 133, Manley 1987: 170, 
Raghavan 1990 : 73]. In the following penultimate chapter, we 
consider the impact of multinational companies and overseas 
lending agencies on the regional telecommunications policy 
process. The role of Cable and wireless, regional states. and 
non-governmental organizations will receive particular 
emphasis. 
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PART 3 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE POST COLONIAL CARIBBEAN 
CHAPTER 8 
CABLE AND WIRELESS AND THE MODERN CARIBBEAN 
We examine in this Chapter the nature- and extent of the 
involvement by Cable and Wireless in the telecommunications 
services of the modern Caribbean, and the national and regional 
policy responses to this. Among the main issues confronting 
national policy planners in the region is how far the benefits of 
telecommunications can be enlisted as a deliberate part of the 
process of national development, or alternatively, whether 
telecommunications is simply another zone for uninhibited 
foreign direct investment. 
We begin, therefore, with an overview of the debate on the 
role of telecommunications in development-and the related area of 
technology transfer. We will be attempting, in the 
-processo, to 
apply our conclusions to the situation existing in the Caribbean. 
The structure and ownership of the regional telecommunications 
network will be outlined and-discussed, 
-as well as the prevailing 
scenario regarding service delivery,, regulation and collective 
policy planning. 
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8.1 
- 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The global trade in telecommunications and information 
services is a vast and rapidly growing industry. In 1990, global 
sales in telecommunications equipment and services were estimated 
by the U. S. National Telecommunications Information 
Administration to reach US$ 540-billion, in an overall world 
information trade worth more than US$ 830-billion-*[Adams 1988: 
55]. The vast majority of this trade is conducted by 
multinational corporations and takes place within the urban and 
industrial sectors of the developed world, although rapid growth 
in the sector is also projected in the underdeveloped countries. 
The Caribbean Association of National Telecommunications 
Organizations (CANTO) estimated that between 1988 and 1993, 
telecommunications expenditure by sixteen national service 
providers, in the region would exceed US$ 3.5 
-billion [CANTO 
1987: 3]. 
In 1985,, in the early stages of this burgeoning growth'in 
global telecommunications trade and investment, the International 
Commission 
-for Worldwide Telecommunications Development [ICWTD] 
highlighted the acute inequality in the global distribution of 
telecommunications services. We have already referred in Chapter 
2 to the contrasting statistics in service provision between the 
underdeveloped and the industrialised countries. But among the 
other issues brought to the fore by ýthe Commission's Maitland 
Report was the question of the extent to which telecommunications 
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contributed to the process of national development. -And while 
the Commission came out in strong endorsement of the view that 
telecommunications could play a major role in economic and social 
development, earlier debate on the issue was far less clear-cut. 
While finding a co-relation between personal wealth and 
telephone usage, earlier studies failed to convince both 
government planners and international lending agencies that 
investment in telecommunications gave rise to macro-economic 
growth. Hardy's model, described by Hudson, attempted to use time 
series analysis and co-relational data to establish the 
contribution of telecommunication investment to growth, using per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) measurements. While the 
model showed that a higher telephone density preceded economic 
development, it left open the probability that overall economic 
development itself contributed to telecommunications expansion, 
as more resources were released for investment in the sector 
[Hudson 1985: 195-196]. 
Other studies (Leff 1984, Wellenius 1984, Gille 1986] have 
linked both industrial growth and rural development with 
increased telecommunications investment in underdeveloped 
countries. However, it was a study by Charles Jonscher of small 
business operations in Costa Rica which was among the most 
impactful in pointing out the specific productivity gains to be 
derived in specific sectors, such as rural communities, from 
increased investment in basic telecommunications Cionscher 
1987: 46]. Earlier studies by Saunders, Warford and Wellenius 
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(1983],, Hudson (1984] and Jonscher [1985] focussed governmental 
attention on the under-funding, of the sector compared with its 
importance in both the national and global development contexts. 
According to Jonscher', I "The I importance of -the 
telecommunications network arises from the fact that it provides 
the backbone of the information infrastructure of a country" 
since it provides the "basic facility through which the 
information needs of government, industry and commerce can be 
satisfied. " [1985: 22]. Commenting particularly on the potential 
ECONOXIC advantages of improved telecommunications, Jonscher 
postulates that "the principle that speedy communication leads to 
efficient market operation is as true for village trading as for 
international commodity dealing. " However, he notes that the 
tendency for rural areas to be neglected in the growth of 
national telecommunication infrastructures often had important 
negative effects on agriculture. Telecommunication services can 
help farmers to "arrange for timely supplies, effective 
collection of produce and access to agricultural information". It 
can also provide the infrastructure for instructional broadcasts 
to rural farming communities (Jonscher 1985: 23]. 
Heather Hudson, in supporting this point of view, argues 
that the large multinational companies are unwilling to take the 
risks perceived to be involved in investment in rural 
telecommunications, preferring instead the relatively more well 
known terrain of the urban business users. But she cites studies 
to show that both social and economic benefits of investment in 
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telecommunications may be greatest in rural and remote 
areas [Hudson 1985: 195]. She notes that "where telecommunications 
services are available, rural people often use them more heavily 
and spend more of their disposable incomes on telephone calls and 
telegraph than do city dwellers" [1985: 198]. This is basically 
because in most cases the only alternative means of communicating 
quickly or frequently is by making trips 
- 
an exercise which is 
often both expensive and time-consuming. Put in economic termst 
Hudson is indicating that benefits per telephone are likely to be 
greater where telephone density is lowest. 
In their 1983 World Bank study, Saunders, Warford and 
Wellenius pointed to evidence which suggests "that with a 
reliable telecommunications system, new communication is 
generated, and stronger, more complex and more productive 
communication patterns built up, partly through direct and 
indirect interaction with numerous- production and distribution 
functions. " The study noted that in developing countries there 
was "a large excess demand for telecommunication services, and 
the measurable return on the investment required to provide those 
services are relatively high. "[1983: 14]. 
Despite this, in its 1985 report to the ITU, the Maitland 
Commission noted that "in a majority of developing countries, 
the telecommunications system is inadequate to sustain essential 
services. In large 'tracts of territory, there is no system at 
all. " [ICWTD 1985: 3]. The Commission recommended that "The 
telecommunication system in a developing country can be used not 
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only to disseminate information of immediate importance on a 
national scale, but also as a channel for educationy for 
strengthening the social fabric, for enriching the national 
culture. " In addition to its essential role in emergencies and in 
health care, the Maitland Commission regards telecommunications 
as increasing "the efficiency of public administration,, commerce 
and other economic activities. " 
Schmandt, Williams and Wilson [1989: 6] argued that the 
benefits of telecommunications for economic development may be 
viewed in at least two ways. One is the traditional state-centric 
approach, in which telecommunications inputs are viewed in light 
of their contribution to government's economic development 
programmes. This approach involves schemes to attract investment 
or promote business development within a state. The second 
approach, however, has a broader economic focus, which seeks to 
use telecommunications to enhance the productive capacity of the 
economy as a whole. In this approach, telecommunications is 
regarded as a factor of production in the economy, essential to 
all-round economic growth. 
It would appear that the appeal of these arguments for 
telecommunications to be deployed in the service of economic and 
social development, depends to a large extent on whether the 
leading operators have a vested interest in the balanced and 
integrated development of the country or whether the basis of the 
involvement is primarily one of financial return on investment. 
In the view of Nathaniel Leff, the financial returns approach 
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often understate the social benefit and externalities to be 
derived from the integration of telecommunications in national 
development. 
Leff contends that evaluation of the advantages of 
telecommunications should not be confined simply to financial 
criteria, because socio-economic and political conditions in many 
developing countries often create substantial market 
imperfections. As a result, market prices of some inputs do not 
reflect their scarcity, and hence their true social cost. Instead 
he advocates the use of the more diverse methodology of Social 
Benefit Cost Analyses (SBCA). The approach recognises that "if a 
factor is used in one project, it cannot be used in another; 
hence the benefits foregone indicate the factors true cost. " The 
concept is also applicable to output, where value is defined in 
terms of the project's contribution towards attaining the 
country's basic socio-economic objectives [Leff 1984: 219]. While 
conducting his study on behalf of the World Bank, Leff appears to 
question the extent to which the techniques were applied in the 
Bank's own decision-making processes. 
Synopsis 
While earlier studies failed to establish direct causation 
between telecommunications investment and economic developmentr a 
succession of more recent studies have indicated a positive 
co-relation between increased telecommunications provisions and 
the level of productivity in certain sectors such as rural 
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agriculture and small business operation. At the, same time, many 
of these studies have shown the global inequality between the 
telecommunications rich and poor, corresponding to the countries 
of the global Centre and those of the periphery respectively. 
Within countries, the gross disparity between telecommunications 
investment in-urban areas compared to the sparcity of services in 
the rural and agricultural sectors has also been highlighted. 
Most of these studies have in common a call for greater 
multilateral investment support for telecommunications in 
underdeveloped territories, and especially in support of rural 
and agricultural sectors in the global and national peripheries. 
8.2 
- 
CARIBBEAN TELECOMS AND DEVELOPMENT 
In the Caribbean, while several regional non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have attempted to use telecommunications to 
supplement overall development programmes, responsibility for the 
sector rests within the domain of the state. However, there is 
little to suggest that governments regard telecommunications as 
performing any special role in development, despite occasional 
rhetorical claims. With little active governmental support, 
the NGO efforts have been sporadic and their progress slow and 
unstable. They are adversely affected by high commercial tariffs 
as well as inadequate regional policy commitment and limited 
effective control over the network decision-making. 
Among the more widely recognised Caribbean projects founded 
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on the use of telecommunication for the collective benefit of the 
Caribbean is the University of the West Indies Distance Teaching 
Experiment (UWIDITE). The project enables interactive distance 
teaching at the tertiary level by linking the three main campuses 
of the regional university in Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados by 
way of a leased network. The network also extends, though on a 
less reliable basis, to university extra-mural centres in six 
other eastern Caribbean territories. In its first five yearst 
over 20 specialised courses had been taught, using the system to 
link students across the region to lecturers who were available 
in one territory only. It also enabled multi-point linkups to 
take place among university administrators across the region, 
reducing the necessity and cost for physical travel. 
Although in operation since March 1983, the UWIDITE system 
remains in an 'experimental' mode, with very little modification 
and no major equipment replacement in the last seven years. In 
circumstances where telecommunications costs, even at a 20% 
discount, represent a third of the project's cost, severe 
financial difficulties have led to stagnation in both technology 
and scope. This is reflected in the continued use of aging slow 
scan equipment and remote loudspeakers, and frequent breakdown 
both of on-site equipment and transmission links [Lalor-and 
Marrett 1986 : 21-22]. 
The UWIDITE telecommunications project 
-not only maximises 
the use of scarce teaching resources in certain fields, but also 
makes a positive contribution to regional integration by allowing 
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simultaneous exchange of student and teacher inputs relating to 
common regional problems. Its benefits can be as broad as the 
range of courses and conferences which it -hosts. But its 
integrative and development potential has been stifled by 
inadequate resourcing. 
Two other regional services relying heavily on leased 
telecommunications facilities are the Caribbean News Agency 
(CANA) and the regional television programmes exchange system, 
CARIBSCOPE, operated by the Caribbean Broadcasting Union (CBU). 
Both projects aim at increasing the flow of'regional news and 
programming, and were founded in response to the dominant foreign 
media content which pervaded the post-colonial Caribbean. In the 
case of television programme content, successive studies found 
imported material increasing significantly. "Moving from an 
average of 77% imported content in 1976 to an average of 87% in 
1986, the annual increase of 1% though incremental, is 
cumulatively potentially devastating and detrimental to regional 
culture. "[Brown 1987: 19, See also Hosein 1976] 
It is this problem that the CARIBVISION project seeks to 
address, according to Terrence Holder, Director General of the 
CBU. "Telecommunications is everything to us, because if-in 
fact we are to exchange material and open a window on the 
Caribbean so Caribbean people can know what is going on in the 
other territories, we need to have some speedy channel. 
- 
If it 
were not for telecommunications we would have to send our 
materials by aircraft, a method which I think is archaic. We are 
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dealing with a commodity that is perishable and we have to move 
it fromýone place to another within the shortest possible time. 
So, we depend almost totally on telecommunication if we are to be 
effective.,, [Holder, Interview 3/10/89]. 
Holder points out that to their credit, some of the region's 
national telecommunications companies were involved in the 
initial establishment of the CARIBVISION project. He notest 
however, that despite CARIBVISIONIS heavy reliance - on 
telecommunications, and the strategic importance of, the project 
to the region, several of these national telecommunications 
service providers as well as the regional external, carrier Cable 
and Wireless, still do not as yet see themselves as sharing 
responsibility to the people of the region to provide the 
CARIBVISION service at affordable rates. "We are talking 
about the costs of satellite services. It has got to come to a 
stage where we can use them without later having to close down 
the organization. Even in cases where the governments have had 
majority or outright ownership, we have not had the kind of 
concessionary rates which are necessary if we are to develop 
regional broadcasting. " (Interview, Holder, 3/10/89). 
But besides the need for what Holder describes as greater 
partnership and commitment from the telecommunications sector, he 
confronts an equally important structural problem: "The problem 
is that CBU is a regional organization, and in terms of 
telecommunications, the, organizations 'are in fact-national and 
not regional. So the CBU is dealing with BET in Barbados, Textel 
- 
332 
- 
in Trinidad and Jamintel in Jamaica. So the CBU has not had any 
dialogue with any regional telecommunication organization in this 
respect. But we do try to draw them individually into our policy 
planning process. " [Interview,, Holder: 2/10/89]. 
A similar set of difficulties exist in the operation of the 
Caribbean News Agency, CANA. Since the start of its operation in 
1976, CANA's regional coverage recorded an annual average 
increase of 48.5% on the previous volume of regional coverage 
circulated by its predecessor, REUTERS. Heavy telecommunications 
costs and other recurrent expenditures, however, constrain the 
agency's future contribution to regional development. The 
Managing Director of CANA, Richard Henderson says the agency has 
to rely on Cable and Wireless and the national carriers to 
deliver its products. "But we find their costs tremendously 
prohibitive for us to venture too far out into the world or even 
outlying areas of the region itself. For example, 'we have never 
been able to serve Belize as we would, wish, although Belize is, a 
CARICOM member state, because of the high'telecoms cost,, for 
dedicated wire service circuits, for rental of printers and the 
purchase of teleprinter paper. - So when we add the total cost, 
that is the basis on which we have to bill our subscribers. " 
[Henderson, Interview: 5/10/89). 
The CANA Managing Director observed that as commercial 
companies, regional telecommunications carriers have to seek to 
make a profit. Cable and Wireless, for example, benefitted from 
the charges for providing the teleprinter links between the 
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islands. But he noted that the company had become engaged in a 
renewed drive in recent years: "What I found interesting enough 
is that in the last couple of year, Cable and Wireless, perhaps 
recognizing that computer terminals are the likely outcome of 
communications technology, seems to be buying back their original 
shares and even more in the telephone companies of the Caribbean. 
So if circuits become redundant as a means of delivery for CANA's 
teleprinter services, they will catch us on the telephone charges 
in relation to computer dial-up for users to gain access to 
CANA's computer system. So they catch us both ways. " [Hendersont 
Interview: 5/10/89]. 
Synopsis 
What the UWIDITE, CARIBVISION and CANA projects have in 
common is their heavy reliance on telecommunications and the 
difficulties associated with the absence of adequate regional 
resourcing and failure to fully exploit their significant 
development potential. The projects are very much the kinds of 
ventures which Cable and Wireless, as an external profit-making 
corporation can legitimately regard as outside its primary 
responsibility. This fact is in itself a disadvantage stemming 
from dominant external control of the inter-island network. But 
equally, the regional governments who owned the national 
telecommunications companies, have also failed to regard such 
projects and others, as part of the integrative and development 
tools of the region. 
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However, as we noted earlier, regional economic integration 
can also operate to the disadvantage of the less developed 
partners or rural areas within the community. Problems of 
polarization of development towards the more advanced areas can 
distort rather than facilitate economic development. This concern 
was among the initial reservations of the LDCs at the CARIFTA 
stage of the regional integration process. Shields and Samarajiva 
[1990: 205] have similarly pointed out that the use of 
telecommunications to help achieve national or regional 
integration is also not an unproblematic proposition. ' "The- fact 
that integration detracts from the rights of rural communities to 
define their development priorities is [often] ignored. For 
example, there is a very strong likelihood that improved two-way 
communication between the city and the hinterland may result in 
the ruin of the local traders in the short term and the 
incorporation of hitherto relatively self-contained 
politico-economic entities in the long term. "[Shields and 
Samarajiva, 1990: 205]. 
These observations particularly have to be taken into 
account where the integration process involves sovereign states, 
such as in the Caribbean. But it should also be recognised that 
integration, by its very character, involves trade-offs. And 
where adequate planning and regulation accompany the processo, 
existing values can either be preserved or even combined with new 
ideas and practices. Communication channels are indeed carriers 
of both information and power, but the imbalance in the flow of 
both can be moderated if the danger is consciously acknowledged 
- 
335 
- 
in the planning, monitoring and regulatory processes. 
8.3 
- 
THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL PRIORITIES 
Although telecommunications is widely accepted as a catalyst 
to economic growth and an important interactive link within and 
between societies and groups, it is not universally regarded as 
automatically deserving of highest priority in the allocation of 
investment resources in developing countries. As the Caribbean 
cases demonstrate, governments appear to remain sceptical about 
how far telecommunications should receive priority attention. In 
common with the World Bank approach, Leff maintained that 
"projects in other sectors (e. g. nutrition, education, industry, 
agriculture etc) can also make strong claims to being crucial for 
development. "[1984: 217] 
However, he expects that social benefit cost analyses (SBCA) 
could advance deserving telecommunications programmes to the 
fore, especially if planners used an appropriate equity 
weighting, by which a higher value is assigned to projects that 
favour an LDC's poorer people or disadvantaged status. Leff notes 
that despite the World Bank's promotion of research on SBCA, 
there has been no change in the Bank's own allocational policy, 
which applies financial rate of return' criteria to 
telecommunications projects [Leff 1984: 221]. In the Caribbean, 
where the World Bank, together with the IMF perform what Leff 
calls its "instructional role in developing countries" [1984: 
218]f it is not surprising that telecommunications receives a 
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relatively low priority. In the World Bank itselft one 
consequence of this constricted approach to resource allocation 
is a traditionally low level of loans disbursement for 
telecommunications projects, which moved from 3.6 % of loans in 
1980 to 1% in 1986. 
Caribbean policy-makers do face harsh competing claims on 
the limited available resources. But as Leff, Hudson, Saunders 
and others indicate, the choice is not simply between 
telecommunications and other sectors, since telecommunications 
is not an end in itself. Greater resource allocation to 
telecommunications can yield beneficial returns in other sectors 
of social need, such as education or transport, agricultural 
extension work or in the high foreign exchange earning sector of 
tourism. In the CARICOM region, where the average penetration 
rate is 12.16 lines per 100 of population compared with 78.4 in 
the United States,, 
-there remains extensive scope for network 
growth and improved service delivery. (See Table 10) 
At the same time, the nature of the telecommunications 
technology and services will need to be appropriate to the 
conditions facing the countries and the region as a whole, and 
not just the commercial interests of the supplier or external 
carrier. According to Girvan, "the adequacy of the relationship 
between technology and development is 
.. 
measured as a function of 
the degree of local resource use and resource development, and 
the extent of local needs satisfaction. " (1983: 12]. But whereas 
with telecommunications in the Caribbean, the cost of indigenous 
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research and development (R&D) is-prohibitive, there is all the 
more need for explicit technology policies including the methods 
and terms for technology transfer. 
In addressing this issue, the Commonwealth Working Group on 
Technological Change points out that for policies and 
technologies to be appropriate, they need to fit with the size 
and technology base of the economy concerned. "Small states, the 
islands of the Pacific, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean, have 
a high degree of dependence on imported technology. For them, 
technology policy involves the selection of a small number of 
high priority areas for technology development where the 
acquisition of local competence is crucial, possible and 
inexpensive, 
-with a strong emphasis on regional collaboration to 
spread the overhead costs of R&D, training and education. Where 
there is reliance on foreign technology, small states can develop 
a capacity for gathering information, forecasting major 
technology changes which affect principal export products, 
selecting appropriate technology importst bargaining and 
absorbing technical knowledge. " (1985: 81]. 
The strategic importance of telecommunications to the 
Caribbean would recommend it as a suitable industry for treatment 
in the latter category. But its effect on labour displacement, 
will also need to be carefully taken into account. While Computer 
Based Message Systems (CBMS) and Electronic Funds Transfer [EFTs] 
networks, for example, may facilitate the large urban business 
users such as multinational banks and major corporations, the 
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TABLE 10 
----------------------------------- 
TELEPHONE PENETRATION RATES 
------------------------------ 
IN CARICOM 
- 
1989 
----------------------------------- 
Country 
------- 
------------------------------ 
Lines/100 of pop 
---------------- 
Antigua 7.2 
Barbados 28.1 
Bahamas 23.0 
Belize 6.0 
Dominica 9.9 
Guyana 4.0 
Grenada 4.1 
Jamaica 3.5 
Xontserrat 25.9 
St Kitts 15#7 
St Lucia 8.3 
St Vincent' 9.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 13.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------- CARICOM AVERAGE 12.16 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
USA AVERAGE (1982)* 78.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------- Sources : Complied from Cable and Wireless Statistics 
and Interviews, Dec 1989. 
* AT&T 
- 
The world's Telephones, 1982 
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effect on job-loss in unemployment-ridden economies could offset 
any gains invol4ed. And while the infrastructure for these 
advanced facilities are multiplied in the developed parts of the 
region, the very low levels of penetration of the ordinary 
telephone in rural areas and in some less developed territories 
often means exclusion of large sections of the population from 
the network or their reliance on the century old telegram service 
technology. The duality of such resource allocation could result 
in telecommunications undermining rather than enhancing regional 
integration and balanced development. 
8.4 
- 
SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
In 1989, Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited maintained 
operations under franchise from the governments of 15 regional 
territories. The specific levels of the company's involvement in 
different Caribbean countries vary, as set out in Table 11. This 
shows that in nine of these territories, Cable and Wireless had a 
100% ownership which was reflected in a monopoly of both domestic 
and overseas telecom services in these countries. In five other 
territories it is the majority shareholder or managing partner, 
and in the remaining country, which operates its own local 
telephone company, Cable and Wireless is the monopoly owner of 
the overseas service. 
In addition, the company owns the transmission network 
linking the territories of the region, and the main links between 
the region and the rest of the world. Cable and Wireless also now 
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holds majority control of the data-processing and teleport 
facility called Jamaica Digiport International (JDI), based in 
Montego Bay, Jamaica and is sole owner of a similar but smaller 
facility in St Lucia. The company originally held 35 % equity in 
the JDI consortium, in which the American telecommunications 
giant AT&T also held 35%. Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ)r 
then a majority-owned government company, held the remaining 30% 
of the shares. However, since JDI's establishment in 1988, Cable 
and Wireless has secured majority ownership 'in TOJ, thereby 
effectively also acquiring majority control of JDI. 
. 
Ironically, the original idea of a high technology data 
processing and transmission facility in Jamaica, the first of its 
kind in the English-speaking Caribbean, neither originated with 
nor involved Cable and Wireless. The original project involved 
Teleport International, a consortium of United States and 
Japanese companies. These included the former Continental 
Telephone Companyl now CONTEL; American Satellite Corporation 
(ASC), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, and C. Itoh. The project 
collapsed in 1988, however, after an appeal court in the United 
States overruled a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
permission for the consortium to use U. S. domestic satellite 
services provided by ASC. 
According to Demac and Morrison "the Court noted that 1981 
State Department guidelines for international use of U. S. domsats 
established two criteria for authorising transborder services. 
These were that the INTELSAT system be unable to provide the 
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services at issue; or that use of the INTELSAT system would be 
'clearly uneconomical or impractical,. It held that the FCC 
decision had not adequately met these criteria. " [Demac and 
Morrison 1989: 56], 
Before the Teleport crisis flowing from this ruling emerged, 
however, Cable and Wireless began to take its own defensive 
action to secure an independent presence in the potentially 
lucrative data-processing business in a region where the company 
otherwise dominated. In late 1988, Cable and Wireless opened its 
own teleport facility in St Lucia, "in advance of the overall 
transmission plan" [Cable and Wireless 1989: 6]. However, the 
collapse of the Teleport project opened the way for Cable and 
Wireless' involvement in the Montego Bay facility, in a new 
consortium with TOJ and AT&T. 
Synopsis 
This situation has left Cable and Wireless with control not 
only of the traditional voice telephony of the region but also 
over the data transmission business. Competition from teleport 
facilities in the Dominican Republic and the Dutch Antilles for 
the processing of coupons and directories, for reservation and 
telemarketing services, computer mapping (CAD), programming and 
text editing from the U. S. market will determine the rate of 
growth of the Cable and Wireless controlled data facilities 
in both Montego Bay and Castries. The initially, competition 
- 
motivated duplication of these facilities in a region with a 
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TABLE 11 
---------------------------------------- 
; 
-------------------- ------ 
C&W CARIBBEAN OWNERSHIP OF TELECOM 
--- ------------------------------------------------------------- 
Percentage of C&W Ownership'in 
Country Local Telco Overseas Carrier 
------- ----------- ---------------- 
Anguilla 100 100 
Antigua 0 100 
Barbados 60 65 
Bermuda 100 100 
Br. Virgin Is. 100 100 
Cayman Is. 100 100 
Dominica 100 100 
Grenada 49* 49* 
Jamaica 79* 79* 
Xontserrat 100 100 
St Kitts 80* 80* 
St Lucia 100 100 
St Vincent 100 100 
Trinidad & Tobago 49 49 
Turks Is. 100 100 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Complied from Interviews: Nov-Jan 1989-90 and Company 
Records, Companies House 1990. 
* Single merged company. 
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deteriorating basic telephone service and massive subscriber 
waiting lists, demonstrates the absenceý of adequate regional 
planning, technology transfer or regulatory control. The flow of 
business to both the Montego Bay and the St Lucia facilities was 
very slow in 1989 with a projection of further uncertainty in the 
face of a downturn-in the United States marketplace as well as 
inadequate advance training arrangements for local data entry'and 
other personnel. 
8.4.1 
- 
The Transmission Network 
The chain of islands in the Eastern Caribbean are linked by 
a Cable and Wireless-owned Digital Eastern Caribbean Microwave 
System (DECXS) spanning 1200 kilometres from the British Virgin 
Islands in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south. 
Illustrated in Figure 2, this modern digital 'system has an 
ultimate capacity of the equivalent of 10,000 voice channels. The 
new system was completed in April 1989, and replaced the initial 
analogue microwave radio system introduced in 1977. The old 
system carried 960 voice channels and also provided the Eastern 
Caribbean with the broadband capacity-to receive international 
television transmissions. The microwave relay was itself 
preceded by a tropospheric scatter system capable of providing 
some 80 voice circuits. Throughout these successive changest the 
technology, equipment and 'routes had remained in the same 
ownership, that of Cable and Wireless, and its antecedent British 
companies since 1877, when the West India and Panama Telegraph 
Company was first launched. 
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The establishment of an effective communication system 
by microwave radio spanning the extensive distances between some 
Eastern Caribbean islands, and covering the total expanse of 
about 800 miles was considered a unique and considerable feat of 
engineering by Cable and Wireless. This was undertaken by the 
company despite it being "difficult to justify commercially" 
[Barty-King 1979: 354). Why then did the company incur its share 
of the EC $14-million involved. According to Barty-King, the 
company's own historian, the achievement was "a useful sales tool 
when it came to selling systems in the future". In addition, he 
noted the political considerations involved in investing at a 
time when a large number of Caribbean territories were achieving 
political independence in a region which was likely to require 
"a modern telecommunication system 
... 
to attract trade and 
commerce and so improve the economy. " It would not have been the 
first time that experimental ventures with a global potential 
were first tested in the microcoým of the Company's Caribbean 
network. 
The telecommunication traffic into and out of the modern 
Caribbean now proceeds by way of at least three routes. As 
indicated by the map at Figure 3. the northern end of the Digital 
Eastern Caribbean Microwave System (DECMS) in Tortola joins the 
Bermuda-Tortola Fibre Optic Cable to Bermuda. At Bermuda, 
linkage to both North America and Europe is effected through the 
newly built Private TransAtlantic Telecommunications Systems, 
Inc. (PTAT), owned by Cable and Wireless and operated by its 
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Figure 2 
Source: Cable and Wireless 
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U. K. subsidiary Xercury. This route via Bermuda and North America 
to Europe was initially charted for the now obsolescent low 
capacity submarine cables of the colonially inspired Atlantic 
Telegraph Company and the West India and Panama Company. 
An alternative cable routing out of the region is via 
Jamaica, using the predominantly American engineered Trans 
Caribbean System (TCS-1). The system's fibre optic cable extends 
from Florida in the United States to Puerto Rico, and the 
Dominican Republic, where it branches west to Jamaica and South 
to Columbia. The network, which was scheduled for completion in 
April 1990,, represents the first significant modern alternative 
to the historical dominance of Cable and Wireless overseas 
transmission facilities in the region. Yet, as can be seen from 
the map at Figure 4, it particularly covers that non- 
English-speaking part of the- region which is most closely 
associated with United States dominance or corporate priority. 
In this regard, as with the initial submarine cables of the 
British, TCS-l not only by-passes but actually circumvents Cuba, 
which, under the U. S. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
classifications, is politically unacceptable. The TCS-1,, 
therefore, perpetuates the long-standing political criteria for 
the configuration of Caribbean telecommunications infrastructure. 
And by not extending the TCS-l link into the south eastern 
Caribbean, the American policy-makers also appear to be unwilling 
to challenge the historical and contemporary control of Cable and 
Wireless over the transmission facilities linking the 
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English-speaking Caribbean to the rest of the world. 
The TCS-1 System, as Demac and Morrison suggest, is aimed at 
providing infra-structural support for American economic 
objectives articulated in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) of 
1983. Despite the provision of preferential access to certain US 
products and services, "the CBI has not generated the expected 
growth in commercial ventures, partly due to corporate concerns 
regarding unreliable and otherwise insufficient channels in the 
Caribbean for transmitting voice and data.,, [Demac and Morrison 
1989: 52]. The response to this situation,, in the form of TCS-1, 
bears close parallel with the objectives which motivated the 
British, nearly a century and quarter earlier to establish their 
communication network in the English-speaking region. It is the 
dominance of this older European-oriented telecommunications 
system which has itself given rise to such corporate concerns in 
the new American imperial centre. 
However, the ownership of TCS-1 suggests that a wider range of 
extra-regional telecommunications interests are in the vanguard 
of this new American led imperialism, and not the monopoly thrust 
of the earlier British colonial venture. Among TCS-1 owners are 
AT&Tr U. S. Sprint, MCI International and its two associated 
companies RCA Global Transoceanic and Western Union. At the same 
time, Cable and Wireless itself, and its major subsidiaries in 
the region, (JAMINTEL, TEXTEL and BET), have also secured 
minority equity participation in the venture based on the need 
for interconnectivity between the networks which they operate and 
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Ficiure 3 
Source: Cable and Wireless 
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the new TCS-1 system. 
For the majority of Caribbean governments and PTTs, howeverr 
the policy procedure by which TCS-l was established, was, as in 
the colonial past, externally imposed and without consultation: 
"Little formal attempt was made during the transcaribbean cable 
proceedings ibefore the FCC-HDI to obtain information directly 
from Caribbean agencies, although national telecommunications 
officials could have provided valuable data on existing 
facilities and on the importance different countries were giving 
to telecommunications in the broader scope of national economic 
planning. " [Demac and Morrison 1989: 54]. 
If Cable and Wireless, despite increasing American and other 
challenges, still controls the main submarine cable and microwave 
transmission routes into and out of the Caribbean, the company 
also dominates in the ownership of the regional satellite 
transceiving facilities which form a third means of external 
telecommunications. Satellite earth stations in Jamaica, Barbados 
Antigua and Jamaica are part of the assets of Cable and Wireless 
subsidiaries, and one in Trinidad is part of an associate company 
of which C&W is now the managing partner. With the exception of 
the purpose-built teleport facilities, the regional earth stations 
were built as part of the analogue system, but are being upgraded 
for digital transmission. They carry traffic into and out of the 
region via the INTELSAT system, in which all the national 
carriers are investors. But before the messages reach the 
national systems they must pass through a satellite receiving 
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network predominantly owned by Cable and Wireless. 
8.5 
- 
EXTERNALLY IMPOSED POLICY 
As the foregoing sections demonstrate, Caribbean states do 
not have formal regional telecommunications policies in 
operation. Instead, their unstated policy involves individual 
reliance on Cable and Wireless for leadership in network 
planning, investment and development, in the expectation that 
what is in the regional and global corporate interest of the 
company, will also redound to the benefit of the Caribbean. 
Despite the existence of a Telecommunications Desk in the CARICOM 
headquarters in Guyana, the company was until recently the sole 
operating entity with a region-wide scope for strategic planning 
and co-ordination. 
In announcing, for example, a US $200-million investment 
programme in digital technology for the Caribbean area, the 
company stated: "As the Group operates in so many locations, 
it has been possible to co-ordinate centrally all the 
improvements on a regional basis, so that network flexibility and 
compatibility are assured. The digitalization of the region will 
lay the groundwork for the introduction of ISDN (Integrated 
Services Digital Network) 
... 
By the time THE GROUP (my emphasis) 
introduces ISDN, the Caribbean will have leap-frogged a whole 
epoch in the evolution of telecommunications technology into the 
age of information. " [C&W 1988 : 1]. 
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This scheme, while well intentioned on the part of the 
company, had not been'subject to any long-term evaluation of its 
overall implications for the region. The system configuration was 
not derived from any regional planning objectives. Its 
introduction into the region was not policy-directed, in 
Caribbean terms, but technology led and integrated only into the 
global corporate strategy of the external multinational 
corporation. As we noted earlier, similar external economic and 
geo-political factors also determined in 1989, the introduction 
and configuration of the Trans Caribbean (TCS-1) System led by 
AT&T and other American, British and Japanese investors. It 
appears that policy-making and implementation in modern Caribbean 
telecommunications, varies little from the previous era when 
fulfillment of British strategic and colonial objectives, was 
paramount. 
If Cable and Wireless still exercises decisive leadership 
in long term investment and network strategies for the Caribbean, 
so too is its dominance over the mechanics of annual financial 
expenditures and planning. In a field interview, the retired 
General Manager of Cable and Wireless in Barbados between 1970 
and 1984, Xr Paul Carrington, described how, as a local manager 
he was required in the normal company practice, to relate to 
corporate headquarters in London: "Financially,, of course, we had 
to produce a budget every year and within that budget there was a 
capital expenditure forecast which needed to be approved or 
otherwise, by the Director responsible for the Caribbean. Then,, 
as part of the budget were the operational plans which again 
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required the approval of the Director, who had his own business 
operational unit in London to look at these things. I guess he 
would look at that in the context of his regional responsibility 
and see whether what I wanted to do was consistent with his 
regional plan. " [Carrington,, Interview 3/10/89]. 
In our earlier discussion of mechanisms for multinational 
control, we noted that irrespective of legal control, MNC 
headquarters frequently exercised operational direction through 
control of budgetary and investment decision-making. In the 
account of Xr Carrington, we see that Cable and Wireless was no 
exception. And the former General Manager indicated that there 
was no reason to believe that these mechanisms of operational 
control from the headquarters in London had changed significantly 
since the end of his incumbency. Indeed, the Cable and Wireless 
Director for North America and the Caribbean addresses regular 
annual meetings of managers of Group subsidiary companies, where 
he directs and co-ordinates budgetary planning with corporate 
regional and global strategies. 
The setting of rates of return on investment as well as the 
level of tariffs for telecommunications services are also areas 
in which a vacuum of collective regional planning, permits Cable 
and Wireless to negotiate separate commercial deals with 
individual governments. In the case of Barbados, the former 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Telecommunications and 
Transport, Xr C. M. Thompson indicates that while applications for 
increases in local telephone rates are considered by a Public 
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Utilities Board (PUB), no such procedure is applied for increases 
in the tariffs charged for external telecommunications. Overseas 
rate increases are approved at ministerial level. [Thompson, 
interview ý5/10/89]. This arrangement, subject to no public 
scrutiny and reduced likelihood of controversy, is favoured by 
the company. Accordingly, Cable and Wireless has managed to 
negotiate an extension of this approach to the setting of local 
rates to the arrangements in their Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago operations. 
Besides demonstrating the power and control of Cable and 
Wireless in the region, 'these arrangements are consistent with 
our argument that telecommunications policy is often a secret 
process, inhibiting public participation and re-inforcing elite 
control over policy. Such approaches are likely to increase with 
the growth of privatization and the attendant justification of 
secrecy on the basis of safeguarding corporate information 
against the competition. But in the process, important groups 
affected by these decisions are excluded from direct input, 
participation and access to relevant information. The situation 
of secrecy and separate negotiations militates against rational 
collective policy making in the region. 
8.6 
- 
IMF, DIVESTMENTS AND RATES OF RETURN 
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The company's rate of return on its investment is not 
subject to market conditions, as privatization would suggest. Nor 
is it indexed to the movement of costs or specific economic 
indicators. Instead, thýe* rate of return is negotiated with 
individual governments and the agreed level inserted as a legal 
guarantee in the overall bi-lateral contractual arrangements. In 
its shareholders agreement with the government of Trinidad and 
Tobago it is provided that "The company shall be permitted to 
earn on its Domestic operations an annual return of fifteen 
percent (15%) on the rate base. " (Trinidad Guardian,, January 19,, 
1990: 1] This 15%, according to the Agreement will be derived 
from domestic revenues after meeting all operating and 
maintenance expenses, all annual depreciation allowances and 
after meeting all taxes other than Trinidad and Tobago 
Corporation tax. The rate base itself is calculated on the value 
of fixed assets less depreciation provisions and a contribution 
towards construction costs. 
Under the Agreement, the provision on rate of return was 
required to be converted into law. The exact wording of the 
legislation was drafted and included as Schedule 6 of the 
Agreement, which issues "Instructions to the Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel to prepare a Bill to amend the Trinidad and 
Tobago Telephone Act.. " Among the amendments will be provisions 
that "the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) will be obliged to 
fix the tariffs chargeable by the company for its domestic 
operations at such rates that will result in a 15% return on the 
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rate base... " In addition, under the agreement "The Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel will present the proposed legislation in 
draft form- to the company and CWWI (Cable and Wireless West 
Indies Limited 
- 
HD) for their consent prior to presentation to 
Parliament. " [Schedule 6 of Agreement, quoted in Trinidad 
Guardian 19-1-90 : 1]. 
The occasion for this apparent dictation of terms to 
government was the company's acquisition of 49% of the shares 
of the Trinidad and Tobago Telephone Company (TELCO), at a cost 
of US$ 85-million. The first installment of US$ 50-million was to 
go directly to government revenues as a repayment for an earlier 
loan to TELCO. Part of this was to be paid "in U. S. dollars to 
the account of the Government at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. Of the remainder, a sum of US$15-million was also to be 
paid to the Government in advance of its due date, in the form of 
a loan. This deal with Cable and Wireless was struck in the wake 
of a foreign exchange shortage in Trinidad, where part of the 
money was urgently'required to meet external payments in advance 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) performance evaluations of 
the Trinidad economy. 
In these circumstances, it is difficult to discern policy 
from economic necessity, but the Trinidad government maintains 
that its sale of 49% of the previously wholly government-owned 
TELCO was a deliberate shift in policy towards partial 
divestment. Numerous bids from foreign investors were considered, 
but the Cabinet agreed to the sale to Cable and Wireless as the 
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most suitable applicant. The company's success in gaining a hold 
on TELCO was consistent with similar successes in Jamaica and 
Grenada where it increased its equity in restructured holding 
companies which incorporate both the local telephone and the 
overseas telecommunications companies. 
In Jamaica,, moves aimed at a merger between the largely 
state-owned telephone company, JATELCO, and the overseas carrier 
JAMINTEL were initiated "as a result of negotiations in 1987 
between the government and C&W. 11 [Telecommunications of Jamaica 
1988: 6]. At that time, Cable and Wireless had a 49 % stake in 
JAMINTEL and no equity participation in the larger JATELCO. The 
negotiations concluded in July 1987 with the formation of 
Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (TOJ), in which government 
retained 53.1 %. Cable and Wireless obtained a 39 % equity 
holding in the merged company, thereby extending its investment 
beyond the overseas operating company and into the local 
telephone service. The remaining 7.9% of TOJ shares were owned by 
employees and members of the public. A legally guaranteed rate of 
return was also fixed, but at the higher level of "between 17 and 
20 per cent" of the rate base. (Interview, Noel Rickards, 
President, Jamaica Telephone Company, 26/10/90. ] 
In 1989,, government sold a further 20% of its holding in TOJ 
to Cable and Wireless, as a result of which the company became 
the majority shareholder with 59% of the TOJ equity. This 
decision by the Jamaican government restored to the British 
multinational firm both legal and operational control of the 
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region's largest telecommunications network, and over one of the 
largest companies in the English-speaking Caribbean. In an 
attempt to establish the basis of this equity transfer, I asked 
the Jamaican Minister of Telecommunications and Transport what 
factors accounted for the government's decision. The following 
was his reply: 
"I think it was moreso economic. It had to do with 
foreign exchange constraints and of course the whole 
question of these companies being on the budget. The 
IXF watches these things very zealously. However, if 
the company is owned 51 % otherwise than government, it 
is not regarded as a government entity, although you 
could wield some amount of influence in terms of policy 
and other things. That was a consideration. So I think 
it was a mixture of economic and policy. Policy in the 
sense that you are trying to give yourself more room to 
do what you want to do, without being a burden on the 
budget, or without having to answer too many questions 
to the IMF. " [Interview with Mr Robert Pickersgill 
26/10/89]. 
The Minister's frank explanation of the major factors then 
motivating Jamaica's telecommunications decisions, makes it clear 
that external pressure from western multilateral lending agencies 
such as the IMF were the decisive influences on policy. And, in 
line with similar developments in Trinidad and Tobagor it also 
appears clear that foreign exchange deficiencies derived from the 
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dependent character of regional economies, help to create the 
conditions for this external control. Indeed, within a year of 
gaining its majority control of TOJ, the company acquired the 
remaining 20 of the shares held by government, thereby 
controlling an overwhelming 79% of the merged company by January 
1990. 
These contemporary developments support our contention that 
the dominating influence of the British imperial state on 
Caribbean telecommunications policies during colonialism, are now 
effectively being substituted by the equally dominant external 
influence of western lending agencies like the IMF. They also 
support our argument that now, as then, the leading beneficiary 
of such policies is the foreign multinational company, Cable and 
Wireless. 
Besides benefitting, however, from the factors of internal 
foreign exchange shortage, debt and IMF economic hegemony, the 
resurgence of Cable and Wireless control of the regional 
telecommunications industry can also be accounted for by its 
control over the technology. The company's Regional Marketing 
Manager for the Bermuda and Caribbean area, A. E Fyfe, speaking in 
1989, pointed to the pattern of technological growth experienced 
by the region. "Cable and Wireless has been in the Caribbean for 
120 years. During the firs. t 80 years there was only one service 
(Telegrams). And here we are after all that time with only three 
or four basic services (Telegrams, Telex, Telephony and Data). 
The next couple of years will see us move into some ten services, 
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albeit some are 
Trincom 89: 31). 
(adaptations of) the old services. "[Fyfe in 
In the period when the telecommunications technology was 
mature and familiar, national Post and Telegraph administrations 
in the larger territories were able to acquire and easily manage 
their networks, with only a contracted involvement by Cable and 
Wireless after independence. 
"The history of this period has been that, as emergent 
countries have reached a particular stage in their 
development and have acquired the necessary technical 
and financial resources to do so, they have purchased the 
company's assets and taken over the operation of their 
own telecommunications services. In some cases the 
company has retained an interest as minority shareholder 
in joint companies formed with the governments concernedr 
which may continue for several years. Today the 
geographical spread of the company's activities is much 
reduced" (Select Committee Report, C&W, 1976: xiii]. 
As Fyfe noted, however, the 1980s saw rapid technological 
changes which multiplied the range of services and the very 
scope of telecommunications management. In addition to 
traditional services, Cable and Wireless was able to take 
advantage of advances in micro-electronics, digitalization and 
satellite technology to renew the network and launch a range of 
new services. These include regional voice mail, package switched 
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data services, charging of calls to credit cards, regional toll 
free calling, cardphones, information access and resale, cellular 
radio and paging services, among others. The government-owned 
operating companies were individually unable to keep up with 
either the technology or the investment costs involved in these 
innovations. 
Regional policy-makers were nonetheless, unwilling to forego 
this new technological phase, but were equally unable, for lack 
of the required technical evaluative institutions, to assess what 
elements of the new technologies, were relevant to the basic 
requirements for regional development. In this. situation, and 
faced with IXF pressures and mounting fiscal and foreign exchange 
difficulties, the governments of the XDCs opted, to varying 
degrees, 
'to 
release their equity control over the state-owned or 
partially nationalised operating companies. The response of the 
Jamaican Telecommunications Xinister reflects this resignation, 
and is not untypical of policy-makers elsewhere in the region: 
"Cable and Wireless, as you know, are all over the 
Caribbean and its a company of world renown 
... 
They deal 
in the technology and as such are advantageous. I don't 
want to come across as promoting Cable and Wireless, 
but really, telecommunications moves at such a rate. I 
mean, today you think you have made stridest tomorrow 
its obsolete. " (Pickersgill, Interview 26/10/ 89]. 
The evidence further suggests that, faced with this 
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situation, individual national governments in the region were 
severely constrained in their ability to achieve policy 
self-determination in this sector. Although Trinidad and Tobago 
had by 1990 conceded only 49% of both local and overseas service 
companies to Cable and Wireless, the shareholders agreement 
granted executive management and financial control to the 
minority partner. In the case of Barbados, we have already 
outlined the procedure for headquarters, approval which a former 
C&W General Manager suggests still exists for financial and 
planning decisions by subsidiaries. And in a majority of the 
Eastern Caribbean LDC territories, the company enjoys a 100% 
monopoly. In Jamaica, the Minister points out that "we have 
representatives on the board, plus the chairman, who has to be a 
Jamaican. " But he grants that this offers only a minimal level of 
real input: 
"We have a sufficient amount of 
... 
I don't want to say 
influence, but a certain amount of connection, and 
would know what is happening. But apart from that, in 
the final analysis, the government deals with the 
licence. And we have found that our views are treated 
with great courtesy and with respect and that's really 
all we ask. " 
While supporting, in principle, the use of telecommunications 
for national development, therefore, many Caribbean authorities 
were unable to retain the technical capacity and bureaucratic 
infrastructure to give effect to their aspirations. The 
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privately-owned multinational structure in the region's 
telecommunications system limits the flexibility and scope for 
development-oriented and locally derived policies. this is 
QSJ, 1:)QCially the case while the constituent territories of 
Caribbean seek to operate individual policies. It was not until 
1988/89 that-the CARICOM governments officially recognised and 
accepted that the consequence of their continued fragmentation 
was an increasing marginalization within their own domain. An 
emboldened Cable and Wireless was reported to be making it clear 
that unless it had majority or operational control, it would not 
be willing to continue its programme of investment in the 
region. [Interview, C. M. Thompson, Barbados 5/10/89]. 
With the assistance of the CARICOM Secretariat, a draft 
agreement for the establishment of a regional telecommunication 
organization was circulated in March 1988, but was only 
ratified by ministers responsible for telecommunications in 1989. 
The organization, named the Caribbean Telecommunications Union 
(CTU), began operation from permanent offices in Trinidad in 
1990. The preamble of its charter recognises "the sovereign right 
of each state to regulate its telecommunication system". "the 
growing importance of telecommunications for the social and 
economic development of all states", and "the need to foster 
international co-operation and economic and social development 
among peoples by means of efficient telecommunication services. " 
The objectives, functions, detailed organizational rules and 
structure of the CTU aim to co-relate the "planning, programming 
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and development" of the regional and international networks, 
promote information exchange among PTTs. co-ordinate regional 
standards, harmonize Caribbean positions at international 
conferences, encourage the transfer of technology among member 
countries and foster greater awareness in the Caribbean of both 
telecommunications needs and its importance for the 
socio-economic development of the region. 
8.7 
- 
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
In line with the results of numerous research studies, some 
sectors of Caribbean society recognize the importance of 
telecommunications for regional economic growth, productivity and 
integration. This has been reflected in the establishment of a 
number of regional project utilizing telecommunications inputs as 
a primary part of a public service. However, these projectst 
while surviving, are severely constrained by the lack of adequate 
resources and. co-ordinated planning. At the same time, the use of 
telecommunications for private capital appropriation by external 
multinational interests is on a dramatic path of expansion. Cable 
and Wireless embarked on a plan of increased acquisition of 
equity in national telecommunications companies to complement its 
monopoly control over the regional cable transmission and 
satellite transceiving systems. The company, in association with 
United States corporate interests, controls the major 
data-processing and teleport facility in the region, and has even 
moved into television broadcasting in one territory. 
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The position of Cal4le and Wireless is strengthened, by 
internal weakness, and indebtedness in the region, which were in 
turn 'related both the historically determined structural 
deficiencies, as well as policy failures within the region 
itself* The resulting economic vulnerability is reflected in 
direct control over decision-making by the multilateral 
representatives of western capital, the IMF and World Bank. 
Pressures by these institutions for divestment, of state holding 
is telecommunications has functioned to the benefit of Cable and 
Wireless, whose agenda varies from the development goals of 
regional planners. While new systems and techniques abound in 
urban-based corporate telecommunications, Caribbean rural 
telecoms provisions remain neglected. 
The regional political leadership has taken the first steps 
in improving policy co-ordination, with the establishment of the 
Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU). Its establishment, 
however, comes comes only after the consolidation of a new wave 
of external control of the Caribbean switching and transmission 
network and over the new data services. Given the extensive and 
growing foreign ownership of the telecommunications system, 
long-standing deficiencies in regulation and weak national policy 
planning structures, it would appear that the CTU by itself and 
as currently structured, is unlikely to provide an adequate long 
term response to the challenges facing Caribbean 
telecommunications. Both its limited staffing and financing 
are inconsistent with its wide ranging remit and objectives. 
It could, therefore, become severely constrained by poor 
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resourcing, in the same manner as other important regional 
telecommunications initiatives such as the UWIDITEI CANA and 
CARIBVISION projects were limited. 
In the concluding Chapter which follows, we present our 
final analysis of both the historical and contemporary problems 
raised by the empirical research presented in this study. We 
summarise our findings and conclusions and relate our assessments 
to the theoretical issues discussed, and to the propositions 
posited in the introduction. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
In this concluding chapter, we discuss the findings of our 
overall research in relation to the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapters 1 and 4. We present this final analysis in 
the same structure of the thesis, beginning with a synthesis of 
theoretical arguments and historical data from PART 1, and 
thereafter presenting the conclusions from the remaining 
PARTS. In the first section of this Chapter, therefore, we 
discuss our findings in relation to the proposition that public 
government, in the form of the British imperial state was a 
consistent and key actor in the expansion and growth of British 
private monopoly control of Caribbean telecommunications system. 
We argue further that this system was designed, not just to 
improve imperial political administration of a distant and 
scattered region, but even more directly in support of private 
British capital accumulation in the wider Latin American area. A 
structural consequence of this process has been the distortion 
and duality which developed in the regional economies, and a 
telecommunications system more attuned to the needs of foreign 
capital than to the requirements of regional development. 
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9.1 
- 
THEORETICAL ISSUES: IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT. 
The early contacts between the European capitalist economies 
and the pre-capitalist formations in the colonial periphery were 
aimed at the opening up of new sources of raw materials and 
markets. In order to gain access to these resources, naval 
prowess and military power were among the key early requirements 
of European colonial conquest. By the mid 19th century a part of 
the overseas investment of the British imperialists was directed 
at the establishment in the colonies of telecommunications and 
rail systems, through the co-operative effort of capitalist 
industrial conglomerates and the imperial government itself. 
Citing Britain's introduction of the railway network into 
colonial India, Karl Marx speculated that foreign capitalist 
investments in the infrastructures of colonies would create the 
foundations for industrial development in the periphery, as part 
of the global spread of capitalism over feudal relations [Marx 
1853: 5]. But experience of over a century and half has shown that 
penetration of the colonial peripheries with the infrastructure 
of industrial capitalism was not a sufficient basis for their 
industrialization and even less so for their development. 
Such systems, according to the analysis of Innis, were 
designed not just to facilitate political control, but also as 
part of the supportive appendage to capital accumulation, 
competition and industrial expansion in Europe [Innis 1950: 67]. 
Within the region's colonial economies themselves, however, the 
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pattern of externally induced investment represented by the early 
telegraph companies and later by Cable and Wireless, was 
considered as creating major structural distortions, which 
conflicted with internally logical development goals. "The 
result 
... 
was almost always to create hybrid structures, part 
tending to behave as a capitalist system, part perpetuating the 
features of the previously existing system. The phenomenon of 
underdevelopment today is precisely a matter of this type of 
dualistic economy. " [Furtado 1967: 129]. 
According to the structuralist theories of the dependency 
school, the industrialization of the developed countries and the 
simultaneous underdevelopment in the colonial periphery are seen 
as two aspects of a single global and historical process. In 
economic development, as in the telecommunications sector, the 
industrial countries of Europe used the resources of the colonial 
south to build up their own dominance in technology, capital and 
in the creation of the communications and physical infrastructure 
to meet northern development objectives. This intrinsic 
inequality in the global structure imposed severe limits on the 
economic development of the underdeveloped regions, which can 
only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant 
countries* (Dos Santos 1973: 76]. 
In the inherited telecommunication structures of the 
Caribbean, one of the consequences of this dualistic pattern of 
development was still evident in the neglect of rural, areas and 
the concentration of the network in support of business and 
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government in the main urban centres. - For Johan Galtung,, it 
resulted from a process of 'communications imperialism', in which 
'vertical interactions' operated between urban-based bureaucratic 
and business elites located both in the industrialised capitals 
and in the urban centres of the peripheries. The system permitted 
little or no lateral communications at either poles, and in the 
south, resulted in a lack of integrated development of broadly 
national communications networks. In Galtung's unduly euphemistic 
term, there developed an acute internal disharmony of interest' 
between urban and rural areas. 
It is not surprising, therefore that by the time the 
Caribbean colonies emerged into political independence starting 
in the early 1960s, their telecommunications systems, personnel 
and processes were heavily skewed against national development 
goals and instead, attuned in favour of external multinational 
and colonial objectives. Herbert Schiller describes this process, 
in its wider implications, as one of cultural imperialism, "by 
which a society is brought into the modern world system, and 
... 
its dominating stratum 
... 
attracted, pressured, forced and 
sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond 
top or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating 
centre of the system. " [Schiller 1976: 9]. 
The statistics of global communications disparity and acute 
sparcity of resources and facilities provided in reports from 
UNESCO, the World Bank and the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), map the contours of deprivation in the global south. 
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Reduced to a single statistic in the Caribbean telecommunications 
landscape, the scenario is one in which less than a dozen 
telephone lines are available for each 100 of the adult 
population across the region, with less than a quarter of this 
number existing in the rural areas [Cable and Wireless 1989: 11. 
However, while an holistic approach does describe the 
historical and current global process of structural dependency, 
it does not disclose many of the internal contributory factors to 
such underdevelopment. As we noted with Sunkel in our earlier 
discussion of dependency, "the importance which is attributed to 
external conditions should not obscure the existence of internal 
conditioning structures. " [Sunkel 1973: 14]. This assessment 
supports our own conclusion that in Caribbean telecommunications, 
besides the historically derived external influence, the role of 
internal actors and local circumstances also resulted in 
important negative consequences. The failure of regional and 
national planning authorities to agree on a common code for 
foreign direct investment, the absence of policy guidelines on 
technology transfer as well as outdated and inadequate regulatory 
mechanisms, have combined with genuine internal economic 
constraints to facilitate dependency and external dominance. 
Our discussion of the internal aspect of this colonially 
derived economic duality accords with the analysis of Latin 
American development theorist, Anibal Pinto. In identifying the 
implications of this duality for domestic industrial policyr he 
argued that the uneven internal distribution of the fruits of 
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technical progress accounted for an artificial limitation on the 
size of the domestic market. In Pinto's view , the disemmination 
of technical innovations, especially to the traditional 
agricultural sector, is one route to tackling the problem. He 
calls for far more balance in the allocation of government 
development funding between the urban and the traditional 
sectors, and for less discriminatory fiscal and foreign exchange 
policies against the agricultural sector. His approach is one of 
de-centralization of the tools and benefits of technical 
progress, enabling a wider industrial base for the production of 
capital goods and the development of a wider national market for 
consumer durables and for services such as telecommunications 
[Pinto 1965: 25]. 
The dependency and adverse colonial inheritance to which we 
refer in telecommunications terms, is re-inforced by the British 
political legacy of a state system modelled on Westminister and 
Whitehall, and unprepared to recommend or implement anything but 
incremental changes in policy. The economic and bureaucratic 
elites which dominate policy-making are able to interface easily 
with the external corporate inheritors of colonialism, such as 
Cable and Wireless. 
Together, the local bureaucratic elites and the external 
multinational interests determine policy, because the mass of 
non-elites do not have an adequate grasp of the issues and the 
technical language which often disguises important social and 
Political implications. The political representatives in the 
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local ruling elite, subject to frequent changes, are also poorly 
equipped, and are therefore reactive and not proactive in policy 
formulation. By way of non-decisions or tacit endorsements, the 
policies of the ruling class are implemented or retained. 
It is in this sense that the state, as suggested in the 
marxist model, is regarded as a facilitator of the interest of 
the dominant economic ruling classes. Applied to the Caribbean, 
this represents, in the first place, the protection of the 
interest of foreign capital. Because, as Samir Amin commented, 
the local state, unlike that in the metropole, serves as "the 
instrument of adjustment of local society to the demands of 
worldwide accumulation, whose changing directions are determined 
by changes at the centre. The difference explains why the central 
state is a strong state 
... 
while the peripheral state is a weak 
state. " [Amin 1990: 168). 
In the industrialised global Centre, the state traditionally 
built up a more resilient relationship with internal interest 
organizations, especially those representing the large corporate 
sectors of capital accumulation. "The societies of central 
capitalism", according to Amin, "are characterised by the 
crystallization of a bourgeois national state, whose central 
role 
... 
is to control the conditions of accumulation through the 
national control it exercises over reproduction of labour power, 
the market, centralization of surplus, natural resources and 
technology. The state here fulfills the conditions of allowing 
lautocentric accumulation', that is, subjection of 
... 
external 
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relations to the logic of accumulation.,, [Amin 1990: 169-170]. 
Our research has shown that particularly in the period after 
1850, the British state had begun to develop a strong directive 
relationship with the telegraph industry. While this resulted in 
early government takeover of the INTERNAL British telegraph 
network in 1868, the relationship between the state and the 
OVERSEAS private submarine telegraph operators remained, for the 
next eighty years, one based on mutual co-operation. Government 
negotiation, concessions and subsidies to the private operators 
were granted in return for some state control over global policy 
and major network decision-making. 
This kind of mutually supportive state/company relationship, 
which we identify as emerging in the telecommunications industry 
from as early as the middle of the Nineteenth century, began to 
be described in the period after the Second World War as a 
process of Corporatism, in which the state and private industry 
assumed a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship in the 
interest of the shared objective of capital accumulation and 
economic and political control. [See Schmitter 1974: 93-94; Grant 
1985: 3-4; Cawson 1985: 8-13]. In this relationship, according to 
one analyst, the state moves from a role of supporting capital 
accumulation to one of directing it [Ham and Hill 1984: 41]. 
The concept of corporatism, according to Cawson, combines 
the two key features of functional interest representation, 
and specific modes of state intervention. "It is the combination 
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of these features that is the hallmark of corporatism" [Cawson 
1985: 8]. Cawson distinguishes between macro-level, societal 
corporatism, which sometimes takes the form of tripartism among 
state,, capital- and labour, and meso-level corporatism which- 
"refers to 'the fusion of the processes of interest 
representation, decision-making and policy implementation with 
respect to a more restricted range of issues than the 'system 
steering' concerns of macro-corporatism". Its collective actors 
include Isectoral associations of business interests', among 
others, possessing a logic of influence,, and involving both 
'opportunities and constraints' [Cawson 1985: 11]. 
These attributes of meso-corporatism were readily 
recognizable in the early submarine telegraph sector. Sectoral 
influence and interest representation were reflected in the early 
successful lobbying by the submarine telegraph industry against 
nationalization in 1868 and in 1928. In return, during this 
period, state direction was exercised through the leverage, of 
subsidiesr the granting of licencesr technical and naval SUPPOrtr 
government telegraph contracts and, effectively, the overall 
co-ordination of private cable construction policy in the empire. 
However, the merger between the cable and the wireless 
sectors of the industry which took place in 1928, marked the 
start of an erosion in the corporatist relationship which had so 
empowered imperialist network expansion during the previous 
century. It represented the strengthening of the state to a 
position of power out of keeping with the corporatist requirement 
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of shared power between the main elements of the partnership 
[Grant 1985: 3]. An important contributory factor to this process 
of disproportional state influence was the pressure being exerted 
on the political Centre by the newly emerging independent-minded 
dominion governments of the empire. 
Amalgamation of the industry into the single firm Cable and 
Wireless, altered the nature of the corporatist relationship, 
which temporarily changed from one of meso or industry-level 
corporatism to one of micro-corporatism between the state and a 
single firm. But by 1945, the company was nationalised, conveying 
total control to government and bringing to an end close to a 
century of voluntary interpenetration of the imperial state and 
corporate sectors in the telecommunications conquest of the 
peripheries of the British empire. In the first part of the 
period which followed, the company operated as a state-owned 
multinational corporation until its denationalization in 1981. 
Thereafter it entered its second phase of private multinational 
status. 
It is against this background that we conclude that the 
early close corporatist relationship and later outright imperial 
state ownership, ensured for Cable and Wireless a consolidation 
of its monopoly hold on telecommunications markets in British 
colonial regions, such as the Caribbean, prior to independence. 
These historical conditions structured policy options in the 
sector in favour of the company and in line with the political 
requirements of the British imperial government and in the 
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interest of the large British state bureaucracy which was 
supported by the company. Naturally, the advantages of 
traditional state support were among the major contributory 
factors to the company's global expansion and unbroken 
profitability in the decade since privatization. 
This process, described by- Girvan as one of 'corporate 
imperialism', strengthened the capacity of the imperial state to 
implement its economic and political objectives at home and 
overseas, in agreement with the leading capitalist interests 
[Girvan 1976 : 11-12]. Despite the end of formal colonialism, the 
structural consequences and policy implications of close to a 
century and a half of imperialist control of the region's 
telecommunications, continue to be felt. British dominance of 
the sector was being maintained through the virtual monopoly by 
Cable and Wireless over Caribbean telecommunications. Whereas in 
the past, however, the Foreign and Colonial Office in London 
provided the political and diplomatýic backing, we conclude that 
the company's current expansion in the region was being mediated 
through the policies of western multilateral lending agencies. 
9.2 
- 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EARLY CARIBBEAN NETWORKS 
our research has shown that the very establishment and 
the subsequent expansion of the Caribbean's telecommunications 
network were direct responses to the economic and political 
requirements of British industrial development and the 
empire-building objectives of the imperial centre. 
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Early British government support to the privately owned West 
India and Panama Telegraph Company (WIPTC) formed part of the 
extensive collaborative state/industry relationship in the sphere 
of telegraphy and telecommunications in general, dating back to 
the state sponsorship of the first successful 'private, submarine 
cable venture in 1850. The official justification for state 
support of these privately operated overseas telegraph schemes 
was provided in 1851 by the then British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Palmerston, who noted that "the free use of continental electric 
telegraphs would be of great political advantage to Great 
Britain", for, among other. things, "the rapid conveyance of 
intelligence of a political and military nature from China and 
from our Indian and other possessions. " [From original letter of 
Lord Palmerston, July 4,1851, in Public Records Office, Kew: 
File FO 97/197]. 
In line with this official view, the challenge of improved 
imperial control placed the vast Indian sub-continent among 
the first colonies to receive the internal telegraphic landlines 
and later the submarine cables linking directly to the control 
centre of the empire in London. "Communications", according to 
another representative of the Nineteenth century British imperial 
power structure, "are of the essence of our empire, and unless we 
succeed in solving some of the most urgent problems of more rapid 
communications, it will be almost impossible in the future to 
hold together this vast empire, scattered over the whole globe.,, 
(British General Smuts, in Wilshaw 1939: 107). Innovations in 
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telecommunications were, then, regarded as the critical 
underpinning of the British political, economic and military 
control of its colonial empire. 
Once the technological watershed of establishing - the 
transatlantic submarine cable was achieved in 1866, British 
political and commercial attention became focussed on the 
prospects of penetrating the markets of South and Central 
America, which were in 'danger, of American domination. The 
long-established colonies of the Caribbean, then declining in 
sugar production, seemed a ready-made beachhead for these 
ventures. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the privately-operated 
but heavily government financed company which spearheaded the 
inauguration 'of the first Caribbean telegraph cables, was called 
the West India and Panama Telegraph Company (WIPTC). Established 
on August 9.1869, the WIPTC, while having some private American 
financing, was predominantly capitalised by British investors and 
controlled from London. [See U. K. Companies House File 00011116]. 
It succeeded in establishing the Caribbean's first direct 
telecommunications link with the United States and Britain in 
September 1870, with a stable commercial service in operation 
only in 1875. But, besides linking the British Caribbean 
territories into the transatlantic cable via Floridat the Company 
had the more ambitious- objective of a linkage with Panama in 
Central America and then along the south west Pacific coast to 
Argentina and Montevideo in Uruguay, objectives which received 
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the active financial support of the British government and many 
of the leading entrepreneurs. 
We can conclude, therefore, that the initial linkage of the 
Caribbean region into the emerging global network, was a function 
of wider British economic and geo-political objectives. In 
addition to the advantages which the new cable connection would 
bring to the imperial Centre's task of remote political 
administration of the colonies, it appears that a major motive 
was also the prospect of increasing British multinational 
investment in Latin America. The inaugural West India and Panama 
Telegraph Company's cable link to the region was to be a modern 
means for the. further incorporation of the Caribbean and Latin 
America into a new wave of British capital penetration, in 
competition with the emergent United States. For the dominant 
colonial elites in the Caribbean region itself, however, the 
cable link meant a reduction in their isolation from British 
society and in their insecurity as a privileged cultural and 
economic minority dominating a majority population of 
increasingly assertive black ex-slaves. 
9.3 
- 
THE C&W MULTINATIONAL: EMERGENCE AND DOMINANCE 
In analysing large corporations and the control of the 
communications industries, Murdock identified two distinct but 
compatible approaches. One approach focusses the analysis on the 
actions of the key allocative controllers and personalities 
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involved in the corporate decision-making process. The other 
concentrates on the economic and political structures determining 
corporate actions [Murdock 1982: 124]. Our analysis of the early 
emergence and overall development of Cable and Wireless as a 
multinational corporation finds support in Murdock's argument in 
favour of incorporating both approaches. "A structural analysis 
is necessary to map the range of actions open to allocative 
controllers and the pressures operating on them. But within these 
limits there is always a range of possibilities, and the choice 
between them is important and does have significant effects 
... 
To 
explain the direction and impact of these choices, however, we 
need an action approach which looks in detail at the biographies 
and interests of key allocative personnel and traces the 
consequences of their decisions for the organization and output 
of production. " [Murdock 1982: 125]. 
Ap lied to our study, the structural approach enabled us to Pp 
better appreciate the role of the parent state, Britain, as an 
important external influence on corporate policy within both the 
existing company and its antecedent forms. We have pointed out, 
for example, that the decisions of the 19th century British 
telegraph firms to avoid intersecting certain non-British 
territories with their early cable networks, flowed directly from 
the wider political constraints of imperial trade and investment 
policies. Yet within this, the flexibility for rapid growth and 
expansion of the sector relied heavily on the decisive role 
played by personalities such as the cable manufacturer and 
textiles magnate, John Pender and the wireless innovator, 
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Guglielmo Marconi, and on their relationships with the state 
structure. 
Cable and Wireless PLC represents the imposing end-product 
of this process of expansion and eventual merger between two 
19th century corporate giants, led by these two personalities. 
Their actions, although dictated by the necessities of imperial 
state policy, were nontheless undertaken by Pender and Marconi as 
the foundation for their individual and joint corporate survival. 
The company which they helped to create in the process, became a 
potent symbol of close to a century and a half of British 
pre-eminence in global telecommunications, since the first 
successful submarine cable venture across the English Channel by 
Brett in 1850. 
By 1887, according to Headrick, Britain controlled 70% of 
the world's submarine cablest with lines to the South Atlantic, 
the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific [Headrick 1988: 107]. The majority of companies operating 
this vast global network of cables, while registered as private 
commercial firms, were in reality sustained mainly by subsidies, 
subventions, contracts and technical support by the British 
government itself. 
The passage of the Telegraph Purchase Bill implementing 
state acquisition of the entire British inland telegraph system 
in 1865" released from public resources 8-million in 
compensation to investors in private domestic telegraph 
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companies.. Xuch of these government resources were re-invested 
-in 
overseas submarine telegraph ventures which were not then subject 
to a similar policy of state acquisition [Headrick 1988: 104]. 
For the very outset, therefore, the British state directly or 
indirectly provided the main financial support for 'private' 
overseas telegraph investment, which was to yield significant 
financial and political benefits for the shareholders and the 
political leadership of imperial Britain. 
The financal advantages were spelt out in an article in the 
Times of London which declared in 1869 that : "There can be no 
doubt that the most popular outlet now for commercial enterprise 
is to be found in the construction of submarine lines of 
telegraph. " [Times, August 26,1869, in Barty-King 1969: 291. In 
the political sphere, the advantages to empire of Britain's 19th 
century telecommunications pre-eminance were summarised in 
dramatic terms in an address to the Royal Colonial Institute in 
1887, by a British Member of Parliament, J. Henniker Heaton. He 
viewed the imperial telecommunications network as the 
historically unique feature which would preserve Britain's 
colonial empire from the disintegration which was the fate of 
previous European empires. 
"Now it is often gloomily predicted by purblind 
students of history that this tremendous agglomeration 
must inevitably break up and dissolve, like its 
predecessors. 'Where, ' they ask, are the Greekr the 
Roman, the Spanish, the Napoleonic Empires? What is 
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there in the British Empire to preserve it from the 
fate of these., I venture to reply, that in the postal 
and telegraphic services, the Empire of our Queen 
possesses a cohesive force which was utterly lacking 
in former cases. Stronger than death-dealing warships, 
stronger than the might of devoted legions, stronger 
than wealth and genius of administration, stronger 
even, than the unswerving justice of Queen Victoria's 
rule, are the scraps of paper that are borne in 
myriads over the seas, and the two or three slender 
wires that connect the scattered parts of her realm. " 
(Royal Colonial Institute, Proceedings 1887-88: 172, in 
Headrick 1988: 97-98) 
Despite the historically inaccurate outcome of Heaton's 
optimistic predictions, his confidence in the telecommunications 
technology of the day is an indication- of the political 
importance then ascribed to it. While unable to halt the 
inexorable march of political decolonization, the British 
imperial telecommunications network has survived, however, both 
as a profitable multinational corporation and a support mechanism 
for more modern structures of capitalist appropriation. Its 
Caribbean subsidiary, West India and Panama Telegraph Company, 
was re-named Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited in 1938, a 
name which it has since retained. 
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By 1945,. the British state on whose behalf Heaton spoke? 
took full control of the Cable and Wireless parent company from 
its private sector operators. The political demands of a realm 
threatened by the forces of political de-colonization, 
temporarily superceded the immediate economic interests of the 
capitalist class. Following the Commonwealth Telegraph Conference 
of 1945, the large white dominions, including Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa secured a measure of autonomy in the 
operation of their telecommunications services, which were to be 
operated as national systems separate from that of the empire. 
But the smaller, predominantly black colonies, including those of 
the Caribbean, remained under British colonialism. And control of 
their own telecommunications networks was denied to these 
colonies in favour of continued commercial dominance by the 
state-owned Cable and Wireless corporation. 
In contrast with the large dominions operating closer to the 
imperial Centre, the Caribbean and other smaller colonies were, 
thus, assigned the status of the outer ring of, the colonial 
periphery. Their economic and telecommunications future were the 
subject of only secondary considerations during the formulation 
of imperial policy after 1945. Divested of a role in the large 
dominions, Cable and Wireless was granted control of the systems 
in these regions as a concessionary prize, despite the appeal of 
some regional governments at the time for autonomous 
responsibility for their own telecommunications. 
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The uniform solution across the Caribbean region in the eyes 
of the leading Colonial Office technocrat was continued external 
control: "Generally", he commented,, "I think that Cable and 
Wireless are in a better position to conduct the overseas radio 
telephone services of the colonies than the colonial 
governments 
... 
I think that there would be some advantage in 
having all the staff operating radio telephone services etc. in 
the West Indies under one body, so that the staff are 
interchangeable and visits by superintending officials can easily 
be arranged. " [Memo of J. Megson, Colonial Office, July 14,1944, 
in PRO File CO 937/3/4]. The view of this colonial official 
prevailed, and the future of Caribbean telecommunications was 
bound up with the future of the external, British company, Cable 
and Wireless. 
It was a formula which engendered both an entrenched 
psychological and a protracted structural dependence on external 
inputs as a motive force for national and regional 
telecommunications development. Despite close to three decades of 
political independence, and over 120 years of Cable and Wireless 
operation in the region, the Caribbean continues to be 
increasingly dependent on the capital, technology and management 
expertise of the now privately owned Cable and Wireless company. 
Whereý the colonial Office managed to centrally organize the 
management of Caribbean telecommunications in a single companyl 
Cable and Wireless, regional governments have failed since 
independence to create a technical institution with a broad 
regional scope capable of adequately regulating the sector. 
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9.4 
- 
FOREIGN CONTROL AND THE MODERN CARIBBEAN NETWORKS 
Despite the acquisition of political independence in the 
Caribbean starting in 1962, the neo-colonial significance of J. 
Henniker-Heaton's perception was underlined by one of the 
conclusions of a UNESCO study of communications in the region. 
According to the report of a UNESCO Research team in 1968, the 
British-owned "Cable and Wireless regional network represents the 
telecommunication lifeline of the Region. " [Roppa and Clarke 
1968: 73]. And, as we have already noted, a German broadcast 
specialist based in the Caribbean, Kristian Knaack, speaking a 
further twenty years after the UNESCO team, observed that, in the 
region, "If we talk about telecommunications policies and 
technologies, we talk Cable and Wireless. " [Knaack 1989: 39]. 
Our study has shown that in 1989, Cable and Wireless (West 
Indies) Limited maintained operations under franchise from the 
governments of 15 Caribbean territories. In 9 of these, or a 
majority of the regional territories, the company functioned as a 
monopoly in the provision of both domestic and overseas 
telecommunications services. In five other territories Cable and 
Wireless was the majority shareholder or managing partner in a 
unified national telecommunications entity, including a 79% 
equity ownership in in one of the region's largest companies, 
Telecommunications of Jamaica Limited (TOJ). 
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In addition, Cable and Wireless owns the central 
inter-island digital microwave transmission network and the main 
cable systems and satellite tranceivers into and out of the 
region. Its entry into regional information processing has grown 
into majority equity ownership of the data-processing and 
teleport facility called Jamaica Digiport International (JDI), 
and the company also has monopoly control of a similar but 
smaller teleport facility, and a television relay service, both 
in St Lucia. 
Our interviews with senior Cable and wireless directors and 
staff in the region indicated that while operational 
responsibilities were vested in a majority of Caribbean managersf 
allocational power and corporate policy-making was conducted at 
the company's headquarters in London. This profile of Cable and 
Wireless is consistent with our discussion in Chapter 4 of the 
tendency for MNCs to strive for wholly-owned subsidiaries over 
which they can exercise more decisive control over accumulation 
and intra-firm trade. 
- 
Integration into data processing, 
teleport provisions and television programmes relay were also 
consistent with the efficiency and profitability objectives of 
MNC1s. But so also is the company's concentration on the 
provision of urban-based services directed at the more profitable 
commercial and corporate sectors to the neglect of the less 
lucrative rural areas. 
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In these circumstances, numerous Caribbean government 
officials and members of the non-governmental community have 
voiced the importance of telecommunications for national 
development and regional integration. According to the Minister 
for Telecommunications in Antigua, it was vitally important that 
"telecommunications development is not allowed to be put under 
foreign monopoly control [CANTO Conference Proceedings 1989: 22]. 
And the former President of the Jamaica Telephone Company, Noel 
Ricards, noted that regional telecommunications systems were 
"extremely important and necessary for growth of a country", 
because of their key interlinkage and information distribution 
functions [Interview 26-10-89]. 
Caribbean Heads of Government, in their Kingston Declaration 
of July 1990i recognised the need for modern technologies to be 
deployed towards the internal development agenda of the region: 
"The strengthening of the knowledge base requires a major effort 
in the field of science and technology aimed at finding new and 
improved methods for utilizing the natural resource of the 
Region, and at adapting and utilizing state-of-the-art 
technologies in the production of goods and services. " [in Demas: 
1990: 24]. And, the General Secretary of the Caribbean Conference 
of Churches, Allan Kirton, referring to the power and importance 
of modern communications technologies, urged that the people of 
the region should "join in the quest for a model of development 
which is non-exploitative and especially non-destructive of our 
culture... 11 (Kirton 1987: 4]. 
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These Caribbean responses, affirming the importance of 
telecommunications and technology for regional and national 
development find support in a number of research studies which 
report a positive correlation between telecommunications 
availability and levels of productivity and economic growth 
[Jonscher 1985,1987; Gille, 1985; Wellenius 1988]. Other 
researchers, such as Leff developed a specialised method of 
social-cost benefit analysis which sought to factor in the 
externalities which were inadequately taken into account in 
previous similar studies [Leff 1984]. 
Some analyses emphasised the substantial under-investment in 
telecommunications in Third World countries [Maitland Report, ITU 
1984], and particularly in rural areas [Hudson 1984, Hills 1990]. 
Rural communities, which require more costly extensions to the 
network and which are viewed as less lucrative to private 
investment, were often neglected, in the same way that rural 
communities in the metropole, such as in Britain itself, were 
underserved. In the Caribbean context, the internal periphery of 
the region exists in the form of both the rural areas and the 
less developed countries themselves. Even if the neglect of rural 
communications in industrialised countries takes place to a 
lesser degree than in the periphery, relative conditions appear 
to accord with Galtung's conception of a correspondence of 
interest. Poor telecommunications provisions in rural areas of 
both developed and underdeveloped economies underline the 
priority placed by private network operators on urban centres as 
part of a global system of vertical interactions (Galtung 1981: 
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303). 
Despite the extensively researched advantages of 
telecommunications for national development, other analysts have 
cautioned that applied to issues of integration and rural 
penetration, the concept is not an unproblematic one. According 
to Shields and Samarajiva, "The fact that integration detracts 
from the rights of rural communities to define their development 
priorities is ignored. For example, there is a very strong 
likelihood that improved two-way communication between the city 
and the hinterland may result in the ruin of local traders in the 
short term, and the incorporation of hitherto relatively self 
contained politico-economic entities in the long term [Shields 
and Samarajiva 1990: 205]. 
These key observations have to be taken into account 
particularly where, as in the Caribbean, the integration process 
involves sovereigq states and valuable cultural variation. We 
have pointed out, however, that access to telecommunications can 
help rather that hinder rural communities in defining their own 
development priorities. At a regional level, we have also 
indi-cated the need to recognize that the integration process, by 
its very nature, involves trade-offs in the interest of wider 
collective benefits. 
Our study has shown that despite verbal acknowledgement 
by governments of the importance of telecommunications in the 
process of Caribbean development, it continues to receive low 
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governmental and intergovernmental priority. A number of regional 
projects aimed at harnessing the advantages of telecommunications 
for enhanced Caribbean interaction, education and development 
have encountered severe financial constraints. The University 
Distance Teaching Experiment (UWIDITE), the Caribbean News Agency 
(CANA) and the CARIBVISION Television Programmes Exchange Project 
all have in common both a heavy reliance on telecommunications as 
well as difficulties of adequate regional resourcing. Projects 
such as these would not fall within the commercial and 
income-generating remit of the private multinational regional 
carrier, Cable and Wireless, a fact which underlines an important 
disadvantage of private external control of the regional 
operating companies and the transmission network. 
Recent divestments of government's majority equity interest 
in the national operating company in Jamaica, the granting of 
additional equity and management control in Trinidad and Tobago 
and increased holdings in St Lucia and Grenada have all occurred 
in favour of Cable and Wireless, and as part of a deliberate 
policy by the company to reinforce its long-standing presence 
in the Caribbean. Telecommunications liberalization programmes in 
the United States, as well as in Britain and Japan created new 
space for multinational corporations operating in the Third World 
to renew their drive for take-over of state telecommunications 
enterprises which were nationalised in the immediate aftermath of 
political de-colonization. But the recent strengthening of Cable 
and Wireless control in the Caribbean is also the result of two 
additional related factors. These are the massive increase in the 
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debt burden and foreign exchange liability of regional countries 
and secondly the role of the multilateral lending agencies in 
enforcing the divestment demands of the western industrialised 
countries whose XNCIs stand to benefit. 
During the first two decades after the start of political 
decolonization in the Caribbean, the governments of the more 
developed territories, in response to the pressure of popular 
expectation, began to strengthen regional control over national 
resources. These measures included majority takeover 
foreign-owned telecommunications systems, which meant state and 
local private sector acquisition of a part of the monopoly 
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless. The company was entirely 
nationalised in Guyana, and in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad, 
equity acquisitions in the profitable overseas networks ranged 
from 40 % in Barbados to 51% in Trinidad and in Jamaica, where 
regulatory provisions were made for a programmed increase in 
national ownership. Such acquisitions and provisions were 
feasible propositions in the early 1970s when the basic 
technology of telecommunications was still a relatively stable 
body of knowledge which could be easily acquired and managed. 
In the presentation of our research data, we have indicated 
however, that these initiatives encountered major reversals 
over the last decade. In Jamaica, where Cable and Wireless moved 
from a shareholding in TOJ of 9% in 1987 to 79% in 1990, the 
Minister of Telecommunications and Transport offered the 
following explanation for the latest tranche of sell-offs: "It 
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had to do with foreign exchange constraints and of course the 
whole question of these companies being on the budget. The IMF 
watches these things very zealously. However, if the company is 
owned 51% otherwise than government, it is not regarded as a 
government entity 
... 
That was a consideration 
... 
You are trying to 
give yourself more room to do what you want to do... without 
having to answer too many questions to the IMF. " [Interview: 
Pickersgill, 26/10/89]. 
We have outlined a similar set of circumstances in Trinidad 
and Tobago, where, in a single negotiation in 1989,49% of the 
wholly-owned government telephone company was transferred to 
Cable and Wireless to complement a similar shareholding already 
held by the British company in the overseas carrier. Management 
and financial control to the loss-making local TELCO was also 
conceded, in the face of mounting national debt, foreign 
exchange shortage, and pressures for divestment from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF]. 
In their analysis of the IMF, austerity and the state in 
Latin Americar Petras and Brill have argued that intervention by 
the Fund and its accompanying incentives and contraints have 
altered the economic behaviour of social actors in favour of 
local and international finance capital at the expense of the 
local productive classes. "As an integral part of Western 
capitalism, the IMF has contributed toward re-structuring Third 
World economies, opening them to exports and flows of capital in 
periods of world expansion; extraction and transfer of surplus 
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from the Third World to the West in times of debt crisis; and 
enforcement of economic obligations in times of declining income 
and worldwide economic contraction. " [Petras and Brill 1986: 
425]. 
It was clear that in both the Jamaica and Trinidad cases, 
the policies of the western multilateral lending agencies, 
in particular the IMF and the World Bank, have imposed loan 
agreements tied to programmes of divestment and privatization. 
We conclude that in Caribbean telecommunications, these policies 
have favoured existing, foreign interests, particularly Cable and 
Wireless with its long record of involvement in the region. The 
facilitative function which was historically performed by the 
imperialist state in the era of colonialism, is regarded in our 
analysis as being assumed in the modern period by these western 
multilateral agencies, in their mediating role on behalf of 
private capital between the centre and the periphery. 
"The IMF does not act independently, nor does its symbolic 
representation as an international body signify anything less 
than a political economic instrument for Western capital. The IMF 
is a significant actor, but its effectiveness is based on the 
economic interests it represents and its capacity to fashion a 
policy which effectively defends those interests. " [Petras and 
Brill 1986: 425]. In Caribbean telecommunications, the IMF and 
its counterpart, the World Bank, have performed exactly this role 
in the interest of foreign capital. 
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However, in addition to the pervasive consequences of such 
modern as well as more traditional forms of imperialism, we argue 
that a series of internal factors have also contributed to the 
situation of increasing external dominance over the region's 
telecommunications structures and policies. These factors include 
the absence of an adequately staffed regional institution for the 
co-ordination of telecommunications policy planning. Such 
institutional forms of regional co-operation and self reliance in 
telecommunications could have served to collectively mitigate 
some of the more unacceptable demands of the international 
capitalist system. The absence of established national and 
regional policies has contributed to pragmatic decisions which 
are uninformed by multi-sectoral analyses of the benefits and 
costs of telecommunications in Caribbean development, and of the 
need to retain national control while regulating the flow of 
foreign direct investment in the sector. 
In addition, limited appreciation of the relevant technical 
and industry issues by both the wider public and the elected 
political leadership contributes to a strengthening of the local 
bureaucratic elites and the mostly expatriate technical personnel 
on whom governments rely for policy-making. The situation is 
compounded by an absence of a sufficient number of local 
personnel with the authority and expertise for bargaining in the 
areas of international technology transfer, equipment acquisition 
and trade in services. In addition, the failure to re-examine and 
revise out-dated regulatory policies and institutionst also 
number among the internal issues having a critical bearing on the 
- 
392 
- 
regional telecommunications policy environment. 
The corporate beneficiary of these internal deficiencies in 
planning, negotiation and policy regulation, as well as of the 
external policy impositions has, once again, been Cable and 
Wireless, which profited from similar circumstances during the 
era of colonialism. ' 
However, during the last decade, increasing investment focus 
by American strategic planners associated with the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI) has encouraged competition from leading 
U. S. communications multinationals in the form of alternative 
transmission links such as the Trans Caribbean (TCS 1) fibre 
optic cable into and out of the region. In addition, British 
Telecom International (BTI) has begun to take an active interest 
in the region, wresting away from Cable and Wireless its age-old 
monopoly in Belize in 1988 and contesting, though unsuccessfully, 
Cable and Wireless' franchise in Trinidad and Tobago in 1989. 
These recent developments could represent important 
threats to the protracted monopoly control by Cable and Wireless 
over the region's telecommunications system. But, such 
interventions and impending actions, while holding out the 
prospect of increased diversity within the region, would be 
nonetheless, a quantitative increase in external control. Without 
a regionally-based common strategy for the incorporation of 
telecommunications in Caribbean development planning, such 
additional competition and externally-generated policy 
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initiatives could further enmesh the region in a wider net of 
dependency. 
*** 
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